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Abstract
The study explores the relationship between the strategic objectives of foreign 
firms entering international joint ventures, foreign parent control, and joint venture 
performance in the context of Sino-European IJVs. Using an integrative approach, 
this study incorporates market power, transaction costs, and organisational learning 
theories which provide a more comprehensive understanding of IJV strategic 
objectives. The findings reveal that foreign partners consider market-developing and 
knowledge-acquiring objectives as important and IJV performance in relation to these 
objectives as satisfactory.
This study found different categories of objectives perform differently in IJVs. 
The relationship between parent control and IJV overall performance received strong 
support. Direct and indirect relationships between strategic objectives and IJV overall 
performance are found. The empirical evidence confirms the significant moderating 
effects of parent control on attainment of strategic objectives. The moderating effects 
of parent control do not merely intensify or weaken the relationship between strategic 
objectives and satisfaction in relation to these objectives, but also parent control has 
different moderating effects in relation to different strategic objectives.
Research in international joint ventures is often associated with financial 
problems because of geographical constraints. This study concentrated initially on a 
web-based survey, using a mail survey to increase response rate as needed. The
majority of respondents (87%) completed the questionnaire online. This provides
1
excellent evidence for researchers to make use of web-based surveys in future 
international marketing studies.
Finally, China, as the biggest recipient of foreign direct investment in 
developing countries, seems the logical choice for the analytical context. This 
research thus contributes to the IJV literature on the Chinese experience.
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Chapter Introduction
The first chapter gives a brief historical background of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in China. The objectives of the study and the implications for theory 
and practitioners are given. The research questions of the study are presented. The last 
two sections provide the organisation of the study and a chapter summary.
1.2. Research Background
The world market of today is characteristised by a move towards globalisation, 
escalating capital requirements for research and development, increased sophistication 
of new products and rapid technological obsolescence which shortens the product life 
cycle (Groot and Merchant, 2000). These trends are forcing companies to reexamine 
the feasibility of traditional market development methods and market entry strategies. 
Inevitably, they come to realise that no matter how strong and resourceful is a 
company, there is no way it can have competitive advantage in each and every step of 
the value added process in all national markets, nor can it maintain a cutting edge in 
all the different critical technologies required for the development, production and
marketing of today's sophisticated products. There are tremendous and often 
prohibitive costs, risks and time required in setting up new research, manufacturing 
and distribution facilities. Thus, strategic alliances have become the logical means to 
rationalise operations, to overcome market barriers and to maintain a company's 
global competitive position (Inkpen and Ross, 2001; Chen and Chen, 2002).
Meanwhile, as the growth of markets in developed countries has been slowing 
down, multinational enterprises (MNEs) in developed countries are becoming more 
and more dependent on the growth of developing markets (Child and Faulkner, 1998). 
Given the battle for survival and success at the international level, multinational 
corporations have realised that it is critical to partner with other companies instead of 
attempting to face the growing uncertainty by themselves. Since corporations 
increasingly utilise alliances as tools for attaining strategic objectives, the issue is 
experiencing a corresponding increase in attention from academics and practitioners 
(Berdrow and Lane, 2003).
Companies often take a wide variety of forms to implement cooperative 
strategies. Contractor and Lorange (1988) identified two broad organisational modes 
of strategic alliances: equity and non-equity alliances. Equity alliances are created 
when two or more partners join forces to form a newly incorporated company in 
which each has an equity share and each participates in the decision-making activities 
of the venture (Geringer, 1991). They can range from total acquisition, minority 
investment to joint ventures. In contrast, non-equity alliances are agreements between
partners to cooperate in some way, but they do no involve the creation of new firms, 
or equity transactions. They include unidirectional agreements, such as licensing, 
second sourcing, and distribution agreements, and bidirectional agreements, such as 
joint contracts and technology exchange agreements.
As an intermediate alternative between acquisition (or internal development) 
and dependence on spot market transactions, equity joint ventures represent a special, 
highly flexible means of enhancing innovation or achieving other strategic objectives. 
Although equity joint ventures are particularly difficult to manage (Killing, 1983), it 
appears that, as the necessity for rapid response becomes greater, as business risks and 
costs soar, and competition becomes more severe, firms are relying on international 
joint ventures with increasing frequency (Colvin, 1999; Doz and Hamel, 1998; 
Hopkins, 1999). There is no apparent reason for this trend not to continue.
1.3. Foreign Direct Investment in China
The opening of China's market to foreign direct investment (FDI) in 1979, 
symbolised by the promulgation of Chinese-Foreign Joint Venture Law on July 1, 
1979, signaled the beginning of a new era in the history of China's economic 
development. Until 1991, the amount of both contractual and actual investment was 
small. Most FDI came from small and medium-sized enterprises in Hong Kong and 
was highly concentrated in Guangdong province. Production of foreign-invested
enterprises was overwhelmingly export-oriented and had little link with the domestic 
economy (Naughton, 1996). The "take-off of foreign direct investment actually took 
place in 1992 (see Table 1.1). In the next ten years, annual contractual investment 
increased from US$ 11.977 billion in 1991 to US$ 82.768 billion in 2002, and annual 
actual investment rose from US$ 4.366 billion in 1991 to US$ 52.743 billion in 2002 
(MOFTEC, 2004)
The effects of foreign direct investment became prominent in several 
important respects. A World Bank report indicates that the nature of China's 
economic growth has been both production-driven and input-driven (World Bank, 
1997). Each of these two factors contributed around half of the 9.4 percent annual 
GDP growth rate for the period 1978 to 1995 and is likely to continue to have done so 
after these dates. The input factor is attributed to the significant increase in capital in 
which foreign direct investment played an important role. The share in total exports 
from China contributed by foreign-invested enterprises increased from 16.75 percent 
in 1991 to 52.20 percent in 2002. The share of foreign invested enterprises in the total 
industrial output values increased from 5.29 percent in 1991 to 33.37 percent in 2002 
(MOFTEC, 2004).
Throughout the period of 1979-2002, the Hong Kong Special Administration 
Region (SAR) was the most important source of FDI in Mainland China. Table 1.2 
shows that it contributed 45.14 percent of the total cumulative contractual investment 
and 45.73 percent of the total cumulative actual investment respectively. Other
important sources of FDI include the U.S., Japan, and European Union countries. FDI 
from the United States followed a steady pace of increase from 1992, especially for 
actual investment. Its shares in the total contractual and actual investment increased 
from 4.58 percent and 7.40 percent in 1991 to 9.85 percent and 10.28 percent in 2002 
respectively (MOFTEC, 2004). FDI from the EU followed a similar path. The shares 
in the total contractual and actual investment rose from 6.34 percent and 5.63 percent 
in 1991 to 8.17 percent and 8.27 percent in 2002 respectively (MOFTEC, 2004). In 
addition, in 2004, the EU becomes China's largest trading partner and China becomes 
the EU's second largest trading partner (Xinhua, 2004). The main investors of 
European countries are United Kingdom, Germany, and France. For both the US and 
EU, the amounts of both contractual and actual investment in 2002 were significantly 
higher than the previous peak levels. After 1997, the US remained the second largest 
investor in China.
The relative increase in the investment shares of the US and EU might be 
explained by the following factors (Lai, 2002; Pei, 1996). First, investment aimed at 
the export-oriented labour-intensive manufacturing industry from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan entered a stage of "saturation". Most of the FDI from HK and Taiwan is in 
light manufacturing industries, suggesting that low labour costs represent an 
important motivation behind these investments. By comparison, Western firms 
investing in China appear to be attracted by mainly the growth potential of the 
booming Chinese consumer market (Tse et al, 1997). Second, The South East Asian
financial crisis seemed to have adverse effects on the capital outflow from Hong
7
Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. It will take these countries and areas a period to recover 
from the negative influence. Third, the investment from the US and EU was primarily 
concentrated on capital- and technology-intensive sectors, which started at a relatively 
low level.
8
Table 1.1 Foreign direct investment in China: 1979-2002
1979-1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Total
Number of
Contracts
920
638
2,166
3,073
1,498
2,233
5,945
5,779
7,273
12,978
48,764
83,437
47,549
37,011
24,556
21,001
19,799
16,918
22,347
26,140
34,171
424,196
Contracted
Capital
(100 million US$)
49.58
19.17
28.75
63.33
33.30
37.09
52.97
56.00
65.96
119.77
581.24
1,114.36
826.80
912.82
732.76
510.03
521.02
412.23
623.80
691.95
827.68
8,280.61
Utilised
Capital
(100 million US$)
17.69
9.16
14.19
19.56
22.44
23.14
31.94
33.93
34.87
43.66
110.08
275.15
337.67
375.21
417.26
452.57
454.63
403.19
407.15
468.78
527.43
4,479.70
Sources: Almanac of the Chinese Economy, 1979-2002
Table 1.2 Major Sources of Foreign Direct Investment in China: 1979-2002
Number of Contracted Capital
Contracts (100 million US$) 
(100
Hong Kong
U.S.A.
Japan
Taiwan
Virgin Islands
Singapore
R. O. Korea
United Kingdom 
Germany 
France 
Netherlands 
Cayman Islands
Canada
Malaysia
Other countries
Total
210,876
37,280
25,147
55,691
6,659
10,727
22,208
3,418 
3,053 
2,033 
1,065 
706
6,040
2,538
28,928
424,196
3,738.06
762.82
495.32
614.71
493.48
401.50
274.76
196.33 
143.22 
71.92 
89.75 
94.81
103.77
62.00
630.24
8,280.61
Utilised ~ , Percentage
Capital
%
million US$)
2,048.75
398.89
363.40
331.10
243.88
214.73
151.99
106.95 
79.94 
55.43 
43.38 
380.33
33.58
28.35
293.51
4,479.70
45.73
8.90
8.11
7.39
5.44
4.79
3.39
2.39 
1.78 
1.24 
1.07 
0.85
0.75
0.63
6.55
100.00
Sources: Almanac of the Chinese Economy, 1979-2002
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There are four types of FDI in China: Equity Joint Venture, Contractual 
Ventures, Wholly foreign-owned Enterprise and Cooperative Development (see 
"China's Legal Construction on Foreign Economy and Trade", 1990, p.69). Equity 
joint venture is managed under the direction of a board of directors that is usually 
selected by the investors in proportion to their respective share of equity investment. 
Profits are distributed in proportion to such shares. Contractual venture refers to a 
variety of arrangements between the Chinese and foreign partners stipulated in a 
venture agreement. These terms and conditions spell out the liabilities, rights and 
obligations of each partner. Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprise is a company organised 
by a foreign company using entirely its capital, technology, and management. The 
enterprise manages the operation independently, and is responsible for all risks, gains 
and losses. Cooperative Development is mainly employed in the exploration and 
development of offshore oil resources.
Over the years, Chinese government has made available a variety of channels, 
ranging from wholly owned subsidiaries to licensing, for attracting the inflow of 
foreign capital. Judging from the attention paid by the government in terms of 
legislation and promotion efforts, joint ventures appear to be the most preferred 
channel. This is understandable. In a joint venture, expatriates and local managers 
work together on a long-term basis and the venture offers an excellent environment 
for the Chinese to acquire both physical and organisational technologies from the
foreign partner (Tsang, 1995). Apart from technology transfer, the advantages that
11
China also sees in joint ventures are the addition of foreign exchange to capital 
resources, the contribution from foreign management, the training and development of 
Chinese managerial and technical personnel, and a potential outlet to foreign markets. 
As shown in Table 1.3, Equity Joint Ventures have been the most important type of 
FDI in China. They accounted for 42.91% of total FDI from 1979 to 2002. Teagarden 
and Glinow (1990) note the distinction between equity and contractual joint ventures 
may not be significant. In addition, following past trends, the FDI will most probably 
take the form of joint venture activity and particularly equity joint ventures which are 
the Chinese government's preferred mode of investment from overseas companies 
(Lai, 2002). In this study, therefore, International Joint Ventures (IJVs) in China 
refers to Equity Joint Ventures (this will be further discussed in Section 2.1).
12
Table 1.3 FDI in China by investment types: 1979-2002
Equity Joint 
Ventures
Contractual 
Joint Ventures
Wholly 
Foreign-owned 
Enterprises
Cooperative 
Development
Total
Number 
of 
Contracts
225,883
52,965
145,165
183
424.196
Contracted 
Capital 
(100 million
US$)
3,275.48
1,633.19
3,325.38
46.54
8,280.59
Utilised 
Capital 
(100 million
US$)
1,922.04
827.83
1,656.16
73.64
4,479.66
Percentage
(%)
42.91
18.48
36.97
1.64
100
Sources: Almanac of the Chinese Economy, 1979-2002
The fast-growing Chinese economy has, with its vast market potential and 
wide pool of cheap labour, presented foreign investors with both business 
opportunities and challenges. The primary problems in managing Sino-foreign joint 
ventures appear to stem from the disparate skills and objectives of the partners 
(Makino and Beamish, 1998; Makino and Delios, 1996). Given the potential for 
conflict, control issues are important considerations for partners (Ding, 1997).
Daniels et al (1985) indicated that aside from the size of the Chinese market, a 
major factor influencing the decision to enter China is that many companies already
13
had a substantial presence in most of the rest of the world. Thus, China was 
considered to be their last untapped market (Si and Hitt, 2004). They found that the 
great majority of foreign firms wanted to establish a long-run position in China as a 
potentially strong growth market and as a base within the Asian region. Relevantly, 
the growth of the Chinese market meanwhile presented an interesting and challenging 
opportunity to study international alliances in a new institutional context (Child, 
1990). Many scholars (e.g., Davies, 1994; Lai, 2002; Lu and Wang, 1996; Skenkar, 
1990; Tsang, 2001; Von Glinow & Teagarden, 1988) reported that China was not 
only the largest developing country but also one of the most structurally complex and 
environmentally diverse.
Zhang's (1995) survey has provided an overview of equity joint ventures in 
China. It states that since 1990 around 49 percent of IJVs in China made a profit 
during the period 1991-1993. However, it was also reported that about 70 percent of 
Chinese joint ventures failed within the first five years of operations due to 
misunderstandings between companies having different management styles and 
cultural backgrounds (Charney, 1997). Beamish (1993) found that foreign joint 
ventures still have to face a number of problems which are unlikely to change in the 
near future.
Although research on IJVs in China has been ongoing since the 1980's, Oslan 
and Cavusgil (1996) suggested that it was still at a stage of infancy. The complex and 
dynamic business environment in China makes the management of IJVs an intricate
14
task (Bruijn and Jia, 1993a). For example, although an UV is recognised as an 
international alliance under Chinese law, regulations governing IJVs are not totally 
clear and regional areas do not always follow the laws passed by central government 
(Chen, 1995). In addition, bureaucratic obstacles resulting from the various authorities 
are not unusual and they complicate, for example, both the formation of IJVs and the 
co-ordination with local suppliers (Pan et al., 1995). State-owned Chinese enterprises 
are recognised as having serious limitations as IJV partners, including being slow and 
ineffective at decision making, having too many employees and possessing too much 
obsolete manufacturing equipment. Because IJVs bring together employees from 
different cultural backgrounds, this can also be problematic (Fan, 1996; Teagarden 
andGlinow, 1990).
1.4. Objectives of the Study
Much is yet to be learned about IJVs. As Geringer and Hebert (1989, p.250) 
observed: our understanding of international joint venture management lags behind 
the demand of practice. Foster and Young (1997) stated that research journals have 
barely scratched the surface in the area of business globalisation topics like joint 
ventures. The central research objective of the present study is to investigate the 
relationship between the strategic objectives, control and performance of IJVs in 
developing countries in general, and in China in particular. Specifically, this study has 
three objectives.
15
Research objective 1: To improve understanding of IJVs characteristics 
in developing countries, with a specific focus on China.
Over 70 percent of all IJVs established by MNEs are located in emerging 
markets (Beamish et al, 1997; UNCTAD, 1999). Since conflicting research results 
have been obtained for international joint ventures in developing and developed 
countries (Beamish, 1985, 1993), the study of IJVs in China will have important 
implications for other emerging and non-market economies. As the most important 
newly emerging market economy in the world (Luo, 2001), China seems the logical 
choice for the analytical context. The rapid growth of co-operative arrangements in 
China, an overwhelming majority of which are equity joint ventures, presents a 
challenging opportunity to study international alliances in a new institutional context 
and thus has caught the attention of Western management researchers and 
organisational and management scholars. Although this study uses China as the 
analytical setting, the framework and key components may be applicable to other 
contexts, particularly in the emerging, previously centrally-planned economies. On 
one hand, as Beamish (1993) emphasized, the joint venture process in China is 
different from that in developed countries and different from that in developing 
countries that have market economies. On the other hand, China shares an important 
common legacy with other countries formerly under communist regimes and with 
centrally planned economic systems. Studying the Chinese experience may help our
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understanding of the joint ventures established in the former Soviet republics and East 
European countries. Other Asian communist countries, such as Vietnam, Laos, during 
the last half of 1980s, took some steps toward a Chinese style strategy to absorb 
foreign investment (Pearson, 1990). Given that, this study will contribute to 
enhancing the understanding of IJVs in developing countries such as these.
Research objective 2: To theoretically explore and empirically examine 
strategic objectives of European MNEs when they establish joint ventures with 
Chinese firms, the content and focus of control they exercise over the joint 
ventures, and the performance results.
The empirical results will provide an opportunity to test the generalisability of 
previous findings. This study chooses Sino-European IJVs as the research setting due 
to two main considerations. The first lies in the increasing interaction between EU and 
Chinese businesses. The scale and speed of China's economic growth are making it 
one of Europe's major economic partners. Being one of the European Union's main 
trading partners - ranking fourth in terms of both imports and exports expressed in 
value - China has emerged as an indispensable market for any European multinational 
enterprise. As a leading recipient of foreign direct investment in the world, China 
benefited from IJVs more than any other nation during the 1990's (Beamish, 1993; 
United Nations, 1999). EU business, one of the largest foreign investors in China, has 
used joint ventures frequently when investing in China. Second, a systematic
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investigation of Sino-EU IJVs is now extremely promising since these ventures are 
believed to have passed the initial experimental phase (Hubler and Meschi, 2001). 
Since China launched its Open Door Policy in 1979, United Kingdom, Germany, and 
France have persisted in seeking opportunities and already have made significant 
investment in China (ChinaFDI, 2001). Of the studies that have examined the IJVs in 
a Chinese context, most have focused on either North American multinationals or 
other Asian countries, such as Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong (e.g., Child, 1990; Child 
and Lu, 1996; Child and Yan, 1999; Yan and Gray, 1994, 2001; Hu and Chen, 1993; 
Daniels et al, 1985; Ding, 1997; Beamish, 1993; Wang et al, 1999; Isobe et al, 2000; 
Si and Hitt, 2004). A few scholars who have studied Sino-European joint ventures 
have examined them from the stock reaction perspective (e.g., Hubler and Meschi, 
2001; Meschi and Cheng, 2002).
Research objective 3: To examine the relationship between strategic 
objectives, IJV control and performance.
No existing research evidence shows links between partners' strategic 
objectives and IJV control. However, it is reasonable to believe that the objectives 
have considerable importance on choices regarding extent and focus of control. Little 
research has been directed at the questions related to what controls are and should be 
used in IJVs. Geringer and Hebert (1989) argue that the IJV managers receive little 
guidance about when and how to use control. In addition, previous research on the
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relationship between IJV control and performance has produced inconclusive results 
(Beamish, 1993; Calantone and Zhao, 2000; Chalos and O'Connor, 1998; Killing, 
1983; Kogut, 1988b; Lecraw, 1984; Yan and Gray, 1994). Inconsistencies in the 
empirical findings suggest that further research is needed to understand the 
relationship between control and joint venture performance. With respect to the 
theoretical issues of interest here, little research has been reported yet on the 
relationships between strategic objectives and performance in IJVs. Foreign partners' 
control over joint ventures is greatly influenced by their strategic intentions in 
developing countries. It is instructive from both a theoretical and practical perspective 
to explore how strategic intention is related to performance in IJV. The research 
findings of this study will be beneficial for those expatriate managing directors 
working in international joint ventures. It also will be useful for firms that are going to 
establish joint ventures in developing countries, and will provide some insights into 
the formulation of their control strategy.
1.5. Research Questions
This research centers on the exploration of questions as below:
1). What are the strategic objectives of European MNEs for engaging in 
joint ventures in the People's Republic of China?
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2). To what extent has the performance of the joint venture met the foreign 
partners' expectations?
3). Through establishing Sino-European IJVs, do any strategic objectives 
outperform others? hi other words, is joint venture more suitable to achieve certain 
strategic objectives than others?
4). Regarding the specific strategic objective, to what extent does the control 
exercised by the foreign partner over joint venture affect the attainment of the foreign 
parents' objective?
5). To what extent do strategic objectives, parent control, and IJV overall 
performance relate to each other?
6). Is there a relationship between parent companies' satisfaction with 
objective achievement and parent's assessment on IJV overall performance?
Specifically, the first three research questions will attempt to fulfill research 
objective 1. The fourth research question will address research objective 2. And 
research objective 3 will be investigated by research questions 5 and 6.
1.6. Organisation of This Study
Chapter One begins with a historical introduction about Chinese FDI. Then the 
objectives of study and research questions are presented. The last section presents the
organisation of this thesis.
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Chapter Two contains an overall literature review and is divided into seven 
sections. The first and last sections are chapter introduction and summary respectively. 
The second section briefly reviews relevant literature on international joint ventures. 
Section three discusses the strategic objectives of international joint ventures. Based 
upon transaction cost, market power, and organisational learning theory, three 
categories of strategic objectives are identified. Section four deals with the 
conceptualisation of parent control, and distinguishes three dimensions of IJV control. 
Section five evaluates the IJV performance. The differences between subjective and 
objective measurement, from parent or joint venture perspective to evaluate joint 
venture performance are addressed. The sixth section examines the relationship 
between management control and performance. The superiority of dominant parent or 
shared management joint ventures is discussed.
Based on the literature review in Chapter Two, Chapter Three proposes the 
research framework and several testable hypotheses. Chapter Four outlines the 
methodology employed in the study. The general design of the study is given, and the 
target population is defined. Data collection procedures and the selection of 
respondents are clarified. The measurements for dependent and independent variables 
are described. The data analysis technique is also discussed. Chapter Five presents the 
analysis and findings of this study. In the final chapter, implications and contribution 
are discussed. The potential limitations of this study are given and future research 
directions are suggested.
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1.7. Chapter Summary
IJVs have increased significantly in popularity in recent years as firms find 
themselves under more pressure to expand internationally, to be competitive. A 
significant development in the 1980s that contributed to the trend of global integration 
of international business was the opening up of traditionally centrally planned 
economies, most notably China, Eastern European countries and the former Soviet 
Union. These economies have presented foreign investors with both business 
opportunities and challenges.
Taking Sino-European international joint ventures as a research setting, this 
study will empirically explore the relationship between IJV strategic objectives, 
control and performance in developing countries in general, and in China in particular. 
The presented research framework incorporates the three constructs for further 
theoretical as well as empirical investigation.
Chapter Two now examines the extant literature on international joint ventures.
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Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Chapter Introduction
This chapter reviews previous studies on joint ventures, particularly the 
relevant research on the key variables and their relationships contained in the 
theoretical framework in figure 3.1. The chapter is divided into the following sections: 
1) introduction to international joint ventures; 2) IJVs strategic objectives, which, 
based upon three main theoretical strands, are categorised as efficiency-seeking, 
market-developing, and knowledge-acquiring objectives; 3) parent control, where 
management control is conceptualised, and two different levels of control are 
identified: strategic and operational control; 4) IJV performance, where subjective and 
objective measurement, as well as from parent or joint venture perspective are 
compared; 5) relationship between control and performance, where two main streams 
of arguments about this relationship are presented. The final section is a summary of 
the chapter.
2.2. International Joint Ventures (IJVs)
The definition of a joint venture adopted in this paper is essentially that of
Mariti and Smiley (1983), which defines a joint venture as: an agreement in which
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two independent legal firms establish a third independent legal firm. Furthermore, the 
definition of the term international in the context of joint ventures as used in this 
paper is based on that of Geringer and Hebert (1991), i.e. at least one parent firm has 
their headquarters outside the TVs country of operation or there is a significant level 
of operational activity taking place in more than one country.
The reality of global competition today is that few companies possess all of 
the competitive advantages that would enable them to be successful internationally. 
For firms in industrial countries, prospects for future growth are increasingly seen as 
being disproportionately in developing parts of the world, not in more familiar 
markets in the developed nations. But, for a variety of reasons, doing business in 
developing countries is viewed as being considerably riskier, to be approached with 
much more caution (Buckley and Casson, 1996). Similarly, developing country 
markets are becoming much more open to international competition, providing both 
opportunities and dangers for domestic companies. To meet these challenges, 
managements are attempting to position their firms to become more competitive. Thus 
from the perspectives of both industrial and developing country companies, the 
evolving global market calls for change from past competitive practices. For this 
reason, many company managements now attempt to complement their firms' 
strengths through alliances with other companies. These alliances, many of which are 
JVs, represent a complicated process of identifying one's own strengths and 
weaknesses, setting forth clear strategic directions, and then endeavoring to match
these directions with those of another company (Harrigan, 1988a).
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Since 1980s, the employment of the joint venture both locally and 
internationally has increased remarkably (Buckley and Casson, 1996; Harrigan, 1988b; 
Hergert and Morris, 1988; Lyles and Baird, 1994). JVs have vital strategic importance 
for international business and their significance is growing (Beamish and Banks, 1987; 
Harrigan, 1987c; Buckley and Casson, 1996). The emergence of an intense 
competitive environment changes both the motivation for and the pattern of foreign 
direct investments. It also creates the need for more flexible production and marketing 
systems, the reorganisation and restructuring of value-added activities, and a new 
form of organisation. The value-creating benefits of joint ventures are many. For 
instance, JVs are referred to as strategic weapons for competing within an 
organisation's core markets and technologies (Harrigan, 1988); a means to cope with 
technological challenges (Isobe et al, 2000), and environmental uncertainty (Mjoen 
and Tallman, 1997); to achieve economies of scale (Killing, 1983); to access 
additional skills and resources (Mjoen and Tallman, 1997); to lower political and 
business risks (Merchant, 2000); to facilitate organisational learning or knowledge 
acquisition (Berrell et al, 2002; Makhija and Ganesh, 1997); and to lower costs of 
labour, transportation, overhead, and taxes (Datta and Rasheed, 1993).
Full acquisition is preferred when the opportunity cost of delaying entry is 
high (e.g. in high growth industries). However, full acquisition dulls the motivation of 
the acquired management team and increases management costs. Child and Faulkner 
(1998) contend that a partial acquisition (JV) is desirable when large differences in
corporate culture exist. While acquisitions are generally the favoured mode of
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expansion into developed country markets, cooperative forms such as joint ventures 
tend to be the most prevalent in emerging economies (Harrigan, 1988a). This is partly 
a result of host-government preferences for local firms to share in the ownership of 
foreign-funded ventures in the expectation that such participation will increase their 
opportunities to acquire new technology, management skills, and other expertise. It 
also reflects a frequently found preference among foreign investing companies to 
reduce their exposure to risk, and to seek the assistance of a local partner in 
navigating through an unfamiliar environment. Similarly, Kogut (1988b) considers 
that joint ventures are formed to achieve synergy through combining complementary 
partners. International joint ventures are formed to improve a firm's competitive 
positioning within the global marketplace. In order to accomplish this objective, 
parent firms attempt to create synergies through combining resources, capabilities and 
strengths (Dymsza, 1988). Local partners, particularly those from developing 
countries, benefit from the technological know-how, management skills, and capital 
brought in by their foreign partners (Kim, 1996). MNEs depend on local partners' 
knowledge and networks in the host country to reduce risks and increase revenue.
Beamish (1985) summarises the differences between JVs in developing and 
developed countries according to eight characteristics: reasons for creating the JV; 
frequency of association with government partners; ownership level; ownership- 
control relationship; control-performance relationship; number of autonomously 
managed ventures; instability; and performance. However, this study was conducted
before the real proliferation of JV in developing countries, especially in the former
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centrally planned economies. After examining the characteristics of JVs in China, he 
added four additional characteristics (Beamish, 1993): origin of investment; number 
of proposed joint ventures actually enacted; use of JVs versus other modes of 
involvement; and use of JVs with a predetermined duration. He argues that IJVs 
formed between developed and developing country partners demonstrate 
characteristics that contrast with those in developed country IJVs.
Joint ventures between domestic companies in developing countries and 
foreign companies have become a popular means for both managements to satisfy 
their objectives. They offer an opportunity for each partner to benefit significantly 
from the comparative advantages of the other. Local partners bring knowledge of the 
domestic market; familiarity with government bureaucracies and regulations; 
understanding of local labour markets; and possibly, existing manufacturing facilities 
(Yang and Lee, 2002). Foreign partners can offer advanced process and product 
technologies, management know-how, and access to export markets. For either side, 
the possibility of joining with another company in the new venture lowers capital 
requirements relative to going it alone (Yan and Gray, 1992). This highly 
complementary nature of skills, capabilities and resources possessed by the partners 
suggests that neither partner is fully capable of managing the joint venture 
independently of the other.
Despite their potential, IJVs have earned a notorious reputation of being the 
Trojan horses of business transactions in that they provide an opportunity for internal
27
attack and parental disputes (Beamish, 1985; Hennart et al, 1999; Janger, 1980; 
Killing, 1983; Lewis, 1992; Urban and Vendemini, 1992). IJV failure has often been 
attributed to the complexities of managing the alliance (Datta and Rasheed, 1993). 
IJVs lessen individual control, and can be slow in their responsiveness to 
environmental dynamics due to the complexity of joint management (Killing, 1983). 
Partner firms run the risk of creating new competitors, damaging their original firm's 
reputation, and eroding their technological base (Gomes-Casseres, 1989).
Reported joint venture failure rates range from 36 to 70 percent (Geringer and 
Hebert, 1991; Killing, 1983, Levine and Bryne, 1986). Groot and Merchant (2000) 
argue that IJV failure rates are probably even higher than are those for domestic TVs 
because IJVs generally face greater challenges. For example, many IJV partners must 
monitor operations in settings with which they have little familiarity (e.g. markets, 
distribution systems, and legal systems); they must often cope with significant 
geographical separation and time differences; and they must bridge cultural 
boundaries.
Harrigan (1988a) summarises eight reasons why joint ventures failed: 1) 
partners could not get along; 2) their markets disappeared; 3) managers from disparate 
partners within the venture could not work together; 4) managers within the venture 
could not work with owners' managers; 5) what was thought to be good technology 
from one partner did not prove to be as good as was expected; 6) owners that were to 
contribute information or resources could not get their personnel down the line to
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deliver what had been promised; 7) partners simply reneged on their promises to 
deliver on their part of the agreement; or 8) other reasons destroyed partner's 
cooperative spirits (p. 181).
The increasing use and strategic importance of joint venturing, as well as the 
unfamiliar complexity, point to the need to know more about how to effectively 
implement this cooperative strategy option.
2.3. IJV Strategic Objectives
2.3.1. Previous Studies on IJV Strategic Objectives
International joint ventures have been characterised as mixed motive games 
between their parents who simultaneously cooperate and compete (Hamel, 1991; Lax 
and Sebenius, 1986). Foreign parents frequently choose the IJV vehicle not because 
they believe it will be easily managed, but because they perceive it will better serve a 
wider array of their objectives (Shenkar, 1990). Partner strategic objectives offer a 
logical starting point in analyzing the interest of potential creators of joint ventures, as 
it is these objectives that bring the partner together. They also offer a means of 
accounting for how the joint venture fits into each partner's long-term strategies.
On the one hand, the overall strategic objectives of IJV parents are the pooling 
of resources to create value in a way that each of the parents could not achieve by 
acting alone (Borys and Jemison, 1989). Value creation refers to the process of
29
combining the capabilities and resources of the partners to perform a joint task that 
has the potential to create monetary or other benefits for the partners. Although the 
perceived value to each of the parents need not be the same, each joint venture parent 
must gain some benefits for a joint venture to be the preferred option (Porter and 
Fuller, 1986). On the other hand, they compete with each other to achieve their own 
agenda, as dictated by the law of opportunism (Kogut, 1988a).
A variety of reasons have been suggested to explain foreign parents' motives 
for forming IJVs (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Daniels et at, 1985; Glaister and 
Buckley, 1996; Harrigan, 1986; Hennart, 1991; Kogut, 1988b; Lin, 1997; Yang and 
Lee, 2002; Young et al, 1989; Zhang, 1997). Regarding the issue of a firm strategic 
objective for forming an IJV, Friedmann and Kalmanoff (1966) pointed out in their 
pioneering work that economic benefits are likely to be the major motivation for a 
firm entering a joint venture.
Kogut (1988b) summarised the motivations for forming a joint venture under 
three considerations: transaction costs which deal in particular with situations where 
there would be small number bargaining, high asset specificity and high uncertainty 
over specifying and monitoring performance; strategic behaviour which addresses 
how a joint venture may enable competitive advantage to be developed in the joint 
venture that had escaped each of the partners operating alone; and knowledge transfer 
that depends upon the setting up of a joint venture in order to transfer tacit knowledge. 
The three motives for joint ventures identified by Kogut are claimed by him to be
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quite distinct although sometimes overlapping. In any specific case, a firm is likely to 
have multiple motives for an alliance.
Transaction cost analyses joint ventures as an efficient solution to the 
hazards of economic transactions, strategic behaviour places joint ventures in 
the context of competitive rivalry and collusive agreements to enhance market 
power. Finally transfer of organisational skills views joint ventures as a 
vehicle by which organisational knowledge is exchanged and imitated ... 
(Kogut, 1988b: 323)
Harrigan (1986) grouped the reasons for engaging in IJVs under three broad 
categories: internal; competitive; and strategic action. Within each of the three broad 
categories, she enumerated more specific actions to explain why firms opt for IJVs. 
Internal reasons refer to: spreading costs and risks; safeguarding resources, which 
cannot be obtained via the market; improving access to financial resources; benefits of 
economies of scale and advantages of size; access to new technologies and customers; 
access to innovative managerial practices; encouraging entrepreneurial employees. 
Competitive reasons refer to: influencing structural evolution of the industry; pre- 
empting competitors; defensive response to blurring industry boundaries and 
globalisation; creation of stronger competitive units. Strategic actions refer to: 
creation and exploitation of synergies; transfer of technologies and skills; 
diversification.
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Contractor and Lorange (1988) provided an objectives/benefits approach to 
address a firm's strategic objectives for setting up an IJV. They indicated that IJV 
formation can generate a variety of benefits through achieving at least seven 
overlapping objectives. These objectives are: 1) risk reduction; 2) economies of scale 
and production rationalisation; 3) exchanges of complementary technologies; 4) co- 
opting or blocking competition; 5) overcoming government-mandated trade or 
investment barriers; 6) facilitating initial international expansion of inexperienced 
firms; and 7) vertical quasi-integration advantages of linking the complementary 
contributions of the partners in a value chain.
By examining the motives and fundamental objectives of strategic alliances 
between Canadian firms and Asia newly industrialised countries (Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan), Hung (1992) found the most important motive 
of Canadian partners is to gain access to local market. Other motives which have 
some importance are to share business risk, overcome trade barriers, minimise capital 
investment, and share regional markets. These findings support the contention that 
many Western companies enter into strategic alliances to avoid investment, and are 
more interested in reducing the costs and risks of entering new markets (Hamel et al, 
1989).
From the country of origin perspective, the strategic objectives of developing 
and developed countries contain both similarities and variances. By examining 94 
strategic alliances (74 percent are IJVs) between UK firms and partners in Western
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Europe, the United States and Japan, Glaister and Buckley (1996) found the most 
important strategic objectives of foreign partners are: the desire to gain a presence in 
new markets; to enable faster entry to the market; to facilitate international expansion. 
The result indicates that the often concerned risk reduction motivation appears not to 
be particularly important. A similar survey had been conducted by Glaister and Wang 
(1993) on twenty-one Sino-UK joint ventures. The most important strategic factor 
here was to gain faster entry to the market, followed by the use of the joint venture to 
facilitate international expansion, to conform to host government policy. Their 
findings reveal that the British firms are more concerned about market-related factors 
when they invest in China. The main motivating factor for joint venture formation is 
faster entry to the market. Joint ventures allow British firms access to largely 
intangible inputs which non-domestic firms would find difficult to develop.
As global competition dictates that MNEs diversify not only geographically in 
order to accrue the location advantages such as inexpensive labour and access to raw 
materials, but also from an ownership perspective to gain entry into historically 
blocked markets deemed critical to longer term growth objectives, attention is being 
turned to emerging country markets (Kashlak, 1998). In a survey of US firms 
investing in China, Daniels et al (1985) found that the great majority wanted to 
establish a long-run position in China as a potentially strong growth market and as a 
base within the Asian region. They did not see short-term profit as a major objective 
and even less emphasis was placed on low-cost sourcing. International joint ventures
fit into parent company's overall strategy to increase its international market share.
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Consequently, the company does not push for overnight growth in profits. Partner 
firms from Western Europe, Japan, and the USA all tended to include in their top 
three objectives and expectations that the cooperation would gain them a strategic 
position in China against their competitors, give them access to the Chinese market, 
and afford a good opportunity for long-term profit.
By contrast, many partners from Hong Kong have looked for more immediate 
profits for their Chinese ventures through low-cost unskilled labour and land which 
had become a scarce resource in their own territories. Partners from Taiwan and 
Singapore also generally conformed to this pattern on priority objectives (Child et al, 
1990; Luo, 1998; Rajan and Pangarkar, 2000; Wang et al, 1999). In a survey of sixty 
Sino-foreign joint ventures, Lin (1997) found that while Japan, the United States, and 
other Western investors pursue their market expansion strategy in China by investing 
in capital-intensive, high-technology, import substitution projects, investors from 
Hong Kong tend to favour the resource-seeking strategy and concentrate mainly on 
export-oriented, processing/ assembling operations. The Hong Kong partners are 
more concerned with 1) using cheaper production factors, 2) seeking favourable 
policies, and 3) exploiting Chinese market.
Through a case study on China Motorola, Yang and Lee (2002) offer some 
further insights. While the primary objective for multinational corporations to invest 
in China is to overcome potential trade barriers with local production plants so as to 
open China's huge market, their Chinese partners seek foreign investment for a joint
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venture business so that their MNE partners will bring in the production technologies 
which normally are in relatively more advanced stages and thus to improve the local 
plants' R&D capability through system installation, maintenance, and employee 
training programmes. Another recognised objective for those multinational 
corporations which expand their current production techniques into their newly-built 
Chinese facilities is to prolong the competitiveness of existing production technology, 
while reducing the financial risks through diversifying their production facilities in 
worldwide locations. Such efforts are just what their Chinese partners looking for 
global allies (who have sufficient financial resources) in worldwide competition 
expect.
In another recent in-depth study of Sino-British joint ventures, Yan and Child 
(2002) find that for a statistically significant 18 out of 20 IJVs, the British partners 
prioritise "market-related" strategic objectives in running IJVs, focusing particularly 
on the establishment of a strategic position in China vis-a-vis competitors, the 
acquisition of local market knowledge and the understanding of local management 
practices. Many British respondents suggest that running joint ventures in China is 
one method of developing their global business portfolio.
2.3.2. An Integrative Approach to Study IJV Strategic Objectives
One of the purposes of this paper is to explore the strategic objectives of
foreign firms which adopt joint ventures to enter Chinese market. For this purpose,
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based upon Kogut's (1988b) conceptual framework, this study integrates three main 
theories: market power, transaction costs economics, and organisational learning 
theory.
Market power theory addresses IJV formation from a market development and 
benefits perspective, whereas transaction costs theory underpins the efficiency and 
costs saving perspective. Market power posits that firms try to maximise profits 
through improving market power. Transaction costs theory posits that firms choose 
the mode which can minimise the sum of production and transaction costs. The 
establishment of a joint venture may stem from market motivations and in fact, may 
present a more costly, but more profitable alternative to other choices. The 
organisational learning perspective posits that a firm seeks knowledge through IJVs 
that it considers lacking but vital for the fulfillment of its strategic objectives. While 
market power and transaction costs provide economic reasons for joint venture, 
organisational learning offers an explanation outside of economic rationality. 
Therefore, the three theories are not competing explanations of international joint 
ventures, but address the same issue from different perspectives. Together, they serve 
as the theoretical foundation for the hypotheses development which follows.
The choice of the integrated approach is essential since the integrative 
approach permits us to obtain the most realistic description (Andersen, 1997). Parkhe 
(1993) argues that a generally accepted and unifying theory in IJV studies is still 
largely absent. Using both transaction costs and the resource-based view to examine
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the rationale for IJV formation, Glaister (2004) recently provided empirical evidence 
that together both perspectives can provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
the benefits of international joint ventures. In addition, the real Chinese business 
environment is so complicated that no single approach can capture all the key factors 
that affect the decision of entry (Child and Faulkner, 1998). These three theories 
collectively offer greater explanatory power than any single one in describing the 
underlying strategic objectives of MNEs' entry into China.
Dunning's (1988, 1990) eclectic paradigm classified FDI motivations into four 
types: resource seeking, market seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic asset 
seeking. Resource-seeking investments are made to capitalise on natural and human 
resources present in the country of investment. Market-seeking investments are aimed 
at exploiting the host country's market. Sequential investments made by already 
established affiliates aimed at increasing the efficiency of their activities by 
integrating assets, production and markets the better to exploit economies of scale and 
scope are called efficiency-seeking investments. Finally, strategic asset-seeking 
investment seeks to acquire resources and capabilities that an investing firm believes 
will sustain or advance its core competences in regional or global markets. Using 
Dunning's classification as a basis, this study concentrates on three categories 
strategic objectives of foreign parents in forming IJVs: market-developing (similar to 
Dunning's market seeking), efficiency-seeking, and knowledge-acquiring (similar to 
Dunning's strategic asset seeking). Dunning's fourth category (resource seeking)
relates to a traditional motive for IJV investment and, although not a primary category
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of interest in this research, given the three theoretical strands which form the 
theoretical framework, is nevertheless represented in the survey through specific 
questions in the questionnaire.
As far as Sino-European UVs are concerned in this study, the objectives in the 
three categories are chiefly incorporated from four influential empirical studies on 
Sino-foreign UVs (see Table 2-1). From a very practical perspective, Harrigan (1987) 
offered a highly comprehensive list of IJV motivations at an early stage of 
international joint venture studies. Contractor and Lorange (1988) also provided a 
conceptual masterpiece in terms of IJV strategic objectives. Their works were referred 
to in numerous IJV studies (e.g. Beamish, 1993; Buckley and Casson, 1996; Ingmar 
and Fan, 2002; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Petrovic and Kakabadse, 2003). Glaister 
and Buckley (1996) thoroughly examined IJV strategic objectives of international 
joint ventures where both IJV partners are from developed countries. Yan and Child 
(2002) recently investigated strategic objectives formed in UVs between developing 
and developed countries, especially, Chinese and Western partners. The objectives in 
each category are somewhat overlapped. They are refined and incorporated for further 
empirical examination.
Concerning the market-developing category, several objectives have been 
investigated in the four studies, such as to overcome trade barriers, preempt 
competitors, faster entry to market, overcoming government mandated trade, co- 
opting or blocking competition, etc. After integrating these objectives, three market-
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developing objectives are generated which will be empirically examined in this study: 
1) entering market fast, 2) managing competition, and 3) overcoming governmental 
barriers.
Similarly, in the efficiency-seeking category, many items are stated, such as 
obtain financing and resources, share cost and risk, create and exploit synergies, 
spread risk of a large project, gain access to a new market, gain a strategic position in 
China, etc. These have been integrated into three efficiency-seeking objectives, which 
will be examined in this study: 1) exploring global synergy, 2) spreading financial risk, 
3) avoiding political uncertainty.
On the knowledge-acquiring aspect, the four studies examined diverse 
objectives: to learn how to do business in China, technology exchanges, market 
knowledge, create innovative managerial practices, and perform technology or skills 
transfer. It is noted that some strategic objectives for establishing IJVs in developed 
countries might not be as applicable in the emerging countries context. For example, 
R&D IJV prevails in developed countries. But the R&D activities of MNEs are 
primarily undertaken by headquarters and only mature and widely distributed 
products and technologies are transferred to the developing country (Shama, 1995). 
Hence, R&D usually is not considered as a motivation when MNEs set up joint 
ventures in developing countries. This study identifies two learning objectives for 
foreign partners in IJVs: 1) acquiring country-specific knowledge, 2) acquiring local 
market knowledge.
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The following three sections illustrate these theories and strategic objectives in 
detail.
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2.3.3. Market Power Theory and IJV Market-Developing Objectives
International market power theory offers several insights into cooperative 
strategy, one of which is that greater market power, with consequently enhanced 
returns, can be attained through collaborating. It regards joint ventures as a form of 
defensive investment by which firms deter entry through preempting competition, and 
enhancing market power in the context of competitive rivalry and collusive agreement 
(Kogut, 1988b).
Hymer (1972) applies market power theory to the study of cooperative strategy 
when distinguishing offensive from defensive coalitions. Offensive coalitions are 
intended to develop firms' competitive advantages and strengthen their position by 
diminishing other competitors' market share or by raising their production and/or 
distribution costs. Porter and Fuller (1986) support Hymer's argument by 
demonstrating that offensive coalitions can have a negative effect by reducing the 
partners' adaptability in the long run. Defensive coalitions, on the other hand, are 
formed by firms to construct entry barriers which are intended to secure their position 
and stabilise the industry so as to increase their profitability. These may also be sought 
by firms that have a relatively weak position in the market in order to defend 
themselves against a dominant player. Moreover, cooperation can emerge when 
partners have different intentions simultaneously.
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Child and Faulkner (1998) argue that firms can improve their competitive 
success by securing stronger positions in their markets. International marketing 
management literature also emphasizes that firms seek to maximise long-term profits 
through their competitive position vis-a-vis rivals (Terpstra and Sarathy, 1994). One 
way firms attempt to accomplish this is by aggressively gaining access to new markets 
and expanding market share in international markets. Furthermore, immediate access 
to a large market can be especially important since product life cycles become 
increasingly short and the rate of technological innovation accelerates. Expected sales 
are dependent on both market size and the length of time over which the product is 
sold in these markets (Hladik, 1988). Joint ventures become an important means of 
attaining an initial presence in new product markets that may be of long-term strategic 
importance to the firm.
Linking with host-nation firms to facilitate access to new markets is a major 
reason for firms to form IJVs (Dunning, 1988a; Harrigan, 1985). Partnerships with 
horizontally related competitors offer the potential for many offensive and defensive 
strategic benefits (Kogut, 1988b). Recent empirical studies reveal that the dominant 
motive for Western corporations to invest in China has been the prospect of gaining 
access to what they perceived as a huge domestic market (Calantone and Zhao, 2000; 
Griffith et al, 1998; Luo, 2001; Zhang, 1997). Most Western investors have taken a 
long-term view that an early presence in China's market might lay the basis for a
43
substantial market share and at the same time prevent international rivals squeezing 
them out.
Buckley and Casson (1998) argued that even if a company has sufficient funds 
to approach an opportunity through organic development, this may not lead to 
substantial market presence fast enough to take successful advantage of the 
opportunity. Joint ventures are a fast means of achieving market presence to meet an 
opportunity, if the partners each have strong resources and competencies, but acting 
alone is insufficient to achieve critical mass. Internal development would take much 
longer, and acquisition has the disadvantage of the possible demotivating effect of the 
subsidiary relationship, and the higher level of investment required.
In a survey of sixty-seven Sino-American IJVs in the sectors of electronics and 
fast-moving consumer goods, Zhang (1997) found the foreign parent companies were 
attracted by the Chinese market, the opportunity for good long-term profits, gaining 
strategic position in China vis-a-vis competitors, and establishing strong business 
credibility in China. These were the priority goals of foreign managers in the IJVs. He 
concluded that keeping and enlarging the market share is the primary target for foreign 
parent companies. In other words, market development was the essential concern of 
the sample joint ventures.
From the first day China opened the door for foreign investors, it clearly 
declared that not only was foreign capital welcome, advanced technology and
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management know-how were expected. The best way to access such knowledge was 
establishing equity joint ventures and cooperative joint ventures, which were the major 
legal forms if foreign companies wanted to enter Chinese market. Even nowadays, in 
some industries, such as publication, telecommunication, and insurance, wholly- 
owned foreign subsidiary is not allowed.
2.3.3.1. Fast Market Entry
In the economic world of the 21 st century, first-mover advantages became 
paramount, and often the conclusion of an alliance between a technologically strong 
company with new products, and a company with strong market access was the only 
way to take advantage of an opportunity in time. Timing is an important part of 
effective joint-strategy formulation in situations where environments change rapidly, 
because firms that move first often can gain access to better partners, which in turn 
can give them a competitive advantage that late entrants could not capture as easily 
(Peng and Heath, 1996). How long a market opportunity may be expected to remain 
attractive, and the windows of opportunity in some markets are often so short-lived 
that firms use joint ventures to leapfrog into these growing markets to exploit them 
before their lustre fades (Deng, 2003).
Generally speaking, it is an expensive, difficult, and time-consuming approach 
to build up a global organisation and a significant international competitive presence 
for those inexperienced medium- or small-sized companies (Buckley and Casson,
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1998; Contractor and Lorange, 1988). Joint ventures offer significant time saving in 
this respect. Even though some firms consider establishing their own market position, 
this may simply take too long to be viable. Acquisition abroad is acknowledged as 
another strategic option for international expansion, but it can often be hard to find 
good acquisition objects at realistic price levels.
As the early entrants in their markets, the pioneer firms are building customer 
loyalty in order to defend themselves against new competitors. An early mover, by 
definition, has a quasi monopoly before competition enters and is in a position to 
capture higher economic rents than would be possible in a competitive marketplace 
(Von Hippel, 1988). After entry, the early mover may gain or maintain advantages by 
pre-empting rivals in riding down learning curves, acquiring scarce assets like locally 
available input factors and geographic space and developing a unique local buyer 
network (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988). This kind of partnership is also a way 
of ensuring that potential entrants do not team up with more dangerous opponents.
To establish an operational presence in a country, a firm must access local 
resources as a means of overcoming market uncertainties (Stopford and Wells, 1972). 
IJVs provide low-cost, fast access to new markets by "borrowing" a partner's already- 
in-place local infrastructure (Doz, Prahalad, and Hamel, 1990). This infrastructure 
includes sales forces, local plants, market intelligence, and the marketing presence 
necessary to understand and serve local markets. In addition, local partners also are
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critically valuable in markets where important customers are state-owned enterprises 
or governments which favour national suppliers.
Recent studies of entry strategies in China have shown even stronger and more 
consistent evidence of early mover advantages among foreign entrants. These studies 
showed that early entrants (foreign investors) in China attained higher performance in 
profitability, sales growth, and local competitive position, suggesting that there are 
noticeable early mover advantages in an emerging economic region (Isobe et al, 2000; 
Luo, 1998; Luo and Peng, 1998; Pan and Chi, 1999, Pan et al, 1999; Wilson and 
Brennan, 2003; Rahman and. Bhattacharyya, 2003). For example, from an empirical 
investigation of 14,466 foreign invested firms in China, Pan et al (1999) found that 
early entrants have significantly higher market shares and profitability than later 
entries. This finding is consistent with past research on U.S. domestic markets (e.g. 
Robinson et al, 1992). They found that equity joint ventures have higher market shares 
and profitability than either wholly owned enterprises or contractual joint ventures. 
Rahman and Bhattacharyya (2003) also contended that emerging markets have certain 
distinctive attributes that offer positional advantages to a first mover.
Several possible factors may allow early movers to gain superior market 
performance in emerging economic regions. First, an early entrant may face less 
competition, which makes it easy for it to develop a monopoly in the local markets. In 
emerging regions, most local incumbents lack the strong capabilities and resources 
necessary to compete directly with foreign entrants. Also, potential foreign entrants
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tend to adopt a wait-and-see strategy because there is a high degree of uncertainty in 
the local markets. Second, early entrants may establish brand loyalty more easily than 
late entrants in emerging economic regions, where dominant brands and design are 
absent. Finally, local governments in these regions often treat early foreign entrants 
more favourably. Where such differential government treatment is critical for success, 
foreign firms may have motivation to move sooner rather that later. For example, since 
it entered China in 1985, AT&T has built a good reputation and powerful brand image. 
It also has a good relationship with China's national telecommunication industry and 
has thus built high entry barriers against its competitors. Being the first entrant gave 
AT&T the opportunity to capitalise on local resources and manpower and establish a 
strong customer base (Luo, 2000).
A partnership with a local firm with superior marketing competence enables a 
foreign company to quickly establish its market position, organisational image, and 
product reputation in the local market. This also helps the foreign company increase 
profitability, reduce uncertainty, and boost its competitive edge in the host country. 
Luo (1995) observed the importance of such marketing competence, particularly skills 
in direct marketing, to the market performance of IJVs. One of the well-established 
and well-reputed Chinese auto firms, for example, Shanghai Automotive Industry 
Corp. has utilised its marketing expertise and resources to help its joint venture, 
Shanghai Volkswagen AG, quickly establish distribution channels, after-sales service 
centers, and high-quality image recognition nationwide. Today, it is the largest
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foreign-invested enterprise in China with regard to total sales, and has a market share 
of more than 50% of domestically manufactured passenger cars in China (Luo, 1995).
Most emerging countries open up their domestic market on a gradual basis. On 
the one hand, the host country government selects and approves the foreign firms to 
come into their markets (Peng and Heath, 1996). On the other hand, foreign firms have 
to become confident that the timing is right for them to be successful there. In the case 
of China, most foreign investors in the early 1980s had a high degree of skepticism 
about investing in China. Those foreign investors who entered China at the time 
showed trust in the open-door policy of the Chinese government. In return, these early 
entrants were rewarded with incentives and concessions in terms of taxes, land use, 
supplies of energy and materials, and market access that were not readily available to 
late entrants (Beamish, 1993; Shenkar, 1990).
2.3.3.2. Managing Competition
Kogut (1988b) argues that motivated by strategic attempts to deter competitive 
market entry and improve oligopoly profit potential, MNEs establish UVs in less 
developed countries in order to extend their home country into a new location at lower 
cost and with less interference than a wholly-owned subsidiary would generate. 
Contractor and Lorange (1988) also point out that the joint ventures can be used to 
pre-empt suppliers or customers from integrating in a manner unfavourable to the firm. 
Joint ventures also can blunt the abilities of ongoing firms to retaliate by blinding
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potential enemies to the firm as allies. Thus, firms can gain new competitive 
capabilities or enter new markets more quickly; create market power; or stake out 
leadership positions in emerging industries.
Because one of the major objectives of foreign investors in the Chinese market 
is to preempt market opportunities and business potential (Beamish, 1993), a local 
partner's competitive advantages are key assets. In China, competitive advantages are 
often represented by a local partner's industrial and business background, market 
position, and established marketing and distribution networks (Luo, 1997). 
Competitive advantages also enable the firm to influence some industry-wide 
restrictions on output, increase bargaining power, and offer the advantages of 
economies of scale (Luo, 1995). For some companies, China may be a critical market 
because production volumes achievable in China may be large enough to affect global 
competition in that sector, such as television production. In this case, an MNE may 
enter China in order to deny competitors unchallenged access to these large production 
volumes, which are seen as a competitive weapon affecting the MNE's ability to 
leverage business elsewhere.
In the interviews with management personnel from eleven U.S. firms which 
participated in the decision to establish joint ventures, Daniels et al (1985) found a 
pervasive feeling among respondents that they could not afford to let competitors 
preempt them in the Chinese market. One respondent mentioned, for example, that if 
his Japanese competitors were to attain leadership in China, they might gain cost
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reductions which could undercut prices in the U.S. or third country markets. These 
firms were willing to sacrifice immediate profits from the joint ventures in exchange 
for the hope that the ventures would offer them a "foot in the door", hence losses in 
the short term would translate into long-term profits.
Initial investment in a host country can be a platform for obtaining rights to 
future opportunities. For instance, the door to foreign investors was opened gradually 
in China. The Chinese government carefully planned the time when a given product 
sector would open to foreign investors, the ceiling on the number and amount of FDI 
in the sector, and the set of state firms designated as potential local partners. Chrysler, 
for example, was not allowed to manufacture minivans in China in 1995 because after 
it granted the contract to Mercedes, the Chinese government had made the decision 
not to accept any new major foreign operations in that sector at that time (Business 
Week, July 31, 1995, p.50). Under such circumstances, MNEs that had not entered 
already faced the prospect of being shut out and having to wait for future opportunities. 
Those that had already entered would be able to take advantage of monopolistic 
opportunities to develop the local market, promote their products, and tap into a 
variety of strategies to preempt the future entry of competitors.
If some EU firms are able to compete in China, one of the largest markets in 
the world, this will boost their global competitiveness in relation to that of their rivals. 
Moreover, a strong Sino-EU relationship may help create a new balance of power in 
the region. For example, the need to avoid total economic dominance by the Japanese
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in the electronics industry was a strategic consideration taken into account by Philips 
when it was contemplating setting up an industrial base in China (Bruijn and Jia, 
1993b). Shanghai Bell, Alcatel's large switching-equipment IJV in China, has a 
Chinese partner under the Ministry of Post and Telecommunication, who owns and 
operates China' fixed-line telephone network. Its competitors, including NEC, 
Siemens, and AT&T, have partners under different ministries that are not involved 
with and have no regulatory authority over China's fixed-line network. It is no 
surprise that Shanghai Bell has an advantage selling its equipment to the local 
operating companies and commands more than 50 percent market share.
2.3.3.3. Overcoming Government Barriers
An MNE is advised to use the joint venture mode to limit its exposure by 
reducing its resource commitment and increasing its ability to exit from the market 
quickly without taking a substantial loss if the environment worsens (Gommes- 
Casseres, 1990). The cooperative mode is often favoured because local equity partners 
may have influence on host government policies, along with a vested interest in 
speaking out against intervention (Beamish and Banks, 1987). Local partners buffer 
the possibly unfavourable influences of the host government's bargaining power 
(Gommes-Casseres, 1990) and reduce transaction costs incurred in a turbulent 
environment (Hennart, 1988). Moreover, local partners can utilise their knowledge, 
experience, and business networks to cultivate a better relationship with governmental
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authorities. Such relationships are particularly critical in emerging economies in which 
personal connections are often more important than legal standards or impartial justice 
systems (Luo, 1997). For instance, while the Chinese bureaucracy often inhibits 
business activities, guanxi (interpersonal relationship) facilitates them (Xin and Pearce, 
1996).
Fey and Beamish (1999) also find that foreign parents formed Russian IJVs 
primarily to obtain help in dealing with Russian market, and to be able to enter Russia. 
Russian bureaucracy was seen as a major obstacle for many foreign firms. Russian 
firms had often been operating for years in Russia in the industry the foreign parent 
wanted to enter. Russian partners, with their years invested in building relationships 
(and sometimes being government-owned), were thought to be of considerable help in 
navigating through Russian bureaucracy. Obtaining knowledge of the Russian market 
was also extremely important to many foreign parents. They expressed that such 
knowledge could be acquired more easily through having a joint venture than by 
hiring local employees to work at a WOE foreign firm.
Interestingly enough, Luo (2000) found that having a local partner can enable 
an MNE to develop close connections with government decision makers. Chinese 
partners are likely to have intimate contacts and connections with critical government 
officials, and thus they should have a major role in influencing government decisions 
on firm-level issues. Furthermore, many government officials are concerned about not 
allowing foreigners to exploit China and thus are more trusting of Chinese
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representatives. However, the foreign side may need to work carefully with its 
partners to help them take a more aggressive stand in influencing government and in 
developing coherent strategies. This need is primarily due to the Chinese heritage of 
centralised planning and unchallenged adherence to government policies.
The ability of a firm to select an optimal entry mode into a foreign market, or 
change entry modes, depends upon constraints present in the host country's legal and 
political environments. For instance, a firm may wish to enter a host country with a 
wholly-owned subsidiary to maintain control over the foreign operation and 
coordinate its activities with those of other foreign subsidiaries. However, the firm 
may be unable to do so if the local government imposes investment or ownership 
restrictions on foreign firms. In these instances, entering the market via an IJV may be 
an acceptable, yet second-best, solution.
Governments in developing countries typically place restrictions on ownership 
by foreign corporation, production capacity, imports, and price increases (Frazier et al, 
1989). Under current Chinese laws and practice, government approval of wholly- 
owned enterprises status may be difficult to obtain. Wholly-owned subsidiaries are 
completely prohibited in some industries (e.g. newspaper, publishing, broadcasting, 
television, post and telecommunications), and restricted in others (e.g. public utilities, 
transport facilities, real estate, trust investment, and leasing) (Xu et al, 2004).
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Through conducting in-depth field studies on fifteen joint ventures, 
interviewing many developing government officers, and being supplemented by over 
one hundred mail questionnaires, Dymsza (1988) conclude that by responding to the 
foreign investment policies of the host government and taking strategic initiatives to 
utilise its firm-specific oligopoly advantages, the MNEs find that the joint venture 
route is the most viable way to overcome government barriers and attain their strategic 
goals. After summarising twelve Chinese joint venture-related studies, Beamish (1993) 
also concluded that the major reason given by foreign partners for using joint venture 
in the PRC was government pressure.
Teagarden (1990) found that the perception of government mandate was the 
primary motivator for alliance formation in a sample of sixty-seven manufacturing 
equity and contractual joint ventures in China. Bjoerkman and Lu (1997) report that at 
a round table discussion with the government of the PRC, 59 percent of participants 
from international joint ventures concluded that Chinese bureaucracy is one of the 
most important concerns. Yan and Warner (2002) also argue that IJVs could help 
MNEs overcome economic and political hurdles, and realise the sales-volume more 
rapidly than wholly owned subsidiaries. Thus as a result of stringent government 
control and incentives offered for IJV formation, many MNEs favoured IJV 
establishment.
On the basis of case studies of sixteen Sino-foreign IJVs, Su (1999) indicates 
that like many other countries in transition, China is experiencing a dynamic
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reconstruction where disorder is an integral part of the society. This consists of an 
absence or lack of effective laws, increasing problems of business ethics, bureaucracy, 
and the government's ambiguous role in the economy with respect to enterprises. With 
regard to joint ventures, the Chinese local authorities too often tend to intervene in 
management and consider the UVs as state companies and are therefore under state 
control. The findings suggest that the sharing of power with a Chinese partner is very 
useful in the administrative, banking, and social aspects of the business.
2.3.4. Transaction Cost Theory and IJV Efficiency-Seeking Objectives
The transaction cost (TC) theory dates back to Commons (1924) who 
emphasized the importance of transactions in the economic system (Perrow, 1986). 
Building on this idea, Coase (1937) postulated that the transactions between parties 
are appropriate units of analysis for understanding organisational behaviour. 
According to him, organisations exist because the market is not always the most 
efficient mechanism for governing transactions. From the perspective of transaction 
cost theory, efficiency is the major criterion for assessing the appropriateness of a 
governance structure between organisations conducting economic exchange (Lee et al, 
1998). As one of the governance choices for two or more prospective partners who 
contribute complementary resources to achieve mutually beneficial goals, joint 
venture will be chosen only if it is more efficient than other alternative governance 
structures.
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The most influential statement of transaction cost economies is associated with 
Williamson (1975, 1985). His argument is that institutional design reflects efforts to 
minimise the sum of production and transaction costs. Production costs are the costs 
usually related with the transforming process, namely, the costs of inputs, the degree 
of scale economies, the efficiency of the productive technology. The transaction costs 
are less well specified. They embrace all the costs associated with organising the 
economic system. For example, transaction costs include the costs of:
Discovering who one wishes to deal with;
Informing market agents that one wishes to deal and on what terms;
Conducting negotiations leading up to the bargain;
Drawing up the contract
Undertaking the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the 
contract are being observed
Transaction costs explain JV formation invoking the logic that, compared to 
other governance mechanisms, this mechanism best minimises the sum of production 
and transaction costs (Glaister, 2004; Hennart, 1988; Kogut, 1988b).
Williamson (1985) also identifies three conditions that are subject to high 
transaction costs: asset specificity (the degree to which assets are dedicated to
57
transacting with a particular economic partner), uncertainty (which represents the 
difficulty of predicting and observing cheating), and frequency (which influences 
whether there is sufficient volume to justify a fixed investment in establishing an 
organisation solution). When any of these dimensions are significantly present, 
transaction costs increase (Williamson, 1985). All of these conditions are necessary; 
none alone are sufficient (Kogut, 1988a).
The significance of the transaction cost theory lies in its ability to link 
transactions and governance structure in a different approach that minimises 
transaction costs and maximises efficiency. For transactions to occur efficiently, they 
must be managed in some way. From the transaction cost economics perspective, there 
are three broad structural systems for transaction governance: markets, hierarchies and 
hybrids (Williamson, 1985, 1991). Therefore, under the transaction cost lens, society 
is seen as a network of transactions mediated either by markets, hierarchies, or hybrids. 
The choice between make and buy decisions is based on the maximisation of 
efficiency which is accomplished through the minimisation of the transaction costs. 
For example, while classic make-or-buy decisions focus on obtaining an item at 
lowest purchase cost, transaction cost economy is also concerned with additional costs, 
such as those related to monitoring product quality, consequences of late delivery or 
strikes, investments in equipment to refine the material, and possible litigation from 
joint and several market product liability claims. When uncertainties related to such
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concerns or asset specific investments are implied, these transactions are more 
efficiently governed within the organisation (Child and Faulkner, 1998).
While full internalisation (i.e. merger or acquisition) appears to be desirable 
under certain conditions, complete movement to the hierarchical end of the continuum 
is not always necessary or possible. In such cases, the JV form is argued to be the 
most efficient and effective means of reducing opportunism (Ramanathan et al, 1997) 
or the potential leakage of proprietary knowledge (Mjoen and Tallman, 1997). Kogut 
(1988b) states that equity joint venture is efficient when two conditions are 
simultaneously met: 1) markets for the intermediate goods held by each party fail 
(market failure); 2) acquiring or replicating the assets yielding those goods is more 
expensive than obtaining a right to their use through a joint venture agreement. Shared 
equity or asset investment basically holds each party mutually hostage when each 
potential partner possesses assets that are unique and essential, when government 
regulation limits the possibility of complete ownership (Buckley and Casson, 1988), 
or when uncertainty makes it difficult for a partner to determine whether complete 
internalisation via merger or acquisition is feasible (Ramanathan et al, 1997).
Cullen and Johnson (1995) argue that what distinguishes TVs from formal 
transactional contracts is the fact that their hybrid governance structure provides an 
additional incentive for venture partners to forbear and shy away from opportunistic 
behaviour. In a JV, transacting parties contribute both financial and non-financial 
resources to the venture and in turn, they jointly own and control the venture's asset,
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resources, costs, and profits. Through joint ownership, parent firms' performance 
interacts with the venture's performance. Hence, JVs reduce the transaction costs 
associated with opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, when transactions are 
characterised by high asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency, and when 
production costs are too high to justify internalisation, JVs are the most efficient forms 
of governance (Beamish and Bank, 1987; Tsang, 2000).
Powell (1990) notes that "firms pursue cooperative agreements in order to gain 
fast access to new technologies or new markets, to benefit from economies of scale in 
joint research and/or production, to tap into sources of know-how located outside the 
boundaries of the firm, and to share the risks for activities that are beyond the scope of 
the capabilities of a single organisation" (p.315). Such an argument is consistent with 
the thrust of the transaction costs literature and recognises that a firm will consider 
forming a joint venture if the potential benefits exceed the corresponding costs. Hill 
(1990) also suggests that in international joint ventures, the fundamental idea behind 
transaction cost is that if the costs of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing exchange 
between two parties are lower than both the cost of integrating the function and the 
marginal economic benefit of the transaction, then the firm will tend to form IJVs.
In the international arena, MNEs establish local operations as a means of 
serving a foreign market rather than engaging in arms-length transactions with market 
intermediaries (Isobe et al, 2000). Given the high level of uncertainty in foreign 
markets, Vanhonacker (1997) argues that wholly-owned subsidiaries would be a
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preferred mode of engagement in a foreign market. However, as exemplified by recent 
statistics in China, joint ventures still are the dominant form of business operation for 
MNEs in developing countries regardless of whether or not they are required by a host 
country as a condition for entry. Beamish and Banks (1987) resolve this contradiction 
between theory and empirical observation by offering a sound argument for IJVs. 
They (1987) argue that IJVs that conform to certain preconditions and structural 
arrangements can be more attractive than wholly-owned subsidiaries because of the 
uncertainty reduction, cost reduction, and revenue enhancement for the multinational 
enterprises. These rents come from the potential synergy effects of combining two 
organisations.
Taking the transaction cost approach, Hennart (1991) lists the arguments 
which most often explain the creation of international joint ventures: firms are looking 
for economies of scale in production; the globalisation of markets requires firms to set 
up subsidiaries worldwide in a short period of time; firms need to share knowledge 
with local actors and reduce political risk in overseas operations. He also notes that 
joint ventures arise when two or more firms desire to combine their inputs, but that the 
transfer of those resources has high market transaction costs, typically because they 
are know-how resources, so an equity transaction is preferred. However, when neither 
firm can afford to acquire all of the other, or both sets of resources are so embedded in 
their organisations that the market fails in both cases, or the strategic opportunity is
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time-sensitive, a complete takeover may not be desirable and an equity joint venture is 
the preferred subsidiary form.
2.3.4.1. Exploring Global Synergy
Glaister (2004) argues that from the transaction cost perspective the IJV can be 
considered as an economising device in the context of the strategy of the parent firms. 
In the past, most joint ventures involving MNEs were merely regarded as a means to 
enter foreign markets. They were not considered a part of the network of business 
units that firms used to cope with worldwide competition. Nowadays, an investment in 
a particular local market is considered strategically important when it is consistent 
with the primary focus and function of a firm's global strategy (Child and Faulkner, 
1998; Harrigan, 1987b; Kogut, 1988b). Many multinational enterprises develop 
complex networks of production and distribution systems around the world whereby 
exchanges of resources and skills and collective learning takes place between 
headquarters and subsidiaries and among subsidiaries (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990). 
For the successful implementation of global strategy, an MNE should efficiently 
implement its entry strategy for each separate international market because the failure 
or success of the investment in a particular local market is important to a firm's global 
strategy.
Researchers such as Levitt (1983) and Kotabe (1992) suggest that companies 
competing internationally can not afford to be polycentric, applying a country-by-
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country approach (i.e., the multinational strategy). Instead, they must seek global-scale 
economies to be competitive, thus implying the need for firms to focus on developing 
an integrated and well-coordinated global strategy rather than making adaptations to 
maximise local competitive advantages. Many firms manufacture in the emerging 
markets primarily to capture a share of rapidly expanding market opportunities. This 
strategy involves producing for local consumption, with attempt to integrate these 
markets into the MNE's regional or global networks (Yan and Gray, 1994).
Global strategic motivation can be defined as motivation to fulfill strategic 
aims set at the corporate level for the purpose of overall corporate efficiency 
maximisation. High level of control enhances an MNE's ability to ensure that strategic 
actions taken by a subsidiary in one national market do not produce negative 
ramifications in other national markets above and beyond the expected gains to be 
made by a focal subsidiary's strategic move (Child and Faulkner, 1998). At the same 
time, a high level of control enhances a multinational's ability to call on its subsidiary 
located in one market to assist in a competitive battle being fought in another market 
for the benefit of the overall organisation.
2.3.4.2. Spreading Financial Risk
Although the organisational risk implications of IJVs have not been a topic of 
empirical research, risk figures highly in many discussions of IJV formation motives 
(e.g. Contractor and Lorange, 1988). By engaging in joint ventures rather than
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acquisitions, for instance, firms can spread various risks over multiple capital 
providers in large-scale projects (e.g., Kogut and Singh, 1988). One possible 
motivation for establishing an international joint venture rather than a wholly owned 
foreign affiliate is to attenuate local risk by reducing the investment exposure of the 
parent firm. For either partner, the possibility of joining with another company in the 
new venture lowers capital requirements relative to going it alone.
IJV is an attractive option when the projects are large and risky (Pucik, 1991; 
Shan, 1991). Project size implies levels of resource commitment, capital contribution, 
start-up costs, and financial risk, which may in turn affect entry mode decision. Some 
projects would never be undertaken without this means of spreading costs and risks. 
Risk premiums may be even higher for big projects in emerging economies. By 
pooling and sharing information through the mechanism of a joint venture, the foreign 
firms are able to reduce risk at a lower long-term average cost than through pure 
hierarchical or market approaches. Thus, firms may shy away from the wholly-owned 
entry mode in favour of joint ventures when the project is too big. Williamson (1985) 
suggests that investors deal more cautiously with transactions that involve greater 
investment commitment.
When the macro-investment environment in a host country gets too risky, 
foreign firms are often advised to reduce the level of investment in that country 
(Tallman and Shenkar, 1994). However, it may not be as simple as that. Some 
industries have a minimum scale of operation. When a foreign firm decides to invest
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in China but is unwilling to commit the necessary investment, it has to find a local 
partner, to put up the balance.
The financial risks, of course, are offset by prospects for higher long-term 
returns, typically a primary reason for investing in the first place. Joint ventures still 
provide a mechanism through which companies can limit their financial exposure 
while at the same time gaining experience in a new market. A large investment is 
associated with higher start-up, switching, and exit costs, thus involving greater 
financial and operational risks (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992). hi order to reduce 
such transaction costs, firms become more prudent. European companies have less 
investment in China than their American and Japanese counterparts. However they 
have an average larger size of investment (see Table 1-2). Consequently, pursuing risk 
reduction in order to achieve investment efficiency is one of the main strategic 
objectives of European partners.
2.3.4.3. Avoiding Political Uncertainty
Most emerging economies are characteristised by greater environmental 
volatility than developed market economies (Boisot and Child, 1988; Peng, 2000). 
According to Asian Development Bank (1997), Asian countries have only recently 
embarked on economic reforms and market liberalisation, both of which invoke 
changing government regulations and implicitly, disequilibrium for foreign investors. 
Arguably, higher level of political risk in Asia also arises from government-induced
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distortions aimed at protecting emerging local industries from sophisticated global 
competitors (Economist, 1997). The political risk of undertaking joint ventures in Asia 
perhaps explains why a relatively higher proportion of MNEs enter into joint ventures 
with state-owned enterprises (Asian Development Bank, 1997).
Generally, "political risk" refers to changes in the political decision-making in 
the host country, and the effect of this is known as "intervention". Country risk can 
take many forms, including political instability, economic fluctuations, and currency 
vulnerability (Harrigan, 1985). Many companies view government actions, such as a 
change in interest rate, artificially holding prices down in a time of high inflation, and 
the withdrawal of preferential treatment etc., as "government intervention" (Zhuang et 
al, 1998). MNEs managers see the inconsistency of government policy as the most 
problematic issue concerning their business operation. This seems to tie in with the 
reputation of the Chinese government which is known for frequently changing its 
policies without warning. Thus, using joint ventures as a means of reducing the 
political risk of intervention represents a logical decision for many companies 
operating in developing countries. Even corporate managers with extensive 
international experience often see developing country markets as inherently more 
risky than operations elsewhere in the world. Wu (1992) argues that political 
environment is a subject which has been mentioned as a reason for expecting that U.S. 
investors may be reluctant to commit resources in China.
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When multinationals evaluate investment opportunities in developing countries, 
political uncertainty and investment instability are inevitable considerations. For 
example, although many foreign investors find China a profitable investment 
environment, with good longer-term prospects, others nevertheless face considerable 
difficulties in managing their ventures in China. Changes in government laws and 
regulations, plus the vagaries of their interpretation at the local level, are a major 
headache for most foreign managers in China. The still considerable governmental 
bureaucracy is combined with regulatory ambiguity, general legal and business risks. 
There have been major and expected policy changes on matters such as import duties 
and VAT rebates for joint ventures (Zhuang et al, 1998). By investigating seventy- 
three Sino-foreign IJVs, Vanhonacker and Pan (1997) found that the lack of clarity in 
laws and regulations has often been voiced as a concern by foreign managers 
operating in China. They believe that not fully comprehending the future implications 
of laws and regulations, Chinese officials in general have been very careful when 
drafting legislation to leave enough of a gray area so that unforeseen problems or 
issues can be dealt with in the future. This situation certainly has increased the 
instability of policy enforcement.
Gupta et al (1991) identify the several aspects of political risk concerning FBI 
in China. First of all, China has a greater degree of political instability and ideological 
swings. Secondly, foreign joint ventures in China may suffer ownership-related risk 
such as expropriation, currency conversion impediments, and intervention risks. An
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additional element of political risk is the uncertainty from the inadequate Chinese 
legal framework governing foreign joint ventures. Furthermore, entering the Chinese 
market imposes significant costs of information gathering, given the lack of prior 
business experience in this market.
In a sample of sixty-seven manufacturing equity and contractual joint ventures 
in the PRC, Teagarden (1990) finds that many Sino-foreign joint ventures are greatly 
influenced by government policy. He argues that the perception of government 
mandate was the primary motivator for alliance formation. For example, many were in 
an extremely difficult situation in the early 1990s because of Chinese adjustments in 
foreign and domestic policy after the 1989 Tiananmen event. The joint ventures of 
Volkswagenwerk AG and Peugeot suffered drawbacks in the late-1980s due to a tight 
control of foreign exchange. Production was stopped and any planned expansion of 
investment was suspended. The difficulties were overcome by the local partners 
negotiating with host government. Similarly, Pearson's (1991) interviews with 
Chinese and foreign managers suggest that most managers were positive about the 
performance, and optimistic about the future prospects. Her interviews were 
conducted before the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989. In contrast, Beamish (1993), 
who researched IJVs shortly after the Tiananmen Incident when the money supply was 
very tight, reports that over half of the Chinese and foreign managers in his interviews 
reported dissatisfaction with the performance of their joint ventures. Ma et al (2003) 
also contend that the political incidents on the value of US firms with joint ventures in
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China had a significant impact, and the market had reacted to this event in an efficient
manner.
2.3.5. Organisational Learning Theory and IJV Knowledge-Acquiring 
Objectives
Organisational learning theory is often viewed as a non-cumulative and 
fragmented theory with limited empirical validation or consensus on what is meant by 
the term learning (Pennings et al, 1994). For example, Hedberg (1981) defines 
organisational learning as "both the process by which organisations adjust themselves 
defensively to reality and the process by which knowledge is used offensively to 
improve the fit between organisations and their environments" (p.3). Fiol and Lyles 
(1985) define organisational learning as "the development of insights, knowledge, and 
associations between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and future 
actions" (p.811). Although there is no consensus towards the definition of 
organisational learning, many agree that the core of organisational learning is the 
process of understanding and gaining new insights (Berrell, 2002; Easterby-Smith et 
al, 2000; Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Senge, 1990). When a joint venture is created, 
organisational boundaries become permeable. This permeability provides firms with a 
"window on their partners' broad capabilities" (Hamel et al, 1989). Consequently, 
knowledge creation and learning should be viewed as potential strategic benefits of 
joint venturing.
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The current study adopts the definition of organisation learning as the process 
of improving organisation actions through knowledge transfer and increased 
understanding of the environment (Fiol and Lyles, 1985; Kogut, 1988b; Lane et al, 
2001; Lyles et al, 2000). In addition, according to the above discussion, this study also 
argues that organisational learning particularly fits those IJVs pursuing long-term 
success, because successful organisational learning mainly involves the acquisition of 
indirect benefits (e.g., knowledge). Meanwhile, the above acquisition may lead to a 
change of organisational knowledge and eventually influence IJV long-term strategic 
success.
Although the value of organisational learning is increasingly emphasized in the 
international business literature, Easterby-Smith (1997) suggested that organisational 
learning with an international perspective is an under-researched area. Wong, Maher 
and Luk (2002) also contended that research on learning and knowledge transfers in 
international joint ventures in transitional countries is limited. The importance of 
learning in the management of joint ventures has only recently emerged in the 
literature. In fact it has been argued that learning or knowledge acquisition is a 
strategic imperative in that it is one of the surest means to a competitive advantage and 
enhanced organisational performance (Grant, 1996; Johnson, 2000; Leventhal and 
March, 1993; Spender, 1996). Grant (1996) even suggests that the knowledge-based 
view is an extension of resource base theory wherein knowledge can be viewed as the 
"most strategically-significant resource of the firm" (p.375). In terms of alliances,
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organisational learning is used as a theoretical underpinning for research investigating 
issues such as the acquisition and transferability of knowledge between parties, 
barriers to inter-organisational learning, how firms develop knowledge about alliance 
management, and how knowledge influences alliance performance (Simonin, 1997).
Lyles (1988) supported the JV-leaming argument. In her case study, Lyles 
addresses three key organisational learning issues: learning that occurs within the joint 
venture parent firms; the process by which learning occurs; and what the firms learn. 
In addition, she divided organisational learning into two levels: low-level and high- 
level. The former includes success programmes (i.e., standard operating procedures), 
and management systems (i.e., policies or hierarchical information flows). The latter 
deals with the more complex process that firms use to adjust organisation goals, 
beliefs, and norms.
Westney (1988) proposed two strategies regarding IJVs: cooperative strategy 
and learning-oriented strategy. The former has as its goal the obtaining of a specific 
output. The latter has been applied under greater uncertainty: involvement in a denser 
and more varied set of interorganisational resource flows; and during the addition of 
value (i.e., new skills) internally to enhance the firm's competitive advantage in order 
to make the relationship work. He argued that a firm whose activities are beginning to 
cross industry boundaries must acquire knowledge from its environment or, more 
precisely, from other organisations in its environment. Thus, although not all
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cooperative strategies involve learning, learning can become an indispensable 
mechanism for cooperative strategies.
Hamel (1991) identifies three factors that affect learning through alliances: 
intent, transparency, and receptivity. Intent refers to a firm's propensity to view 
collaboration as an opportunity to leam new skills, rather than to gain access to a 
partner's assets. Where there is intent, learning takes place by design rather than by 
default, which is much more significant than mere leakage of information. 
Transparency refers to the openness or "knowability" of each partner, and therefore 
the potential for learning. Receptivity, or absorptiveness, refers to a partner's capacity 
to learn. Clearly, there is much a firm can do to maximise its own intent and 
receptivity, and minimise its transparency. Intent to learn will influence the choice of 
partner and form of collaboration.
From a learning perspective, the IJV is the most effective vehicle for the 
transfer of tacit and embedded knowledge, because it allows for prolonged 
cohabitation of managerial and technical personnel and facilitates the replication of 
organisational routines (Berrell, 2002). A direct interface among the partner firms 
permits direct observation of operations and enables the gradual and experiential 
learning that is essential for successful transfer of tacit knowledge. Equity control and 
profit and loss sharing serve to align the interests of parent firms, reduce opportunism, 
and eliminate the need for complex ex ante specification of ongoing activities and 
behaviour. Because tacit and embedded knowledge cannot be easily specified, IJVs
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may succeed where other modes of interaction might fail. The IJV also allows for 
superior monitoring, since owners are typically entitled access to independently 
verified information and are also able to observe operations directly. Monitoring is 
especially valuable where tacit knowledge is not readily codified, and hence cannot be 
transmitted in the form of reports and balance sheets (Hennart, 1999). Indeed, given 
joint ownership rights and the mutual commitment of resources, the situational 
characteristics best suited for an IJV are high uncertainty regarding specifying and 
monitoring performance, and a high degree of asset specificity, conditions that also 
characterise tacit and embedded knowledge.
Kogut (1988b) proposes knowledge transfer as an organisation learning 
objective. He argues that a joint venture was and remained a way for an organisation 
to learn new capabilities. Kogut (1988b) further stated that a "market is replaced by a 
JV not because tacitness is a cost stemming from opportunism, but rather from the 
necessity of replacing experiential knowledge which is not well understood" (p.323). 
Therefore, entering an IJV may be a way for firms to combine complementary 
knowledge and know-how, to retain their embedded capabilities by replication, and to 
benefit from their partner's skills and capabilities. Although the foreign partner does 
not necessarily enter the IJV with the explicit objective of knowledge acquisition, 
access to knowledge originating in the local country is an important factor in 
motivating the foreign partner to choose an IJV investment rather than full ownership.
73
From global competition perspective, the importance of timely acquisition and 
internalisation of important skills on the part of firms is crucial. For this reason, both 
domestic and international joint ventures now have a higher likelihood of being 
motivated by learning. For international joint ventures in particular, this motive is 
much recognised in the literature. Researchers have pointed out that IJVs are an 
effective vehicle for coping with the competition and rapid technological change 
characterising the international environment (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Gomes- 
Casseres, 1989). Learning is therefore perceived as a means of knowledge transfer and 
gaining collabourative know-how and collective experience (Child, 1994; Child and 
Rodrigues, 1996; Simonin and Helleloid, 1993).
In addition, Root (1988) argues that when the firm first enters as overseas 
market, a low resource commitment mode such as export is desirable. As the firm 
acquires more knowledge and experience in that overseas market, it will assume a 
higher level of resource commitment with higher level of risk, control and profit return. 
The motivation of the foreign partners to have a learning objective is the conversion of 
IJVs into wholly-owned enterprises after the learning objective is achieved. It has 
solid theoretical foundations: IJVs are a transitional form of management and serve as 
an intermediate strategy for a parent firm, with an option to buy out the other partner 
when the future is promising (Harrigan, 1985; Kogut, 1991). In short, when an MNE 
has acquired enough experience about local economic conditions, the economic 
rational for establishing a WOE is increased. In other words, the acquisition of local
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knowledge is the enabling factor in the transition from joint venture to subsidiary. 
During the early stages of market entry, a foreign firm requires a local partner. As the 
firm learns about the local peculiarities, it reduces dependence on the local partner 
(Deng, 2001). After all, the knowledge gained in joint venturing can be transferred to 
operation of wholly-owned enterprise later on. Moreover, with incremental experience 
and continuous knowledge acquisition, MNEs can obtain increasing sophistication in 
their approaches and solutions to the host country market. Indeed, many foreign firms 
initially operated as JV partners. At the end of a fixed period of time, they take over 
the assets from the local partners and continue to run the operations as WOEs 
(Business China, 1998). The primary reason is that the added value of the local 
partners is significant but limited to the early stages of the venture and the foreign 
parents can acquire sufficient knowledge of the local market as time passes.
In the current study, two types of knowledge are defined: country-specific 
knowledge and market knowledge.
2.3.5.1. Acquiring Country-Specific Knowledge
Country-specific knowledge is usually defined as general knowledge. It 
comprises information and know-how about the economy, politics, culture, and 
business customs of the host country; information on how to access local labour force, 
infrastructure, raw materials, and other factors that are required for the conduct of 
business in a region. Makino and Delios (1996) in interviews with executives of
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Japanese MNEs, each with several alliances in Southeast Asia, found that the primary 
motive for alliance formation with local firms was to access local knowledge. They 
also argue that when the firms invest abroad, it has the disadvantage of being foreign. 
This disadvantage of the liabilities of foreignness stems from a lack of local 
knowledge of social, political and economic conditions in the host country. Thus, a 
stock of local knowledge is required to mitigate such disadvantage.
Foreign market involvement is inherently risky due to elements such as 
cultural differences, political instability, or changes in the value of exchange rates. 
When a firm enters a foreign country for the first time, it lacks the local knowledge, 
which is tacit, and consequently its purchase is subject to high transaction costs. These 
firms are often hypothesized to benefit the most from participation in international 
joint ventures due to the associated learning opportunities.
Host country experience enhances the ability of MNE managers to scan, 
process, and analyse information about a new territory, thus improving the scope of 
bounded rationality and mitigating transaction costs (Williamson, 1985). Experience 
also reduces the uncertainty associated with assessing the probable economic worth of 
entering a foreign market (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998) and strengthens the ability 
to stabilise business operations in an uncertain environment (Luo and Peng, 1999). It 
follows, therefore, that MNEs with little or no experience with a target host market 
will try to limit risk exposure (Chang, 1995). In this case, joint venture not only
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reduces the firm's resource commitment and risk-taking, but also facilitates learning 
through cooperation and interaction with local firms (Barkema et al, 1996).
It is generally more costly and takes longer for MNEs to develop host country- 
specific knowledge when using wholly-owned subsidiaries than is the cost for those 
that are learning from joint venture partners (Erramilli, 1991; Hamel, 1991). Business 
culture, commercial practices, and networking tactics are culture specific (Luo and 
Peng, 1999). Cultivating good relationships with various governmental authorities is 
essential yet challenging (Xin and Pearce, 1996). Under these circumstances, a local 
partner's country-specific knowledge is of strategic importance to foreign companies 
with little experience in the host country (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). In certain 
countries like China and Russia, the economic and political climates are evolving so 
rapidly that local "know-how" is a prerequisite to conducting successful business in 
these markets (Beamish, 1993; Fey and Beamish, 1999).
Beamish and Banks (1987) found that northern European firms seeking to do 
business in China prefer to form joint ventures with local firms in order to acquire 
local knowledge. They argue that the joint ventures are used when the MNEs from 
developed countries encountered higher adaptation and information requirements than 
they are accustomed to, particularly in culturally dissimilar countries. For example, 
when Kentucky Fried Chicken entered China, a local partner was considered essential 
because of the complexities associated with obtaining operating licenses and leases, 
negotiating employment contracts, and interpreting investment regulations. China was
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self-sufficient in many areas and closed to the Western world for a long time. Western 
culture to China may encounter more adaptation problems than it would in other 
developing countries. Most European investors in the PRC confront such requirements.
Si and Bruton (1999), when examining Sino-foreign IJVs, found that Chinese 
IJV partners' knowledge needs were focused on the acquisition of economic factors 
related to the operation of modern business, whereas Western partners of the IJV were 
interested in acquiring knowledge related to Chinese culture and local market 
conditions. Indeed, the high uncertainty of the Chinese environment and its cultural 
impediments offer significant challenges to potential foreign market entrants. For 
example, any major manufacturing joint venture in China is influenced by five levels 
of Chinese bureaucracy: the central planning authorities, the ministerial organisations 
that carry out the plans, the local government, the Chinese partner, and the Chinese 
managers and workers - each of whom may have distinctive attitudes about the 
purpose and operations of a foreign joint venture. It is a time-consuming job for 
foreign managers to understand the relationship between different levels and how they 
function. In addition, China's legal system is not a consistently applied system of 
recognised rights and wrongs, but rather a series of broad guidelines that give an 
individual judge leeway to determine rights and wrongs. Furthermore, a provincial 
government may write regulations prohibiting the sale of a product not produced in its 
own region. Thus the Western joint venture partner is highly likely to place greater
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emphasis on knowledge acquisition in China than would be the case in other business 
environments.
2.3.5.2. Acquiring Local Market Knowledge
Marketing considerations play a primary role when international firms evaluate 
the joint venture approach (Mead, 1994). Local market knowledge is usually the 
foreign firm's major lack when entering a host country. Diverse local tastes and 
preferences and marketing practices increase the possibility that foreign firms will 
make costly mistakes, encounter significant delays, or struggle to establish operations 
abroad. Many rash attempts to enter new host countries consequently result in 
prolonged poor performance or even eventual withdrawal. One of the fundamental 
reasons for these difficulties is a foreign firm's lack of local market knowledge 
regarding the new country context. Inkpen and Beamish (1997) assert that acquisition 
of local market knowledge is critical for the successful planning and implementation 
of almost all aspects of entry into a new host country.
However, it is very difficult and costly for a foreign firm to initially acquire 
local market knowledge since some knowledge is not readily transferable, or must be 
obtained through partnering with another firm (Makino and Delios, 1996). The local 
market knowledge ranges from explicit information such as demographic data, 
macroeconomic statistics, or other codified market research, to more tacit forms of 
knowledge, such as local product market and distribution channel familiarity,
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knowledge of labour conditions, likely problems in managing in the local environment, 
knowledge of the legal system and government regulations, and familiarity with local 
customers and conventions, etc.
In emerging countries, relatively explicit forms of market knowledge can be 
difficult to obtain because well-developed sources of market information may not exist. 
Moreover, even when explicit forms of market knowledge do exist, they may become 
quickly obsolete because of rapidly changing political and economic conditions. Even 
though extensive market research statistics and published reports might be helpful to a 
foreign firm, they can not ensure a successful foreign market entry. For example, 
despite extensive pre-entry market research and planning, Disney's theme park in 
Europe struggled for many years because the company lacked a deeper understanding 
of the differences of local culture and their impact on human resource management 
and marketing (Etienne-Benz, et al, 1996).
There are several dimensions in all to which a local partner might be expected 
to make a contribution. On one hand, when a foreign firm does not have local market 
knowledge, IJV can be used to gain quick access to local partner's knowledge base. 
On the other hand, for a foreign company seeking to deepen its understanding of local 
conditions in a country, a JV provides one way to shorten what could be a lengthy and 
potentially expensive process. As one executive described in Beamish's (1987) survey:
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"We need our partner in the same way that a child playing in a park still likes to 
have his parent around if he gets into trouble. It's not that the child is dependent on 
the parent, but more a function of being reassured that he is there if needed. " (p.32)
Foreign firms may also find it difficult to penetrate foreign markets without 
local marketing expertise. A joint venture partner may provide the know-how or 
established local distribution channels through which to market the new product. For 
example, Japanese linkups with U.S. pharmaceutical firms, take advantage of both the 
Japanese and U.S. parents' home-country distribution networks to market new 
pharmaceutical products (Hennart, 1991).
In the process of implementing their business strategies, foreign firms have to 
face Chinese business practices often sharply dissimilar to those prevalent in their 
home countries. As a result, sensitivity to local Chinese business conditions, such as 
the importance attached to personal relations (guanxi) with customers, or the practice 
of extending credit terms in marketing must be developed. In particular, cultivating 
and extending firm's guanxi should be a preoccupation for business success. Given the 
pervasive influence of guanxi in Chinese societies, sales force marketing is a crucial 
selling tool for firms operating in these environments. Likewise, the provision of 
preferential terms of payment for customers is common across firms and in every 
economic sector in China.
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2.4. Conceptualisation of Parent Control
As joint venture partners come together to form a separate organisation with 
shared ownership, the exercise of management control in joint ventures is far more 
complex than controlling stand-alone companies and has received considerable 
attention by joint venture researchers and practitioners alike (Yan and Luo, 2001). The 
topic of IJV control was first raised by West (1959), who recognised potential inter- 
partner conflicts, which could result from this form of organisation. According to 
Geringer and Hebert (1989, pp.236-237) "control refers to the process by which one 
entity influences, to varying degrees, the behaviour and output of another entity 
through the use of power, authority and a wide range of bureaucratic, cultural and 
informal mechanisms."
Kogut (1989) and Inkpen & Beamish (1997) argue that a joint venture can, by 
itself, enhance uncertainty because it is a less stable organisational form. The 
uncertainties of joint venture arise partly from the weak sanctions they provide against 
a partner's opportunistic behaviour and from the potential for competitive conflicts 
between partners. In addition, contract may not cover all possibilities, and 
enforcement of contracts may be difficult. In order to limit these uncertainties, 
exercising management control over joint ventures is desired.
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Mjoen and Tallman (1997) argue that parental control of venture activities 
implies that the parent firm can ensure the most effective use of whatever strategic 
resources it shares with the IJV, a great concern in turbulent environments. Control 
also implies that the strategic resources of one parent can be sheltered from the kind of 
casual exposure to the other parent by which competitive advantage may be lost to a 
potential competitor. Similarly, Geringer and Hebert (1989) suggest that exercising 
control over some or all of the activities of an international joint venture help protect 
the firm from premature exposure of its strategy, technological core or other 
proprietary components to outside groups. Transaction cost theory also suggests that 
since it is virtually impossible to specify all future contingencies at the time of 
drawing up a contract for interorganisaitonal partnerships, mutual adjustment between 
the partners in executing the contract, as an informal control mechanism, should be 
installed to attenuate the costs potentially caused by opportunism engaged in by the 
partners (Williamson, 1975).
Control plays an important role in determining a firm's ability to achieve its 
strategic objectives, since it affects the organisation's ability to monitor, coordinate, 
and integrate the activities of its various business operations (Geringer, 1993). 
Without effective control efforts, firms are likely to experience increased difficulty in 
successfully managing their operations and achieving their objectives. This is 
particularly essential in the case of JVs due to the shared ownership and decision- 
making nature of these ventures; each partner must relinquish some control over the
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JV's activities (Geringer, 1993). A firm may avoid relinquishing control over some or 
all of its activities for reasons intimately related to its corporate strategy and objectives. 
Attainment of a firm's objectives over the long term depends upon its ability to 
implement a strategy which exploits its distinctive competences along one or several 
critical dimensions of corporate activity. Because it may decrease the probability of 
achieving a desired behaviour or outcome, insufficient or ineffective control over an 
IJV can limit the parent firm's ability to coordinate its activities, to efficiently utilise 
its resources and to effectively implement its strategy. In contrast, exercising effective 
control over some or all of the IJV's activities helps increase the probability that a 
desired behaviour or outcome will be achieved. Therefore, to fully achieve their 
strategic objectives, it is essential that parents implement effective control systems 
within their UVs.
Geringer and Frayne (1990) argue that from the parent firm's standpoint, an 
effective IJV control system is one which promotes the attainment of its strategic 
objectives for the venture. However, the unique feature of IJV is the shared nature of 
ownership and decision making. Therefore, in order to develop a truly effective 
control system, the parent must not focus solely on its own self-interests. Rather, the 
parent must also ensure that the control system it proposes to implement will not 
prevent the other partners, as well as venture management, employees and the host 
government from also achieving their strategic objectives.
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Exercising effective control over a joint venture is often difficult for both sides. 
Each faces a conflict between the desire and the ability to exert control over the joint 
venture (Mjoen and Tallman, 1997). Intuitively, most partners want a high level of 
control. Makhija and Ganesh (1997) use the concept of perceived bargaining power to 
explain the ability to control. They argue that variances in composition and 
distribution of power within an organisation should influence the design and use of 
control mechanisms. A partner with greater bargaining power can affect the design 
and use of control mechanisms more than the partner with less power. In other words, 
the level of control by one party reflects its importance in the joint venture. A party, 
whose need for the other's special resources is high, has reduced bargaining power 
and cannot gain complete control over the joint venture. For example, foreign partners 
that want to take advantage of local resources are likely to give part of the control to 
the local firm because of its poor local knowledge.
Indeed, among the available research studies, there is also the complication 
that some have examined control in joint ventures between developed countries, while 
others have investigated control in joint ventures between developed countries and 
developing country partners. The distinction between these two situations has to be 
borne in mind because they may produce contrasting findings with different practical 
implications (Beamish, 1988). According to Child and Yan (1999), when parents from 
developed and developing counties are involved, there can be a marked asymmetry in 
their relative ability to provide valuable resources. Such asymmetry may enhance the
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potential for control, because it reduces the likelihood of dispute between the parents, 
and enhances the legitimacy of the parent that provides the resource.
Geringer and Hebert (1988) conclude that the concept of IJV control is a 
multidimensional construct. They identify three dimensions of control in international 
joint ventures: 1) the types of control mechanisms employed by parent organisations 
to monitor and evaluate the activities of IJVs; 2) the focus or scope of the parents' 
control activities; 3) the extent or level of control exercised by parent companies.
2.4.1. Mechanism of Control
The first dimension of IJV control which researchers have examined is the 
means or mechanisms by which control is exercised. Parents use these mechanisms to 
ensure that risk is minimised and return is maximised, as well as to efficiently 
coordinate activities, utilise resources, and implement corporate strategies (Geringer 
and Hebert, 1989; Luo, 2001; Yan and Gray, 1997, 2001)
The most widely researched, and yet most controversial, control mechanism is 
the parents' ownership share in an IJV (Yan and Gray, 1992). Early studies showed 
that some firms consider equity ownership to be tantamount to control and therefore 
desire high levels of equity ownership as a means of acquiring control (Friedman and 
Beguin, 1971; Stopford and Wells, 1972; Tomlinson, 1970). For example, Gullander
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(1976) asserted that management control is said to exist for a company that has the 
majority equity share.
This narrow treatment of IJV control has been widely criticised. Yan and Gray 
(1992) indicate that even though ownership and management control are closely 
correlated, they are conceptually and operationally distinct from each other. It is 
misleading to assume that 51 percent of equity share can be interpreted into complete 
management control, while 49 percent of equity means complete lack of control.
Although a majority equity position can ensure some degree of control, it is not 
a strict and automatic consequence of ownership. Boisot and Child (1990) argue that 
in developed countries, the amount of control increases along with ownership. Such a 
relationship breaks down in developing countries since there is local government 
legislation or pressure limiting foreign company ownership. However, the foreign 
firms are able to exercise somewhat greater control than their equity levels would 
suggest (Beamish, 1993). The cut-off point of ownership percentage that distinguishes 
an IJV from other forms of foreign direct investment (e.g. minority investment) is 
therefore ambiguous in the literature. This will be further discussed in section 4.5.
A variety of mechanisms other than equity participation are available for firms 
to exercise effective JV control, such as participation in the management of day-to-day 
operations, special agreement related to technology and management, representation
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on board of directors and the use of veto right, etc. (Behrman, 1977; Child, 1973; 
Friedman and Beguin, 1971; Yan and Gray, 1992).
In a landmark study, Schaan (1983) distinguished positive control mechanisms, 
which parent firms employed in order to promote certain behaviour, from negative 
control mechanisms, which were used by a parent to stop or to prevent the IJV from 
implementing certain activities or decisions. Positive control was most often exercised 
through informal mechanisms, staffing, participation in the planning process and 
reporting relationships. In contrast, negative control relied principally on formal 
agreements, approval by parents and the use of the IJV board of directors.
Aulakh et al (1997) divide control mechanisms into three classes: output 
control, i.e. monitoring results in relation to performance goals; process control, i.e. 
monitoring behaviour or means to achieving goals; and social control, i.e. self-control 
fostered within a common organisational culture. The first two are formal control, 
which consist of written rules, goals, procedures, and regulations that often relate to 
specific performance and behaviour outcomes; and the latter one is informal, which is 
facilitated through methods such as socialisation and training.
2.4.2. Focus of Control
The second dimension of control which researchers have examined is the focus 
of control, i.e., the activities or decisions over which parent firms actually exercise
control. Parent companies tend to selectively control only those IJV decisions that are 
strategically important to them, instead of trying to exercise control across the whole 
range of venture activities.
Control is not free - the exercise of control costs critical organisational 
resources (e.g., executive time, budget, and expatriation of managers). This 
perspective of control was supported by Geringer's (1986) empirical study of ninety 
joint ventures in developed countries. These findings imply that parents with different 
strategic objectives and interest in the joint venture might seek control over different 
joint venture activities. For example, studies reveal that expatriate managers are very 
expensive (Joinson, 2002). One estimate of the direct costs of expatriate managers is 
three times the domestic salary plus relocation expense. Relocation alone runs as high 
as $150,000 per person. Beyond these costs and expenses, the expatriate managers are 
reported to have problems such as difficulties in maintaining productive and satisfying 
relationship with local employees (Clarke and Hammer, 1997), generally poor work 
performance (Harvey, 1985), and a high rate of premature return (Shay and Tracy, 
1997). Sending expatriate managers to joint ventures therefore becomes more and 
more selective.
Glaister (1994) noted that, based on data collected from 94 joint ventures in 
UK, parent firms tended to seek to control specific decisions and activities, to select 
the area of control, and the strategic areas concerned. Meanwhile, a parent firm not 
adequately exercising control over activities judged as critical for the achievement of
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its objectives could ultimately suffer from ineffective strategy implementation and 
strategic inflexibility.
Ding (1997) found that Chinese partners are likely to have less expertise at 
improving efficiency in joint ventures compared with foreign partners. Performance is 
enhanced when foreign partners apply their advanced managerial skills and 
technology. By controlling the major joint venture functions, foreign partners are 
likely to ensure their own profits and high performance.
Child (1984, pp. 137-138) argues that there are two kinds of control that 
investors may hope to attain: strategic control and operational control. Macintosh 
(1994) also termed them "market control" (strategic) and "command control" 
(operational control).
Strategic control is control over the means and methods on which the whole 
conduct of an organisation depends, including the deployment of capital, the 
determination of strategic priorities and the making of senior appointments (Child, 
1984). These decisions are important to the organisation at the overall level and have 
great impact on the organisation's long-term prosperity. The locus of strategic control 
over joint ventures rests at the corporate level of the joint venture.
Operational control is control over the production process within an 
organisation, in the sense of determining how the employees of an organisation 
perform their work (Child, 1984). It involves such activities as regulating and
90
governing the implementation of the strategic decisions, making operational decisions, 
coordinating across functional areas, and overseeing the joint venture's overall 
operation on a day-to-day basis.
In their extensive review of previous empirical research on this issue, Child 
and Faulkner (1998) conclude that a parent firm's equity share impacts the strategic 
control over a venture while its control in operational areas relies upon its provision of 
noncontractual support (p.201). More interestingly, they found that separation between 
strategic and operational control is frequently observed in IJVs formed between 
developed- and developing country partners.
It is noticeable that strategic control and operation control are not mutually 
exclusive but are overlapping (Child et al, 1997; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Yan and 
Gray, 1994). However, the distinction between strategic and operational control is 
essential. Strategic control for a joint venture can be exercised in a remote manner - 
the controller does not need to reside near the venture, while operational control is 
necessarily on-site. Particularly in international joint ventures, it is extremely difficult 
to exert remote operational control over such activities as dealing with local 
environmental issues, maintaining distribution networks, and resolving daily problems. 
Frequently, the primary means for the foreign partner to exercise operational control is 
to position expatriate managers in the IJV.
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2.4.3. Extent of Control
The third dimension of IJV control examined by researchers was the extent of 
control, i.e., the degree of control achieved by the parent firms. In his study of 23 
U.S.-based wholly-owned subsidiaries and joint ventures operating in Taiwan and 
Philippines, Dang (1977) used a range of 17 items to measure control based on the 
locus of decision making. He found no relationship between the degree of equity 
ownership and the degree of parents' control over their subsidiaries. However, he 
observed a higher incidence of expatriate managers in joint ventures than in wholly- 
owned subsidiaries, which suggested that the degree of control in these ventures might 
in fact be higher than that indicated by the control indices. Other authors (Tomlinson, 
1970; Killing, 1983; Beamish, 1985) measured the amount of control achieved by the 
partner over the joint venture by examining parent firms' influence on a number of 
important types of decisions in joint ventures.
Consideration of the extent of control also draws attention to the danger of 
over-control. The attempt to exercise more control than is necessary will not only 
incur additional direct costs, it could have negative consequences. If one parent tries to 
exert too much control within a joint venture, this may threaten the quality of its 
relations with its partner. As Schaan (1988: p.5) argued:
'in order to ensure the success of a joint venture, managers seek to 
strike a subtle balance between the desire and need to control the venture
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on the one hand, and the need to maintain harmonious relations with the 
partner(s) on the other hand'.
Moreover, if parents either singly or together try to control their joint venture 
too much, this may inhibit the flexibility which the joint venture needs in order to 
develop within their own competitive environment (Bleeke and Ernst, 1993). 
Therefore, as Ohmae (1993: p.42) argues, 'Managers must overcome the popular 
conception that total control increases chances of success'.
In his pioneering study of control in thirty-seven joint ventures from developed 
countries, Killing (1983) classified joint ventures into three groups based on the 
amount of control shared with a partner. In the first group of ventures, management is 
dominated by a single parent. Killing described such ventures as managed much like 
wholly-owned subsidiaries; almost all operating and strategic decisions are made by 
the dominant parent. The board of directors plays a largely ceremonial role in 
dominant-parent ventures. In the second group of ventures, management is extensively 
shared by the parents. In shared management ventures, both parents actively 
participate in the management of the venture so that almost all significant management 
decisions are shared. The board of directors, consisting of executives from each parent, 
has a real decision-making function. In the third group of ventures, classified by 
Killing as independent, management is independent of both parents. In this type of 
venture, the management team is highly autonomous, receiving little direction from 
either parent.
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Regarding the third group, Anderson (1990) agrees that joint ventures should 
be seen primarily as stand-alone entities seeking to maximise their own performance, 
not the parents'. This perspective would then free the joint venture from parent politics 
and parochial viewpoints. This may be naive and, in practice, impossible. It is 
frequently imperative to consider joint ventures in the context of their fit within the 
network of the parents' (international) ventures. The linkages which most alliances 
have with other units of the network may render them inseparable, politically, from the 
power structure of the network as a whole.
Killing's classification was an important contribution to this area of research 
and has been widely employed in subsequent studies. It will be discussed in more 
detail in Section 2.7 in relation to two main arguments on extent of control: dominant 
and shared control.
In summary, parent control is a critical variable in the IJV literature, though the 
concept has not been consistently defined and operationalised. It is reasonable and 
comprehensible that parent control be conceptualised as a multi-dimensional variable 
manifested in the mechanisms, focus and extent of control.
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2.5. IJV Performance
2.5.1. Conceptualisation of IJV Performance
Organisational performance is a multidimensional construct whose 
conceptualisation and operationalisation, over the years, has created much controversy 
and heated debate in the organisation and management literature (Beamish, 1985; 
Calantone and Zhao, 2000; Chakravarthy, 1986; Geringer and Hebert, 1988, 1991; 
Killing, 1983). In IJVs, performance evaluation is even more problematic because 
more than one firm is involved and each may adopt a different perspective. Many of 
the performance problems experienced by IJVs have been linked to the unique 
managerial requirements of these ventures. The complexity associated with the 
presence of two or more parent organisations, who may be competitors as well as 
collaborators, often causes IJVs to be difficult to manage and can result in substantial 
transaction costs associated with coordination of and communication between parents 
and the IJV. The overall costs can be quite substantial since, in addition to consuming 
large amounts of management time, money and other scarce resources, an IJV may 
also expose critical aspects of a parent firm's strategy, technology or other know-how 
to partner or third party firms, thereby threatening to compromise the parent's long 
term competitive position. Thus, performance problems of IJVs constitute a major 
concern for the parent firms.
Nevertheless, the lack of clear understanding surrounding the concept of IJV 
performance has constrained research progress in this area of investigation. Obviously,
95
the inadequate performance evaluation of joint ventures may affect the efficiency of 
their resource acquisition and utilisation, and this could eventually lead to stress or de- 
motivation among managers, simply because the parent companies are applying 
inadequate performance criteria (Shapiro, 1982; Demirag, 1988). Lee and Beamish 
(1995) point out that the performance problems are costly not only to the parent 
companies, but also for the recipient country itself, due to the social costs and 
economic disturbances associated with such problems. A major controversy over the 
measurement of joint venture performance appears to be in finding an appropriate 
criterion.
Given such difficulties, it is easy to understand why so many criteria for 
measuring joint venture performance have been used in the literature. Not only do few 
studies employ exactly the same dimensions, but also the operationalisation of the 
same criteria is not always the same. There is no consensus on the most appropriate 
criteria for evaluating joint venture performance, even if some measures are more 
widely used than others.
In this study, IJV performance is defined as follows: performance is the 
effectiveness of the joint venture in achieving the strategic objectives of the foreign 
parent firm. There are three points in the definition which are noteworthy.
First, evaluating performance from the foreign parent's point of view correctly 
focuses on the interests of the Western shareholders of the joint ventures. Since
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performance is defined as achievement of foreign partner's strategic objectives, it is 
logical to assess from the single parent perspective, i.e. European partner. The 
comparison of assessment from parent or joint venture perspective is further discussed 
in section 2.5.3.
Second, through utilising joint ventures as a means to achieve the strategic 
objectives, sponsoring organisations evaluate the performance according to their 
diverse goals. Unless the parents' strategic expectations are going to be met, there is 
no need to establish joint ventures at the first place (Harrigan, 1986). This study 
attempts to provide insights on European firms investing in Chinese joint ventures, 
including the strategic objectives they intend to attain and how they control the joint 
ventures. It is appropriate to assess whether the joint ventures achieve the parent's 
objectives effectively.
Third, the achievement of the parent's objectives serves as a more flexible and 
robust indicator of performance than some quantitative measures, such as profitability. 
The two streams of viewpoints are compared in section 2.5.2.
2.5.2. Subjective vs. Objective Measures of Joint Venture Performance
Subjective measures usually try to obtain a rating of how effective a given 
joint venture is at meeting its goals, as perceived by managers. They include items 
such as perceived IJV success (Beamish, 1985; Beamish and Banks, 1987, Killing,
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1983; Yan, 1993), and perception of goal attainment (Beamish, 1993, Lyles and Salk, 
1996).
Objective measures are often limited to three criteria: longevity or survival 
(Harrigan, 1986; Kogut, 1988b), stability (Beamish, 1985; Gomes-Casseres, 1987; 
Osland and Cavusgil, 1996) and quantitative measures (Tomlinson, 1970). Longevity 
or survival is the duration of a joint venture, from the date of its establishment to its 
termination. Stability refers to whether there has been any change in the capital 
structure or control of a joint venture during this lifetime. Quantitative measures are 
indicators such as profitability, growth and market share, etc.
Both subjective and objective measures of IJV performance have their own 
limitations. Studies that measure IJV performance in terms of venture survival or 
stability incorrectly assume that characteristics such as venture termination or 
instability are indicative of poor IJV performance. Gomes-Casseres (1987) argues that 
changes in ownership share are often normal evolutionary developments in a venture's 
lifetime that represent organisational adaptations to environmental changes. 
Furthermore, the death of an IJV does not automatically imply that the venture is 
dissolved because of poor performance. Some IJVs, especially those operating in 
centrally planned economies, are formed with a predetermined life span. When the IJV 
contract expires, the venture is either dissolved or a new contract is drawn to extend 
the venture's operations. For example, Hamel (1991) argues that where learning is one
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of the strategic objectives, the termination of an agreement can not be seen as failure, 
nor can its longevity and stability be seen as evidence of success.
In measuring success one could try to take objective measures such as return 
on investment, growth, market share, or, shareholder value. This way of measuring 
has two pitfalls: first, it is impractical as results of foreign subsidiaries are not 
available, except, in those cases which are listed on a stock exchange; companies 
would be reluctant to give such information privately for fear of giving away inside 
information. Second, those measures would be quite biased and incomplete anyway 
since in a lot of cases, tax consideration, supply contracts, management fees, 
technology licensing fees, royalties, and transfer pricing practices (Geringer and 
Hebert, 1991), or simply competitive secrecy would make the data questionable. IJVs 
may be formed for pursuing a variety of objectives, from technology transfer and joint 
research to access to materials, new markets or economies of scale (Contractor and 
Lorange, 1988). Many IJVs also operate in contexts where measures of short-term 
financial performance might suggest that the venture is performing poorly. For 
example, IJVs formed to develop radical new technologies or new markets are often 
not likely to generate a financial profit for many years. In such situations, a financial 
or objective measure is unlikely to accurately capture an IJVs relative performance.
On the other hand, subjective measures suffer from serious response biases. It 
is not uncommon to find managers that are reluctant to admit that their ventures are 
underperforming even when there are clear signs of poor performance. Moreover, the
99
fact that a joint venture reaches its goals does not mean that it is efficiently managed 
or without any problem.
There are a few studies which investigate the links between subjective and 
objective measures. Interestingly, they suggest that the two types of measures are 
positively correlated and complementary (Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Glaister and 
Buckley, 1998; Hatfield et al, 1998). Geringer and Hebert's (1991) work is the first 
study which examines the relationship between objective and subjective performance 
measures. They found that the correlation between objective (survival, stability, and 
duration) and subjective measures is generally positive but that the strength of the 
links varies significantly according to the different criteria used. Objective measures 
are strongly correlated to subjective assessment of overall satisfaction with joint 
venture performance and individual dimensions evaluating overall effectiveness (e.g. 
sales level, market share, profitability).
Hatfield et al (1998) also proved that partner assessment of joint venture goal 
achievement is positively and significantly related to joint venture duration survival. 
The positive correlation between these variables is, indeed, theoretically logical. That 
is, it takes time to achieve parents' strategic objectives, and survival is a desirable state. 
Failure to survive limits duration and the opportunity for further objective attainment. 
Although Glaister and Buckley (1998) only partly confirm Geringer and Hebert's 
findings, this is largely due to the differences in the nature of the samples investigated.
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Measuring the parent's satisfaction vis-a-vis the performance of an UV, the 
main advantage of this type of measure is its ability to provide information regarding 
the extent to which the UV has achieved its objectives.
2.5.3. Parent vs. Joint Venture Perspectives
Several perspectives have been used to assess a venture's performance. Based 
on the argument that IJVs are established to fulfill their sponsors' strategic goals and 
objectives (Harrigan, 1986), a number of studies measured UV performance from the 
parents' standpoint. Some researchers have used the performance assessment provided 
by a single parent (e.g. Ding, 1997; Lecraw, 1984), while others incorporated the 
perspectives of both parents (e.g. Beamish, 1985; Beamish and Banks, 1987; Harrigan, 
1988; Schaan, 1983, Yan and Gray, 1994). Other studies reasoned that since JVs are 
free-standing organisational entities, it is more appropriate to evaluate their 
performance using the ventures' management perspective (Anderson, 1990; Killing, 
1983). While partners often differ in their interests, the success of a joint venture does 
not necessarily lead to an increase in the performance of its parents either. In certain 
cases, some successful joint ventures end up competing with their parents.
In Osland's (1994) in-depth case studies, a bilateral approach was applied. 
Data were collected from personal interviews with managers from both parent
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companies, joint venture operating managers from both partners, and government 
officials from both countries. However, Geringer and Hebert (1991) found that results 
do not differ substantially if one evaluates satisfaction based on 1) one partner 2) both 
partners, or 3) the joint venture management. Reliance on a single parent company 
respondent as a data source appeared to be a justifiable option when the respondent 
represented one of the key shareholders (i.e. the parent company executive with direct 
responsibility for the IJV). Hence, reliance on one respondent may not create serious 
bias.
2.6. Relationship between Parent Control and Performance
The study of parent control in IJVs is not an end in itself. The rationale behind 
the studies of control lies in its impact on IJV performance. However, the control- 
performance relationship in IJVs is more complex than that in stand-alone 
organisations because IJVs are multi-player partnerships in which different players 
exercise different levels of control.
The control exercised by parent companies over a venture's operations 
represents a critical determinant of IJV performance and the attainment of parent 
company strategic objectives. Yet, particularly in comparison to wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, the exercise of effective control over these jointly owned and managed 
ventures often represents a more difficult proposition for parent companies. Parents
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are often unable to rely solely on their ownership position and related formal controls 
to ensure that their strategic objectives are adequately considered (Geringer and 
Frayne, 1990).
Concerning the content of control, researchers studying the relationship 
between parent control and IJV performance have mainly focused on two types of 
ventures: dominant-parent versus shared management ventures. The recent studies 
have considered them as two extreme ends of a continuum (Calantone and Zhao, 2000; 
Ding, 1997; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997), i.e. at one end of the control continuum are 
dominant-parent ventures and at the other end of the control continuum are shared 
management ventures.
The following two parts of this section will review the work of researchers 
who viewed parent control exercised over the IJV along the control-sharing continuum. 
The last part is a critique of previous studies and the incorporated approach employed 
in this study.
2.6.1. Arguments for Dominant Parent Joint Ventures
Based on his sample of thirty six IJVs in North America, Killing (1983) 
suggests that dominant-parent ventures tend to be more successful than shared 
management ventures. His measure of JV performance is the degree of parent 
satisfaction with JV performance. The rationale for his argument is that dominant-
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parent ventures are easier to manage than shared-management ventures, and hence 
generate better performance. He argues that in dominant-parent ventures, the majority 
of functional managers will come from, or be selected by the dominant parent. They 
and the joint venture general manager will be evaluated on the same basis as plant 
managers for a wholly-owed subsidiary. In addition, the joint venture will be 
integrated into the dominant parent's management system. Therefore, joint venture is 
easier to manage; hence, it performs better. Indeed, the shared nature of IJV 
management makes IJVs difficult to manage. Typically, a variety of behaviour, 
cultural, and managerial differences between parent firms makes the effective 
management of an IJV quite a demanding task in terms of time and effort (Doz, 1996).
In his study of 153 MNEs subsidiaries in five countries of the ASEAN region, 
Lecraw (1984) further developed and generalised Killing's findings. He found a 
statistically significant positive relationship between IJV performance and the amount 
of control exercised by parents. From the MNEs' perspective, the percent equity 
ownership and IJV performance is U-shaped. High and low levels of equity ownership 
are associated with high levels of IJV success. To measure the extent of the parent's 
control exercised over the IJV, Killing used nine decision-making areas while Lecraw 
used eighteen decision-making areas weighted by their importance in the achievement 
of IJV performance.
Concluding their survey of 102 IJVs established by Norwegian MNEs, Mjoen 
and Tallman (1997) observed that the more control foreign parents had over their IJVs,
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the better the UVs performed. They argue that exercising more control over their IJVs, 
the parent would have stronger sources of firm-specific advantages than the parents 
exercising less control. Therefore, the IJVs where parents have more control should 
exhibit superior performance.
Similarly, through examining thirty eight Sino-American IJVs in China, Ding 
(1997) found that dominant management control exercised by foreign partners had a 
positive impact on the perceived JV performance. The foreign parents need to notice 
that the extent of managerial control they exercise over the JVs 1 activities will have 
significant impact on the possibility of meeting their strategic objectives. In order to 
measure the extent of overall control exercised by MNE parents, Ding used ten 
decision-making areas comparable to those of Killing (1983).
Lee and Beamish (1995), by investigating thirty one IJVs established by 
Korean MNEs, also found results supporting a positive relationship between foreign 
parents' control and IJV performance. The parent control is measured by assessing the 
degree of the parent firm's influence in decision making regarding fourteen decisions. 
Their study is unique in that IJVs included in their sample are formed between firms 
from emerging market countries.
Osland and Cavusgil's (1996) in-depth analysis of U.S.-Chinese IJVs 
concluded that US managers revealed a pattern of being more comfortable and more 
satisfied when maintaining dominant control in IJVs. From the perspective of
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efficiency, dominant control can be perceived as more efficient than shared control. 
The transaction costs associated with opportunistic behaviour and uncertainty are 
minimised as there is less interpartner conflict in IJVs where one parent makes the 
business decisions. Coordination and monitoring costs are lower when one party 
manages the business functions. Furthermore, control is a means to reduce the risks 
associated with the uncertainty of a relatively unknown, potentially ill-equipped, 
developing country partner managing an activity.
Yan and Gray (1994) provide another set of arguments concerning the 
relationship between control and company performance. Using the findings of case 
studies, they proved that dominating partner control would only promote the 
controlling partners' objectives while balanced control will generate higher 
satisfaction for all the partners. However the contractual obligations, trust and 
commonality of goals between partners would help the expectations of both partners 
even under dominant partner control. In their later study of ninety Sino-U.S. IJVs in 
China, Yan and Gray (1997) confirm the positive correlation between IJV 
performance and parent control over operational areas of IJV management. They 
suggest that the more control a parent exercises, in comparison to the other partner, 
over the joint venture's routine operations, the greater the extent to which this parent is 
able to achieve its strategic objectives.
Empirically investigating ninety one Sino-Japanese, one hundred twelve Sino- 
Korean, and one hundred nine Sino-U.S. IJVs, Calantone and Zhao (2000) also found
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evidence for MNE parent-dominant ventures. Despite the insignificant Japanese result, 
their findings from Korean and U.S. samples confirm the previous research on MNE 
joint ventures in developing countries that foreign parents tend to have high 
performance if they can have more control on joint ventures in an unstable market 
such as China. They further suggest that performance is likely to be improved if 
foreign partners can control the major functional areas by applying their advanced 
technology. In recent research on foreign-Singaporean international joint ventures, 
Pangarkar and Klein (2004) also found a beneficial relationship between control and 
IJV performance.
In summary, the aforementioned empirical studies support the view that the 
control-performance relationship is positive and direct. They consider that the equal 
division of control between the partners leads to coordination problems and 
transaction costs that ultimately reduce the value of the venture. In essence, if one 
partner has dominant control, decisions will be less time consuming and easier to 
make. Dominant control also is a mechanism for reducing the risks associated with 
coordination and opportunistic behaviour, and, consequently, for minimising 
transaction costs (Geringer and Hebert, 1989). Thus, as is argued by this stream of 
studies, foreign parents exercising more control should exhibit higher performance 
than parents exercising less control.
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2.6.2. Arguments for Shared Management Joint Ventures
Tomlinson (1970), in his early examination of the joint venture process in 
international business, looked at the control-performance link. He found that "higher 
levels of return were obtained from joint venture investments by UK firms with a 
more relaxed attitude toward control. This casts some doubt upon the theory that 
control is necessary in order to improve the operational effectiveness of a joint 
venture" (p.63). Tomlinson feels the MNEs should not insist on dominant control over 
the major managerial decisions and that the sharing of responsibility with local 
associates will lead to a greater contribution from them and in turn a greater return on 
investment. However, he didn't explicitly indicate the relationship between dominant 
control and performance.
Beamish (1985) first presented evidence against the argument for dominant- 
parent ventures. He observed a strong correlation between unsatisfactory performance 
and an MNE parent's dominant control in his sample of IJVs in developing countries. 
He applied the same control measure as Killing (1983). His theoretical argument for 
shared management ventures, which derives from organisational learning, is that 
sharing control with a local partner is a vehicle for tapping country-specific 
advantages embedded within a local partner. Therefore, the more control an MNE 
parent shares with a local partner, the more country-specific advantages the MNE 
parent will acquire, and superior performance will result.
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In his later investigation of twelve previous studies, supplemented by his own 
study of twenty two Sino-foreign IJVs, Beamish (1993) also observed that shared 
management ventures have greater success than dominant-parent ventures. He 
concluded that the "unique economic structures, uncertain political environment, 
unfamiliar culture in PRC are far removed from the experience of most western firms 
and managers as to make a dominant control extremely risky. Similarly, the lack of 
managerial skills by the Chinese makes dominant control by them equally risky." 
(p.40). Chinese managers, unfamiliar with operating a business under competitive 
market conditions or current global business standards, are seen as ill-equipped to 
compete against global companies who are far more experienced in designing 
effective marketing strategies and in manufacturing high quality products efficiently. 
Moreover, many of the Chinese parent company partners are government agencies 
who provide capital, but who have never managed a profit-oriented business.
Shan (1991) argues that US partner companies prefer to have minority equity 
in IJVs in China as it helps to align the interests of local partners to those of the IJVs. 
It is particularly essential in China because of the high level of uncertainty in political, 
bureaucratic and legal situations. In that context, achieving dominant control may not 
be the best way to generate satisfactory results for IJV operations.
Hebert and Beamish (1997) also investigated the relationship between IJV 
control and performance and found that shared ownership IJVs often exhibit higher 
performance. Specifically, they found that shared control over operational and
109
strategic decisions was positively related to performance, while technological 
autonomy was negatively related to performance. The authors argue that categorising 
control under three dimensions (operational, strategic, and technological) may help 
explain why previous research has resulted in contradictory findings.
It is noticeable that the joint ventures used in these studies were formed 
between developed- and developing-country partners. There tends to be an association 
between satisfactory performance and less dominant control by the foreign partner. 
The argument is that a sharing of control with local partners will lead to a greater 
contribution from them which can assist in coping with circumstances that are 
unfamiliar to the foreign partners, and therefore result in a higher performance.
2.6.3. Critique of Control-Performance Relationship
Given the diversity in the conceptualisations and operationalisations of IJV 
control and performance, it is not surprising that extant research in the IJV control- 
performance relationship has generated mixed results. As is evident from the studies 
reviewed, there is no consensus about the relationship between parent control and IJV 
performance. Even the studies of IJVs located in the same country have produced 
conflicting results. For example, in China, Osland and Cavusgil (1996), Ding (1997), 
Van (2000), and Calantone & Zhao (2000) found results supporting Killing's (1983) 
dominant-parent hypothesis while Beamish (1993) found evidence to the contrary.
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Researchers have conceptualised parent control in terms of the extent of 
control exercised by MNE parents. They have attempted to correlate IJV performance 
with the level of overall control either exercised by MNE parents or shared with local 
partners. They implicitly assume that parents seek overall control over the IJV's 
management rather than specific activities of control. Some scholars suggest that 
parent control tends to be selective and exercised over specific activities rather than 
over entire activities of the joint venture management. For example, in his in-depth 
study of eight Sino-US JVs, Osland (1994) explored the relationship between control 
of key functions and performance. He found that the more control the US parents have 
over functions that they considered to be critical (i.e. marketing, pricing), the more 
satisfied they were with their IJVs in China.
However, the researchers in this research stream did not further explore the 
link of specific divisions of control with IJV performance. Therefore, in examining the 
relationship between parent control and IJV performance, this study incorporates 
parent control as the choice of extent of control and focus of control (i.e. strategic 
control and operational control).
It is important to point out that consistency in the unit of analysis in 
conceptualising and operationalising control and performance is necessary in order to 
expect explainable empirical results. For example, if control is conceptualised from 
the IJV management's perspective, performance should be defined in terms of the IJV 
management's goals. Similarly, if performance is assessed by using one partner's
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criteria, control should be conceptualised from the same partner's viewpoint. In this 
study, since control is conceptualised from the parent perspective, the venture's 
performance is therefore characterised as the level of attainment of the parent's 
strategic objectives.
2.7. Chapter Summary
This study concentrates on a particular form of international market entry: 
international joint ventures. The establishment of IJVs is a strategic option for 
multinational corporations, especially those pursuing global strategies. IJVs are 
critical to the maintenance of competitive advantage because they are increasingly 
employed to exploit an organisation's core markets and technologies. Despite their 
increased popularity and strategic importance, IJVs have frequently failed to achieve 
the strategic objectives of their parent firms.
Diverse reasons have been suggested to explain the strategic objectives for 
forming international joint ventures (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Glaister and 
Wang 1993; Harrigan, 1985; Hennart, 1991; Kogut, 1988b; Mead, 1994; Yang and 
Lee, 2002; Zhang, 1997). Based upon transaction costs, market power, and 
organisational learning, the foreign partner's objectives are broadly classified in three 
categories in this study. In essence, the three theories are not competing explanations 
of the strategic objectives, but address the same issue from different perspectives.
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Efficiency-seeking objectives imply the partner's intention of exploring efficiency by 
reducing costs, spreading risks, and pursuing global operational synergies. Market- 
developing objectives are more concerned with how to obtain fast market access, 
managing competition, overcoming government barriers. Knowledge-seeking 
objectives include, through the joint venture's interactive setting, the foreign partners 
acquiring the local partner's country-specific knowledge and local market knowledge.
The issue of control in IJVs is much more complex than in wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, since two or more parents may exert influence on the venture's activities 
for divergent objectives. A review of literature reveals that there is no consensus as to 
the conceptualisation and operationalisation of IJV control. Three dimensions of 
control are discussed. This study incorporates parent control as the choice of extent of 
control and focus of control.
Given its problematic nature, the performance of IJVs is difficult to define and 
measure. Even though performance and its relationship with control have been 
extensively studied (Beamish, 1993; Calantone and Zhao 2000; Chalos and O'Connor, 
1998; Ding, 1997; Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Luo, 2001; Luo and Peng, 1999; Wang 
et at, 1999), the results are inconclusive. Two dimensions of performance 
measurement are discussed: subjective and objective measures, from the perspectives 
of the parents.
113
The extant empirical studies produce controversial results on the relationship 
between parent control and IJV performance relationship. The controversy is chiefly 
generated from the different conceptualisations of control and performance, and the 
research context.
This literature review on partners' strategic objectives, parent control and IJV 
performance provides a basis for the development of a conceptual framework. This is 
discussed in the next chapter. A number of hypotheses are also proposed.
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Chapter 3. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
3.1. Chapter Introduction
From the literature review in the preceding chapter, three categories of 
strategic objectives for establishing international joint ventures have emerged. Parent 
control and IJV performance are conceptualised. This chapter firstly presents the 
research framework. The three categories of IJV strategic objectives are developed 
from three theoretical strands respectively as discussed in Chapter 2. Their 
relationship to parent control and performance is indicated. A number of hypotheses 
are proposed and discussed subsequently.
3.2. Theoretical Framework
Regarding strategic objectives of international joint ventures, vast and growing 
studies have emerged. The studies are compounded by the diversity of research lenses. 
The critical issues explored include: 1) transaction cost economics, 2) market power 
theory, 3) organisational learning theory, 4) motivations of IJVs 5) conceptualisation 
of IJV control, 6) IJV performance, and 7) the linkage between parent control and IJV 
performance (these are discussed in detail in Chapter 2). Although each individual
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study may cast new light on some aspects of these important issues, taken together, 
extant research has been highly fragmented in orientation. Furthermore, a clear 
understanding of the relationship between IJV control and performance is constrained 
by inconclusive and inconsistent research results. Therefore, further research efforts 
are required to incorporate all major theoretical dimensions of IJV strategic objectives, 
control and performance into an integrated research framework, which may be 
examined and empirically tested in an integrative study.
Based on the transaction costs, market power and organisational learning 
theories, and the review of literature, a research framework for this study is designed 
and presented in Figure 3.1. The strategic objectives are the inputs, which are 
categorised based upon three main theoretical strands, whereas performance is the 
output. Control is the process which ensures the parent firms effectively attain their 
objectives.
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Putting more emphasis on the benefit side of a transaction, market power 
theory regards joint ventures as a form of defensive investment by which firms deter 
entry through preempting competition, and enhancing market power in the context of 
competitive rivalry and overcoming government barriers (Kogut, 1988b).
By focusing on the cost aspect of a transaction, the transaction cost logic 
explains joint ventures in terms of market failure for intermediate inputs, asset 
specificity, and high uncertainty over specifying and monitoring performance. It 
posits that firms achieve efficiency by minimising production and transaction costs.
In the organisational learning view, firms entering a foreign market not only 
exploit their existing competitive advantages, but also develop new resources or build 
new capabilities through learning and knowledge acquisition. A joint venture is used 
for the transfer of organisationally embedded knowledge that cannot easily be 
blueprinted or packaged through licensing or market transactions. That is the joint 
venture is used as a vehicle through which organisational knowledge is exchanged 
and imitated. Although a partner does not need to have very specific learning 
objectives when they set up the joint venture, acquiring other's knowledge is one of 
the important motivations.
A firm's objectives are its strategic intention, and control is an element of its 
structure. It may be inferred that the parent's motivations for forming an IJV affect its 
degree of control over the IJV, thereby influencing its performance. Geringer and 
Hebert (1989) also assert that control can be determined by the parent's strategic 
objectives. In other words, a given partner's perception of the importance of control 
depends mainly on its strategic mission for the cooperative arrangement (Root, 1988).
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The parent's objectives for forming an IJV, therefore, will have direct effects on the 
extent of control.
In IJVs, the exercise of effective control may prove to be difficult and 
complex. Firms can not rely solely on their ownership position. They also need to 
relinquish some control over their activities and resources due to the fact that 
exercising control is not free. It costs organisation resources (EIU, 1995). Firms 
establish TVs to achieve their strategic objectives. It is logical to measure IJV 
performance by the perceived degree of objective attainment and overall satisfaction 
with joint venture performance.
3.3. Research Hypotheses
Joint venture is often considered the fastest way to get a foothold in a new 
market since existing players have expertise in dealing with the domestic environment 
(Harrigan, 1988a; Kogut, 1988b). A joint venture motivated by the market is intended 
to reduce the market power of rivals or enhance the firm's own market power 
(Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Kogut, 1988b). Timing will be an important part of 
competitive strategy in this situation because firms which move first can gain access 
to better partners. If the ventures are "exclusive", firms could gain a competitive 
advantage which late entrants could not capture as easily.
Tallman and Shenkar (1994) assert that strategic control should be important 
to foreign investors who need to implement their fast market entry strategy and align 
the IJV with overall and long-range goals. Local partners in developing countries 
generally expect the joint venture products to be exported to earn foreign exchange.
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While the foreign partner's strategic objective is market-oriented, access to these local 
markets, more control is required at a strategic level.
Local partners' contributions in market access at operational level are often 
very critical for successful IJV performance in emerging economic regions (Luo, 
1997; Makino and Delios, 1996). Isobe et al (2000) find that the extent of a foreign 
firm's control over an IJV was negatively associated with early entry. This result 
implies that foreign parents' decisions regarding the choice of operational control may 
be based on a tradeoff between the potential risks of leakage of proprietary knowledge 
and the potential contributions from local IJV partners with respect to local market 
access. Foreign firms strictly pursuing dominant operational control over their local 
partner may fail to gain their local partner's assistance for entry into a local market 
and. Therefore, it is proposed that:
HI a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between fast market entry and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective: when the strategic control is high, fast market entry 
and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is positively 
related; when the strategic control is low, fast market entry and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective is negatively related.
Hlb: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between fast market entry and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective: when the operational control is high, fast market entry 
and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is negatively 
related; when the operational control is low, fast market entry and satisfaction 
with performance in relation to this objective is positively related.
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In coping with the intensified international competition and the challenges of 
globalisation of the world's economies, IJVs represent an effective approach in 
competing globally. Foreign firms face pressure from other foreign competitors in the 
global market. By forming a joint venture with local partners, foreign firms can blunt 
the penetration of other foreign firms into the market (Baird et at, 1990).
As emerging countries enter a time of economic transition, MacMillan (1983) 
suggested that the first entrants from each industry group into these emerging markets 
would accrue long-term benefits. Specifically, these firms have an opportunity to 
preempt future competition by gaining the most efficient distribution channels or 
access to raw materials or by capturing a brand loyal customer following. Pre-empting 
other foreign competitors are not immediate concerns of IJV local partners. But the 
foreign partners are more likely to govern the IJV strategic direction in order to 
manage potential competition. Exercising operational control over the functions in 
joint ventures, such as production and marketing, is an effective way to maintain 
competitive advantage against competitors. Therefore:
H2a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between managing competition and satisfaction with performance 
in relation to this objective: when the strategic control is high managing 
competition and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is 
positively related; when the strategic control is low, managing competition and 
satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is negatively related.
H2b: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between managing competition and satisfaction with performance
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in relation to this objective: when the operational control is high, managing 
competition and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is 
positively related; when the operational control is low, managing competition 
and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is negatively 
related.
The literature suggests that foreign partners are likely to rely on local partners 
to cope with pressure from government and trade barriers (Beamish, 1993; Mjoen and 
Tallman, 1997). IJVs are viewed by the developing country authorities as the 
preferred form of foreign investment because they provide an opportunity for the 
transfer of advanced technology and management skills to the economy and lead to 
increased exports (Management World, 1996). For example, many Sino-foreign joint 
ventures were founded to overcome governmental restrictions (Beamish, 1993; Child 
and Faulkner, 1998; Luo, 1997).
Young et al (1989) contend that the rationale behind the adoption of joint 
venture as an entry mode generally can be attributed to the MNE's intention to 
overcome various local barriers due to its lack of local expertise, its lack of 
complementary resources, or merely because of the regulations imposed by the local 
authorities.
Vanhonacker (1997) considers that dominant parent control joint ventures are 
appropriate when a company takes on a partner solely in response to pressures from a 
host government. In such a situation, foreign companies often prefer to find a passive 
local company that (1) has no knowledge of the product, (2) is willing to be a passive 
investor, 3) is neither a government agency nor controlled by the government. If the
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local partner never learns the joint venture's business, the dominant foreign parent can 
expect good IJV performance.
Some MNEs strive to avoid joint ventures, but when they do enter into them 
because of the requirements of host governments, they strive to adopt their own 
systems, based upon product differentiation, aggressive promotion and advertising, 
selling, and emphasis upon trademarks and brand names (Luo, 1997). They consider 
control of the key operational elements in a joint venture essential in their type of 
business.
H3a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between overcoming government barriers and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the strategic control is high 
overcoming government barriers and satisfaction with performance in relation 
to this objective is positively related; when the strategic control is low, 
overcoming government barriers and satisfaction with performance in relation 
to this objective is negatively related.
H3b: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between overcoming government barriers and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the operational control is high, 
overcoming government barriers and satisfaction with performance in relation 
to this objective is positively related; when the operational control is low, 
overcoming government barriers and satisfaction with performance in relation 
to this objective is negatively related.
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Equipped with modern communications and transportation, MNEs 
increasingly adopt a global strategy as their favoured strategy. When a MNE pursues 
a global strategy, it is critical that all, or almost all, activities are coordinated centrally, 
and such central coordination can be achieved only with full control (Kim and Hwang, 
1992). The empirical study conducted by Kim and Hwang (1992) confirmed that an 
MNE prefers full-control modes because they enhance the MNE's ability to ensure 
that strategic actions taken by different foreign subsidiaries are consistent with the 
global strategy.
Harrigan (1988) argues that firms that pursue global strategies prefer to 
coordinate closely all of the pieces of their global systems. Shared-equity ventures 
often restrict sponsoring firms' abilities to enjoy the close coordination they seek in 
global strategies. At the strategic level, a firm attempting to coordinate its operations 
in a global market may seek to insure that the joint venture fits in with these other 
activities. Without majority control of the venture, this may cause problems (Dymsza, 
1988). Similarly, MNEs' managers embrace ventures where they anticipate that 
synergies with their firms' wholly owned business units can be exploited, or where 
they can attain scale of integration economies through them. However, synergies and 
economies can not be realised unless the dominant managerial control systems are in 
place. Indeed, The MNE looks upon the joint venture as one piece of a complex 
global web, and it is not likely to allow that single piece to dictate its own policies 
where other pieces or the web itself might be compromised.
One primary reason for MNEs to expand to China is to leverage the shared 
costs of manufacturing and marketing for global competitive advantage (Luo and 
Peng, 1999; Tse et al, 1997). MNEs such as Hewlett Packard, IBM, Procter &
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Gamble, and Motorola are increasingly entering the Chinese market, concentrating 
production by taking cost advantages through lower labour costs and exporting their 
products worldwide. From their perspective, subsidiaries in China have to be prepared 
to accept centrally determined decisions as to what they should produce, how much 
they should produce, and how their output should be priced for transfer between 
operations. In such global industry settings, the need for full control may be more 
pressing than in other circumstances. Raj an and Pangarkar (2000) empirically 
highlight the importance of global strategy by Singaporean MNEs in their propensity 
of setting up wholly-owned subsidiaries in China. In short, achieving strategic needs 
in an interdependent global system necessarily requires a high degree of control over 
the operations of different national affiliates (Deng, 2001). Thus, the arguments lead 
to the following hypotheses:
H4a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between seeking global synergy and satisfaction with performance 
in relation to this objective: when the strategic control is high seeking global 
synergy and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is 
positively related; when the strategic control is low, seeking global synergy and 
satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is negatively related.
H4b: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between seeking global synergy and satisfaction with performance 
in relation to this objective: when the operational control is high, seeking global 
synergy and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is 
positively related; when the operational control is low, seeking global synergy
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and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is negatively 
related.
From the investor's perspective, projects involving more capital are inherently 
riskier than smaller projects. The financial risk for partners investing in an IJV is 
likely to be greater in emerging economies because of their institutional limitations 
(Child and Faulkner, 1998; Harrigan, 1988a; Luo, 2001). Risk reduction attempts to 
reduce risk by bringing it under apparent control. Firms tend to do this by securing 
direct control over their affiliates and sufficient external influence so as to enact 
critical aspects of the environment (Child and Tse, 2001).
Concluding from 132 Sino-Singaporean joint ventures, Wang et al (1999) 
indicated that it was important to maintain control in the financial aspect of the IJV if 
the projects were very large. As such, the foreign companies sent financial controllers 
to the joint venture to provide training in modern accounting and financial methods. 
At the same time, the financial controller could act as a "policeman" for the foreign 
parent firms. Therefore, if a partner perceives that there is a high financial risk in 
entering an IJV, this may dispose it towards trying to secure the investment by seizing 
more control on the strategic level (Pan, 1996).
Although China is currently undertaking a series of aggressive reform 
measures to transform the traditional centrally planned economic system into a 
market-oriented economic system, state-owned enterprises still possess enormous 
power upon which foreign investors may wish to rely. Due to the high financial 
requirement of large projects, the choice of local partner is often limited to state- 
owned enterprises. But it may not be an appealing option to let the Chinese firm be
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the dominant partner of the cooperative arrangement because of the nature of the 
economic system and state-owned firms in China. Since a state-owned partner would 
generally have little experience managing a for-profit organisation, the foreign partner 
would be more than willing to ensure its dominance in strategic decisions while 
leveraging its local counterpart to manage operational issues, such as handling 
external stakeholders (Tsang, 1998). The state-owned companies have direct contact 
with government departments that control some resources, and can explain relevant 
policies differently and favourably. These are very valuable to the IJV operations. 
Therefore:
H5a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between spreading financial risk and satisfaction with performance 
in relation to this objective: when the strategic control is high spreading 
financial risk and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is 
positively related; when the strategic control is low, spreading financial risk 
and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is negatively 
related.
H5b: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between spreading financial risk and satisfaction with performance 
in relation to this objective: when the operational control is high, spreading 
financial risk and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is 
negatively related; when the operational control is low, spreading financial risk 
and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is positively 
related.
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The political environment of a host country is a critical dimension in 
distinguishing among respective opportunities in a foreign market. The political 
environment may be related to international business through the concept of political 
risk and the greater the exposure is to political risk in emerging and developing 
countries, the greater the increase in an organisaiton's total risk (Merchant, 2000).
Teece (1986) identifies political risk in particular as an important 
environmental factor affecting the relative efficiency of alternative governance 
structures: whereas wholly-owned subsidiaries involve a direct connection between 
the MNE and the host government, and this in turn increases the likelihood of hold-up 
after the firm has made sunk investments, firms using JVs are less susceptible to 
political risk because the local partner acts as a buffer. Several empirical studies have 
confirmed a negative relationship between political risk and the firm's control of 
foreign affiliates (e.g., Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque, 1995).
Yan and Gray (1994) discovered that at the early stage of investment in China, 
political risk is one of the most important concerns. Boisot and Child (1999) argue 
that one response to the risk presented by environmental complexity and uncertainty 
is to attempt to reduce it through the exercise of greater control. Many large foreign 
companies in China have been adopting this approach.
In China, reducing reliance on local partners and external relationships will 
lower the transaction costs of social exchange, but it is likely to raise the transaction 
cost of exercising direct operational control using expensive expatriates. Moreover, 
this policy could be of limited effectiveness in reducing risk because it places low 
value on the support of local partners and may also alienate powerful officials in the 
institutional environment. These factors point to a distinct limitation in the ownership
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advantages enjoyed by foreign firms operating in China, which may contribute 
significantly to their often disappointing performance in that country (Child, 1994). 
Thus:
H6a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between avoiding political uncertainty and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the strategic control is high 
avoiding political uncertainty and satisfaction with performance in relation to 
this objective is positively related; when the strategic control is low, avoiding 
political uncertainty and satisfaction with performance in relation to this 
objective is negatively related.
H6b: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between avoiding political uncertainty and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the operational control is high, 
avoiding political uncertainty and satisfaction with performance in relation to 
this objective is negatively related; when the operational control is low, 
avoiding political uncertainty and satisfaction with performance in relation to 
this objective is positively related.
The foreign partners must tradeoff control while the local knowledge 
transfemng process is being undertaken (Datta and Rasheed, 1993). The tradeoff in 
learning is between the acquisition of complementary expertise that other partners 
might be willing to transfer to the IJV and ceding power over decisions relating to 
critical resources to the resource providers (Borys and Jemison, 1989).
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Yan and Luo (2001) argue that when a multinational firm aims at acquiring 
country-specific knowledge, it may be either lacking bargaining power in negotiating 
for a majority ownership or reluctant to take a majority position in the venture 
because of its lack of knowledge about the host country. Lyles and Salk (1996) found 
that IJVs with 50/50 ownership control had significantly higher levels of knowledge 
acquisition than majority-controlled IJVs.
Inkpen and Beamish (1997) also suggest that a local partner will possess 
greater bargaining power over and be less dependent on its foreign JV partner when 
the foreign partner possesses little knowledge of local market conditions. In support of 
this view, Makino and Delios (1996) find that the presence of local partners had a 
significant and positive impact on the financial performance of an IJV when the 
parent firm had limited experience of the local operation. Information about the local 
economy, politics, culture and business customs, consumer demands and tastes, the 
labour force, infrastructure, raw materials, and other factors required for the operation 
of joint ventures is likely to be delegated to the local partner (Makino and Delios, 
1996; Vanhonacker and Pan, 1997). These findings generally imply that foreign firms 
tend to allow their local IJV partner to keep a high level of control within the ventures 
when they are keen to learn about unfamiliar local markets.
China is a developing transition economy that represents complex and 
unfamiliar conditions for foreign investors (Boisot and Child, 1999). The main ways 
that Chinese partners can help their IJVs to succeed is in providing country-specific 
knowledge, contacts with regulatory authorities, and management of the local 
workforce. The local firm has many years experience in China and can provide access 
to its distribution system, to managers who are competent in the local environment,
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and to its knowledge of how best to deal with government agencies. Moreover, the 
costs of employing expatriate managers to enforce operational control in Sino-foreign 
IJVs can very substantially eat into profits (EIU, 1995). Therefore, the foreign partner 
should not take over the operational control.
For many European enterprises, a joint venture in China is their first 
experience with a planned economy in a developing country. Local knowledge is 
likely to reside with the Chinese partner. Foreign partners are likely to exercise less 
control over the joint venture, because they need to gain knowledge from the Chinese 
partner in the process of operation. The foreign partners are even likely to delegate the 
Chinese partner to make operational decisions because they need to gain knowledge 
from the Chinese partner. However, knowledge acquiring must be selective. Giving 
away full control will lead to inefficient learning. The foreign parents are more likely 
to seize strategic decisions. Therefore,
H7a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the strategic control is high 
acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective is positively related; when the strategic control is low, 
acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective is negatively related.
H7b: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the operational control is high, 
acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with performance in
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relation to this objective is negatively related; when the operational control is 
low, acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective is positively related.
As an important strategy, international joint ventures have been increasingly 
used by MNEs to improve their local market knowledge (Tsang, 2002). When a firm 
decides to market and distribute its product in the foreign market it must obtain access 
to physical facilities (e.g. warehousing, local repair and service facilities), and, most 
importantly, acquire marketing expertise in the foreign market and disseminate 
information about its product (Hennart, 1988; Buckley et al, 1990). From the 
viewpoint of the local partner's management, it is understandable that maintaining 
control over distribution channels and marketing is one way in which its continuing 
contribution to the joint venture can be assured.
Foreign firms entering China may have particular concerns about the level of 
uncertainty in what is generally regarded as a highly complex and difficult to 
understand marketplace. The exercise of control will be moderated when the foreign 
partner is to enter into a joint venture because of a lack of competitive expertise in the 
local marketing context. While the strategic level of control should be guarded, it 
might be problematic if the foreign partner lacks managers with sufficient knowledge 
of local markets, but intends to exercise great control over operational practices. 
Therefore, it is proposed that:
H8a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between acquiring local marketing knowledge and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the strategic control is high
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acquiring local marketing knowledge and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective is positively related; when the strategic control is low, 
acquiring local marketing knowledge and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective is negatively related.
H8b: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between acquiring local marketing knowledge and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the operational control is high, 
acquiring local marketing knowledge and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective is negatively related; when the operational control is 
low, acquiring local marketing knowledge and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective is positively related.
Relationship between strategic objectives and parent control
If a foreign partner has entered into a joint venture, market development will 
require continued commitment, for example in technology infusion (Martinsons and 
Tseng, 1995). In essence, the risks associated with the dissipation of technology 
know-how are cited as an issue of particular concern to MNEs entering China that has 
had a history of infringement of intellectual property rights (Ding, 1997). Dissipation 
of proprietary knowledge may have serious effects on the competitive position of a 
foreign parent, possibly creating new competitors or damaging the parent's over 
efficiency (Prahalad and Hamel, 1991). Therefore, market development 
considerations may eventually push MNEs to choose full control mode in China.
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Similarly, Lecraw (1984) found that marketing-intensive MNEs often choose 
to exploit their firm-specific advantages by internalising the transaction. Such firms 
may have the ability to develop a marketing package that is independent of the 
country in which they operate, may place little value on inputs from local partners in 
the form of marketing expertise and access to channels of distribution, and may fear 
loss of control over product quality. Hence,
H9: Foreign partner pursued market-developing objectives are positively related to 
strategic control (H9a) and operational control (H9b).
Transaction cost analysis focuses on organisational efficiency, specifically 
where market transactions involve significant uncertainty. For example, projects 
involving technological innovation will feature uncertainties associated with 
completion and performance. In such cases, firms are often prepared to trade 
potentially some level of management control for a reduction in uncertainty.
The empirical study conducted by Kim and Hwang (1992) confirmed that an 
MNC prefers high-control modes because they enhance the MNC's ability to ensure 
that strategic actions taken by different foreign subsidiaries are consistent with the 
global strategy. Kohli and Jaworski (1993) argue that too high a management control 
from the headquarters tends to have a negative effect on the efficiency orientation at 
subsidiary levels. Therefore, MNCs might retain strategic control over the IJVs to 
assure implementation of global strategy, and relinquish operational control in order 
to facilitate production and organisation efficiency in the IJVs. Thus,
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H10: Foreign partner pursued efficiency-seeking objectives are positively related to 
strategic control (HlOa) and negatively related to operational control (HI Ob).
The familiarity with local environment is positively related to control (Groot 
and Merchant, 2000). Knowledge-acquiring based IJVs are likely to receive more 
autonomy from parent companies. An IJVs intention to seek new knowledge depends 
on its ability to monitor, search for and apply new knowledge to its existing 
knowledge base (Hamel, 1991), that is, on its absorptive capacity. The absorptive 
capacity is an important factor in determining whether new knowledge is acquired. A 
flexible and autonomic organisational structure and approach to management is 
thought to be associated with higher capacities for knowledge acquisition (Lyles and 
Baird, 1994).
However, although foreign companies generally intend to acquire their local 
partners' know-how, they are also worried about losing their own knowledge-based 
resources in a highly integrated operation of a joint venture. Thus, they will prefer to 
retain a certain level of control in order to minimise the likelihood of unintended 
transfer of resources (Das and Teng, 2000). Thus,
Hll: Foreign partner pursued knowledge-acquiring objectives are positively related 
to strategic control (HIla) and negatively related to operational control (Hllb).
Relationship between parent control and IJV performance
In examining the relationship between control sharing and IJV performance, 
parent control exercised at the strategic level of the IJVs management is
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distinguished from control exercised at the operational level of the IJV's management. 
The strategic level of control is defined as the control exercised over the managerial 
issues associated with the long-term development of the IJVs, whereas the operational 
level of control deals with the managerial issues associated with the IJV's ongoing 
operation (Child et at, 1997; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Yan and Gray, 1997). The 
measurement of strategic and operational control is provided in section 4.6.2.
As control allows the parent to integrate the venture's activities with the 
overall strategy and activities of the parent (Gullander, 1976), having control over an 
IJV means that it is more likely that an individual partner's objective for the IJV will 
be met (Groot and Merchant, 2000). Yan and Luo (2001, p.89) define IJV control as 
"the mechanism and process in which the foreign and local sponsoring organisations, 
as well as the venture management, influence the venture's strategic and operational 
decisions and regulate its business activities in order to meet the parents' strategic 
expectations".
From strategic control perspective, for example, if the foreign partner aims at 
long-term growth in the local market development while the local partner focuses on 
an immediate return on capital, conflict will occur whenever the venture makes a 
profit. The former will prefer reinvesting the earnings, whereas the latter will favour 
distributing the profit as dividends. In other words, who will decide how to use the 
profit? Such conflicts are often the case in Chinese international joint ventures (Child 
and Yan, 1999). The solution to this conflicting situation will greatly depend on which 
partner is in charge of the venture or on the division of strategic control. How 
strategic control is divided between parents will directly impact the joint venture's 
performance.
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H12a: The extent of strategic control exercised by the IJV foreign parent is positively 
related to satisfaction with overall IJV performance.
Different levels of control are also immediately related to the extent to which 
their desired outcomes are achieved. Yan and Gray (1996), in their study of Sino-US 
joint ventures, assessed performance in terms of the extent to which joint venture 
general managers or deputy general managers perceived each parent company's 
strategic objectives to have been achieved. The results suggested that the higher the 
level of operational control a parent company exercises in the joint venture relative to 
its partner, the greater the extent to which that parent is perceived to be achieving its 
objectives. Thus:
H12b: The extent of operational control exercised by the IJV foreign parent is 
positively related to satisfaction with overall IJV performance.
Relationship between strategic objectives and IJV performance
Since different parent companies operate in different competitive 
environments, it is reasonable to expect that objectives that are important to one 
partner may not be equally important to the other partner. According to Habib and 
Bumett's (1989) findings, parent objective disparity positively correlated with conflict, 
and conflict negatively correlated with IJV performance. It can be inferred that parent 
objective disparity negatively correlated with IJV performance. Conversely, 
commonality in partners' objectives will positively relate to IJV performance. 
Theoretically, agency theory researchers suggest that when two economic agents do
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not share the same set of objectives, agency costs will occur and the efficiency of the 
transactional relationship will decrease (Fama, 1980).
Foreign partner's market-developing objectives are more likely to accord with 
local partner's concerns (Groot and Merchant, 2000). Both foreign and local partners 
may be eager to develop markets and defend against competition. These objectives are 
more explicit and cause less conflict. Shared market-developing objectives leading to 
the success of IJV are desirable for both parent companies.
H13a: Market-developing objectives on the part of the foreign partner are positively 
related to the joint venture overall performance.
From efficiency-seeking perspective, an MNE may hope that the joint venture 
operates in a way that is optimal from the standpoint of its entire global network, not 
merely within the local market on which the domestic joint venture partner focuses. 
These differing objectives potentially threaten the independent strategies and may 
eventually lower joint venture performance.
H13b: Efficiency-seeking objectives on the part of the foreign partner are negatively 
related to the joint venture overall performance.
MNEs often enter IJVs expressly to provide a vehicle to learn about country- 
specific knowledge of doing business. This seems particularly true for management 
with little foreign experience, who might feel uncomfortable about their level of 
understanding with respect to government relations, labour recruitment and
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management, or marketing and distribution techniques. However, as learning takes 
place over time, the advantages of the local partner begin to erode, and the MNE may 
begin to feel more confident about its abilities to handle these issues. In other words, 
with increased experience, a foreign firm will move up the learning curve and does 
not need the local knowledge that the native firms possess (Kogut, 1991). At such a 
time, MNEs are more likely to behave self-interestedly and may ask for a change in 
the IJV's strategic direction, which is more favourable to its own global strategies, but 
not necessarily to the joint venture itself.
H13c: Knowledge-acquiring objectives on the part of the foreign partner are 
negatively related to the joint venture overall performance.
The relationship between Hypotheses 9 to 13 and the theoretical framework 
presented in Figure 3.1 is given in Figure 3.2 below.
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Performance between categories of objectives
Given the varied foci of theoretical explanations of joint venture formation, a 
question arises as to whether the joint venture mode is more appropriate for achieving 
some objectives than others. Although theories suggest joint venture is favourable 
under certain circumstances, they do not address which objectives are more suitable. 
Harrigan (1988) has argued that the financial-pursuing objectives were more likely to 
take a longer time to realise than other categories of objectives since joint ventures 
were transitional strategies.
Luo and Peng (1999) argue that MNEs' such as IBM, Procter & Gamble, and 
Motorola, expansion into China is to leverage the shared cost of R&D, marketing, and 
manufacturing for global competitive advantage. They found that wholly-owned 
enterprises were more appropriate to pursue efficiency-seeking objectives in such 
global industry settings. The Chinese government now grants more and more foreign 
WOEs operating in the areas where equity joint ventures are currently approved and 
does not differentiate equity joint ventures from foreign wholly-owned subsidiaries in 
terms of financial policies, taxation, and regulations for licensing, quotas, and duties 
(Deng, 2001). Therefore, the performance of efficiency-seeking IJVs might be less 
satisfactory than other categories of objectives. Thus:
H14a: Where satisfaction with strategic objectives is concerned, on average, Market- 
developing objectives outperform Efficiency-seeking objectives.
H14b: Where satisfaction with strategic objectives is concerned, on average, 
Knowledge-acquiring objectives outperform efficiency-seeking objectives.
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After two decades of high economic growth (around 10% annually), in terms 
of purchasing power parity, China has become the second largest economy in the 
world behind the U.S. (Economist, 2000). In addition, with its formal entry into the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December, 2001, China is likely to accelerate its 
economic momentum. The increased market demand and potential are very attractive 
to foreign companies. Joint ventures are the most appropriate mode to quickly enter 
the market and manage competition (Zhang, 1997). Joint ventures also are necessary 
means to attain MNEs' knowledge-acquiring -related objectives. However, 
knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, takes considerable time to learn and then 
transfer back to parent companies. Therefore, its performance might be less obvious 
than market-developing objectives.
H14c: Where satisfaction with strategic objectives is concerned, on average, Market- 
developing objectives outperform knowledge-acquiring objectives.
Parent satisfaction with performance in relation to objectives and overall IJV 
performance
Foreign parent companies intend to attain diverse strategic objectives through 
joint ventures. Therefore, from their point of view, satisfaction with attainment of 
objectives is one of the criteria that evaluate whether a joint venture is successful. On 
the other hand, IJV is an independent organisation which is difficult to manage 
(Killing, 1983). Parent satisfaction with overall performance of IJV per se is 
important since it is the vehicle to carry out parent's strategies.
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If a joint venture parent firm is satisfied with the achievement of strategic 
objectives, it is reasonable to assume that it will encourage maintaining the status quo 
or even making efforts to improve IJV performance. Dissatisfaction with strategic 
objectives may stimulate changes in IJV management at both strategic and operational 
control levels, even if the IJV itself functions very well. Therefore, Joint ventures 
achieving parent companies strategic objectives are very likely to be considered as 
successful (Merchant, 1998). If the parent perceives that the joint venture is out of 
control and unlikely to meet the expectations, it would terminate its involvement in 
the IJV. Hence, it is hypothesized that:
HI 5: Satisfaction with overall IJV performance is correlated with parent company 
satisfaction with performance in relation to objectives.
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3.4. Chapter Summary
This chapter presents the conceptual framework of this research. The 
relationships between constructs are clarified: the strategic objectives are input, parent 
control is the process, and the IJV performance is the outcome. Research hypotheses 
are discussed in detail. They are tested in the empirical study. The next chapter 
provides the research methodology, including the general design of the survey, 
population, sampling criteria, and measurement of variables.
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Chapter 4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
4.1. Chapter Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology that is used to conduct the research 
and analyse the data. Section 4.2 introduces two major research paradigms in 
management research. In section 4.3, the general design of the study is defined. The 
population selection criteria are described in section 4.4. Section 4.5 presents the 
rationale for choosing respondents and the data collection procedure. Section 4.6 
provides the measures of the dependent and independent variables of the study. 
Section 4.7 briefly describes the data analysis techniques employed in hypotheses 
testing. The last section provides a summary of this chapter.
4.2. Research Paradigm
The term research paradigm refers to the theoretical framework which 
underpins the research process (Bryman, 1984; Cuba, 1985). The framework provides 
a sound guiding structure and a range of acceptable tools that help the researcher to 
find an answer to the question they have posed, or address a hypothesis they have 
posited (Easterby-Smith et al, 1999).
The main philosophical choices underlying management research are positivist 
paradigm and phenomenological paradigm (Guba and Lincoln, 1996). Researchers 
need to understand which type is the most suitable for a particular study. Easterby-
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Smith et al (1999) defined three reasons why the understanding of the philosophical 
paradigms is very important. First, it helps to clarify the research design; second, it 
helps the researchers to recognise which designs will work and which ones will not; 
and third, it can help the researcher to identify and create designs that may be outside 
of his or her past experience.
The key idea of the positivist paradigm is that the social world exists 
externally, and that its properties should be measured through objective methods, 
rather than being inferred through sensations, reflections or intuition (Easterby-Smith 
et al, 1999). Positivism attempts to operationalise and give numerical values to social 
phenomena. It is traditionally associated with quantitative methods of data analysis 
(Collis and Hussey, 2003) and is typically used for theory testing.
Husserl (1946) stated that the phenomenological paradigm argues that the 
world and the reality are not objective and exterior, but they are socially constructed 
and given meaning by people. It uses a more involved approach to understand the 
complexities of the social world (Collis and Hussey, 2003). Phenomenology aims to 
develop a rich and complex understanding of each individual's interpretation of that 
world. Traditionally, this involves qualitative techniques and is used for theory 
generation.
Positivistic methods of collecting data, like surveys, are assumed to offer 
positive proof and rely on data which is collected systematically and methodically 
(Howe, 1985). By applying statistical techniques to this data, it may then be possible 
to generalise from the findings. Positivistic research often contains surveys, 
longitudinal studies, experimental studies, cross-sectional studies. On the other hand, 
phenomenological frameworks, such as case studies, seek data which is drawn from a
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particular site or context, often using the personal observations of the researcher and 
case-specific data (Burrel and Morgan, 1979). While generalising from these studies 
may be problematic, detailed case studies can provide insights from which useful 
conclusions (information) can be drawn. Phenomenological research includes case 
studies, action research, participant enquiry, ethnography, feminist perspective.
Positivists seek rigor using statistical criteria and conceptions of reliability and 
validity to evaluate the quality of quantitative findings. Sample size, common 
methods bias and sampling error are common concerns. In contrast, meaning focused 
research in the phenomenology tradition is assessed in terms of trustworthiness 
criteria including credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability and 
authenticity criteria including fairness and ontological, catalytic and tactical 
authenticity (Guba and Lincoln, 1996).
A quantitative research methodology is appropriate where quantifiable 
measures of variables of interest are possible, where hypotheses can be formulated 
and tested, and inferences drawn from samples to populations. Qualitative methods, 
on the other hand, are appropriate when the phenomena under study are complex, are 
social in nature, and do not lend themselves to quantification (Liebscher, 1998). These 
two paradigms usually lie at extreme ends of the research spectrum, but it is not 
unusual for researchers to use combinations in the same study. Considering the nature 
of the research issues, the research questions of this study can be tackled using the 
positivist paradigm.
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4.3. General Design
The choice of the research design is a critical consideration for empirical 
studies. The option of relying on secondary sources to test the research hypotheses is 
rejected since preexisting IJV databases are virtually nonexistent. The hypothesis 
testing of this study requires subjective and perceptual data from key decision-makers 
who are intimately involved in the strategic decision-making process of joint ventures. 
Since the research focus is on how foreign partners perceive their Chinese ventures, 
the key decision-makers who represent foreign partners were investigated.
One of the most difficult tasks in conducting research on joint venture 
performance in developing countries, particularly in China, is obtaining reliable data 
on joint ventures (Shenkar, 1990). It is notoriously difficult to get quality data from a 
country like China. Most statistical data are compiled only for the purpose of 
government administration and policy formulation. Although the Chinese government 
has started to publish some statistical data in recent years, the accuracy of such 
information is questionable (Hu, Zhang, and Chen, 2004). Political pressures to inflate 
performance; the large chunks of the private and service sector that go uncounted; and 
technical factors, such as how to set the inflation deflator, have been identified as 
primary reasons for inaccurate secondary data (The Economist, 2000). Particularly the 
information on foreign direct investment might be exaggerated in order to attract more 
foreign capital into the country. A rigorous checking of such information is needed for 
the purpose of scientific research.
A mail survey is chosen over interviews for several reasons. Firstly, 
questionnaires represent the fastest method of gathering information from a large 
sample of respondents when there is only a single interviewer available. Secondly,
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surveys are cost efficient when collecting data from respondents that are scattered 
around a broad geographic region. Thirdly, mail surveys are not as susceptible to 
interviewer biases as interviews. Finally, it may be easier for busy executives to 
schedule the completion of a mail questionnaire at their own time and pace than 
scheduling a face-to-face or telephone interview.
Of course, mail surveys suffer from a number of drawbacks (Churchill, 1991; 
Zikmund, 2000).Three issues seem to be of particular concern. First, when data are 
collected through a mail survey, there is little opportunity for question clarification 
and missing information or partially completed surveys can become problematic. 
Second, low response rates or non-respondent biases can raise serious questions about 
the validity of the study's findings. Finally, even though every effort can be made to 
direct the survey to the most appropriate organisational members, the researcher has 
little control over who is actually responding to the survey instrument. To minimise 
these drawbacks, every effort was made to conduct a methodologically rigorous 
survey design.
The questionnaire was developed based on the review of the literature. Three 
types of question structure were utilised: closed-ended with ordered answer choices, 
closed-ended with unordered answer choices, and a few open-ended questions. The 
majority of the questionnaire was comprised of 7-point Likert-type scales. Previous 
studies utilising the key informant methodology in the context of IJVs indicated that 
ordinal scales were more readily understood and better completed by busy senior 
executives than potentially more precise, but more complex and time consuming 
interval approximating techniques (Geringer, 1991). Research has shown that Likert 
scales with seven response options are more reliable than equivalent items with
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greater or fewer options (Rea and Parker, 1997). It also tends to provide a level of 
variation in the response that is sufficient for correlation analysis and multivariate 
analytical methods (Hair et al, 1995).
A combination of internet survey and mail survey approach is applied. There 
can be little doubt that the number of surveys being conducted over the World Wide 
Web is increasing dramatically. The ability to collect large amounts of data without 
interviewers, and stationary or postage, makes the cost of doing web surveys very 
attractive (Witt, 1998). This is the primary data collection method chosen. However, 
if responses were not forthcoming after two reminder e-mails, then a mail version was 
posted to the non-respondents.
In order to increase reliability and response rate a formal letter was sent out to 
all the respondents in the sample. The letter served two functions: to direct the target 
person to the web site and to ensure authenticity of the survey. Since the respondents 
were very busy managing directors, the questionnaire was designed to be as short as 
possible and the web page designed to make responding easy (mainly through check- 
boxes) and quick so that they are not required to devote too much time and patience to 
completing all the questions. Only a few questions were open-ended and most 
responses were assessed using 7-point Likert-type scales. Prior research indicates that 
ordinal classification of perception is a more realistic task for respondents than use of 
interval or ratio measures (Geringer, 1991). In order to further increase reliability and 
reduce survey error, particular attention was paid to principles for designing the web 
questionnaire in such a way as to reduce different types of error (Dillman et al, 1998). 
The length of the questionnaire should not present a major concern because it was
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designed to be completed within approximately 20 minutes. Thus it does not take 
away too much time from the respondent managers.
The questionnaire used in the survey consists of five sets of questions on the 
joint ventures, covering (1) general background; (2) strategic objectives for investing 
in China and the extent of satisfaction with each objective; (3) extent of control; (4) 
focus of control; (5) performance. The questionnaire contains both qualitative and 
quantitative questions.
For evaluating the validity of the questionnaire, a pilot test was conducted. 
The sample questionnaire was published on University of Salford's website and 
respondents were encouraged by personal email to visit the website and complete the 
questionnaire online. Ten Sino-European joint ventures were chosen and the 
introduction e-mail was sent to the individual managers. One of them was 
undeliverable. Two reminder e-mails were sent in two weeks. There were four 
responses. Based upon the feedback from the pilot test, the questionnaire was refined, 
and one question about financial outcome which was considered sensitive by 
respondents was therefore removed.
There were a total 340 Sino-European IJVs on the final survey list. For some, 
more than one representative or expatriate was quoted. The highest ranking person 
was initially chosen as respondent (i.e. General Management). If no response was 
received, a subsequent questionnaire was sent to a lower ranking manager (e.g. 
Deputy General Manager or departmental manager). The first wave of e-mailing was 
launched in November, 2003. A total 781 e-mails were sent. There were 348 were 
undeliverable. The first reminder e-mail was sent two weeks after the first e-mail as 
the response had almost ceased, with a second reminder e-mail two weeks after the
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first reminder e-mail. Due to the fact that there were a high number of undeliverable 
e-mails, and some managers' e-mail addresses cannot be publicly obtained, a printed 
questionnaire was sent to these potential respondents by post. The survey period 
lasted approximately five months and ceased when no further responses were 
forthcoming (March 2004).
4.4. Choice of Respondents
The specialised nature of the desired information also determines that 
participants have to be senior managers who are knowledgeable about the strategic 
objectives served by the joint venture and intimately familiar with the control system, 
and the performance aspects of the IJVs. Practically, the foreign general managers or 
expatriate managers are the ones who have participated in the initial IJV negotiation 
process. Their secondment from the parent companies, plus regular involvement in 
reporting and other communication with the parents, are deemed to provide a 
reasonable basis for them to assess parent company objectives for the IJVs. This 
approach to data gathering is widely accepted in this field (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 
1984). Furthermore, Geringer and Hebert (1991) found a significant correlation 
between the parent's assessment of IJV performance and that of the IJV's general 
managers. Child, Yan and Lu (1997) also found the similar correlation.
While the IJV CEO or General Manager is the key informant of choice, it is 
acknowledged that he or she, in reality, may not have been the one who ultimately 
completed the questionnaire. This study considers the accuracy of the information to 
be critical, rather than the title of the individual. Therefore, if another member of the 
executive team has first-hand knowledge of the IJV-parent relationship, then he or she
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should be the one to complete the survey. To provide motivation and accurate 
responses, respondents were guaranteed anonymity and promised a summary of the 
research findings.
Since Sino-British, Sino-French, and Sino-German IJVs were the focus for 
this research, the questionnaire was developed in English, French, and German. In 
addition, due to the fact that increasing representatives of foreign partners are of 
Chinese nationality, a Chinese version was also provided. The survey was initially 
developed in English and then translated into Chinese by the author, a native-speaker 
of Chinese. An English-Chinese language expert checked the readability and 
understandability of the Chinese translation. Confusing and unclear expressions were 
discussed and revised accordingly. The Chinese version was sent to another language 
expert, who translated it back into English. The translation was compared with the 
original English version and suitable amendments were made. One French version 
and one German version followed the same steps of translation and back-translation 
as the Chinese version. Therefore, a multilingual survey instrument should 
sufficiently serve the purpose of the study. This method is widely accepted in joint 
venture research (e.g. Si and Bruton, 1999).
4.5. Population and Sampling
China, one of the fast-growing emerging markets in Asia, served as the 
research site for this study. The advantages of using China as the research site and the 
Sino-European IJVs are already discussed in Section 1.3. In this section, the 
population is further specified. The study's primary objective for collecting data is to 
obtain conclusions about the population of IJVs and not merely describe the sample's
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characteristics per se. Four sources were used to identify joint ventures that met these 
criteria: 1) European Chamber of Commerce in China, 2) British Chamber of 
Commerce in China, 3) French Chamber of Commerce and Industry in China, 4) 
Delegation of German Industry and Commerce. The target population is defined as 
stated below.
First, the study is limited to manufacturing ventures. Inclusion in the study 
required that the venture be in manufacturing (rather than service, mining or 
distribution). Non-manufacturing ventures were excluded because mixing joint 
ventures in a sample where the scale of investment is commonly much higher (mining) 
or lower (distribution) could potentially affect the joint venture decision process. 
Service IJVs are omitted since they differ from manufacturing UVs in terms of 
investment rationale, institutional treatment, and performance measurement (Luo, 
2001). Because many joint ventures never get off the ground, those firms which had 
been fully operating businesses for less than three years were excluded to increase the 
comparability of the sample. In addition, the ventures are widely representative of 
Sino-European joint ventures operating in various industrial sectors. Manufacturing 
IJVs are viewed by the Chinese authorities as the preferable form of foreign 
investment because they provide an opportunity for the transfer of advanced 
technology and management skills to the Chinese economy and lead to increased 
exports (Management World, 1996). Foreign companies have a particular interest in 
manufacturing in China, as it gives them access to the large Chinese market and to 
potentially low production costs (Davies, 1994). Since IJV manufacturing is critical to 
both the Chinese economy and many foreign investors, it is an area worthy of 
investigation by academic researchers.
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Second, to keep costs down, only IJVs in Beijing, Yangtze Delta, and 
Guangdong Province were studied. Note that Beijing is the capital of China and the 
location of many major IJVs. Yangtze River Delta is the economic area encircling the 
delta region of Yangtze River, covering Shanghai, the southern part of Jiangsu 
province, northern part of Zhejiang province. It has been the country's most advanced 
industrial center and is becoming increasingly the focus of foreign direct investment. 
Guangdong is the province where the Chinese open-door policy started. Accounting 
for well over 30 percent of the total realised and contracted FDI in China, it is the 
largest recipient of FDI among all Chinese provinces. Moreover, Guangdong is more 
developed than most other regions in China in terms of the stage of economic 
development and the development of market institutions (Vogel, 1989). Thus, the 
selection of these three areas assures a certain degree of representativeness of IJV 
activity in China.
Third, the IJV must be two-party sponsored by for-profit organisations. If 
multi-party IJVs were included, it would have been, necessary to employ different 
operational definitions for the two-party and the multi-party IJVs. Since Sino- 
European joint ventures are the research setting, the participating ventures must be 
one Chinese partner, and one European company. As discussed in Section 1.3, UK, 
France, and Germany are the major European investors in China. These three 
countries account for more than half of European FDI in China (MOFTEC, 2004) and 
are therefore chosen for investigation. Consequently, the foreign partner must have 
headquarters in UK, France, or Germany. Moreover, the IJVs that include non-profit 
organisations as venture partners are excluded from the sample since government 
agencies or non-profit organisations which may have non-economic intentions are 
beyond the research interest of this study.
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Fourth, neither partner should hold more than 80 percent of the venture's 
equity. Nevertheless, what is not clear in the literature is the exact percentage of 
foreign ownership that distinguishes an IJV from other forms of foreign direct 
investment. In Hennart's (1991) research, IJVs were defined as those organisations 
that were 5-95% foreign owned. The study indicated that less than 5% foreign 
ownership represents a minority investment for the foreign companies, while more 
than 95% ownership approximates a wholly owned subsidiary. The 95% cutoff was 
also employed in Gomes-Casseres' (1989) and Gatignon and Anderson (1988) study. 
On the other hand, some researchers defined IJVs as one parent company holds 
between 10-90% of the company's equity (Park, 1992; Shenkar & Zeira, 1992). 
Makino and Beamish (1998) follow traditional accounting principles (e.g. accounting 
standards of Canada, US, etc.) that firms are considered to be affiliated when equity 
ownership is between 20 percent and 80 percent. When it is under 20 percent, the 
investment is termed a "portfolio investment". Despite some discrepancies in the 
literature, this study adopted Makino and Beamish's approach using 80% cutoff to 
ensure the sample included in the research are those joint ventures in which both 
Chinese and foreign partners seek participation in the IJVs management and control 
decisions. Otherwise, the joint venture would be considered as a wholly-owned 
subsidiary or a capital investment, in which the partner holding a minority equity 
position has no intention of being involved in the management of the joint venture. 
Likewise, IJVs where partners are banking investors who usually are not actively 
involved in the IJVs management are considered as portfolio investment and 
excluded from this study.
Fifth, the joint ventures chosen had all been in operation at least three years so 
that a sound evaluation of performance is possible. The three-year criterion was
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chosen because of the finding that it takes two years for a foreign subsidiary's 
performance to stabilise (Woodcock et al, 1994).
Sixth, the time frame, which is often a concern for bias in international studies, 
should not represent any problem here. The total administration of the surveys took 
five months. There had been no significant international event occurring during that 
period that might have influenced the Chinese international joint ventures and 
respondents.
4.6. Measures
It is important to point out that consistency in the unit of analysis in 
conceptualising and operationalising control and performance is necessary in order to 
expect explainable empirical results. For example, if control is conceptualised from 
the IJV management's perspective (Killing, 1983), performance should be defined in 
terms of the IJV management's goals (as opposed to the parents'). Similarly, if 
performance is assessed by using one partner's criteria, control should be 
conceptualised from the same partner's viewpoint. The degree of conceptual and 
measurement correspondence between the two variables may substantially bias the 
potential empirical results. It is as much a theoretical issue as a methodological one, 
as consistent and robust results have to be theoretically explainable. In this study, 
since management control is conceptualised on a foreign parent company basis, the 
joint venture's performance is similarly characterised as the level of satisfaction with 
the partners' objectives and with overall joint venture performance.
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The three key constructs are IJV performance, parent control, and IJV strategic 
objectives. The following is a detailed description of the study's measures and the 
items that are used to measure the study's constructs.
4.6.1. Dependent Variables
The dependent variable of this study is IJV performance. A perceptual 
measure is used, as aforementioned, because objective measures such as financial 
performance or survival may not properly reflect the degree of venture success 
(Glaister & Buckley, 1999). Further, JV financial data are usually not public but are 
included in the annual financial reports of the parent companies in aggregate form. In 
addition, asking for financial performance data would have likely lowered the 
response rate (Tomaskovic-Devey et al, 1994).
Following prior studies of parent control and IJV performance (Ding, 1997; 
Mjoen and Tallman, 1997; Osland and Cavusgil, 1996; Yan and Gray, 1994), two 
measures of IJV performance are adopted.
One is the foreign parent satisfaction with performance in relation to each 
strategic objective. Since joint ventures are formed to pursue each partner's strategic 
interests, and each partner commits critical resources toward these ends, the degree to 
which these goals are satisfied constitutes an effective measure of performance. 
Unless the partners' strategic expectations are going to be satisfied, there is no reason 
to establish joint ventures in the first place (Harrigan, 1986). The achievement of the 
IJV foreign parents' objectives for participating in the venture therefore deserves the 
central attention in IJV performance evaluation. Since local partner's objectives of
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entering the partnership is not a major concern in this study, foreign partner's 
evaluation is therefore the appropriate criterion to measure IJV performance.
The other performance measure is the foreign parent's assessment of overall 
satisfaction with IJV performance. The major consideration in using this measure is 
that it conveys the idea of how much the parent is satisfied with operation of joint 
venture per se. Achievement of strategic objectives does not necessarily mean that the 
IJV is running well, especially when opportunistic behaviours exist (Gupta and Misra 
2000). Hence, the representatives of the foreign parent were asked to rate overall 
satisfaction with IJV performance on a seven point scale (1 labelled "Very satisfied", 
7 labeled "Very Dissatisfied" and no descriptor label assigned to the integers in 
between).
Following the reviewed literature, thirteen major strategic objectives of 
foreign parents are developed: exploring global synergy, spreading financial risks, 
reducing investment exposure, avoiding political uncertainty, entering the Chinese 
market fast, gaining more competitive advantages, managing competition, 
overcoming government barriers, acquiring country-specific knowledge, and 
acquiring local market knowledge. In addition, three traditional joint venture 
objectives were added: generating profits in China, benefiting from low labour costs 
in China, benefiting from natural resources (Daniels et al, 1985; Zhang, 1997).
4.6.2. Independent Variables
Control Prior studies about parent control commonly focus on 
the relationship between IJV performance and the extent of control. They regard
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parent control on a continuum going from full control by MNE parents through shared 
control with local partners. This study proposes that parent control exercised over the 
IJV should be examined not only from the point of view of extent but also in terms of 
focus. When firms design the control system, they face the choice of activities of 
control as well as the choice of amount of control exercised within those chosen 
activities. Therefore, without considering the potential activities that they want to 
control, firms cannot precisely determine the amount of control they intend to exert 
over the IJVs.
Questions relating to parent control at both a strategic level and an operational 
level were developed from previous empirical IJV studies. Seven questions relate to 
strategic control: 1) setting strategic IJV priorities, 2) use of profit, 3) choice of key 
product lines, 4) allocating senior management positions, 5) choice of location of IJV 
facilities, 6) choice of geographic market scope, and 7) choice of major capital 
financing relations (Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Geringer, 1988, Hebert, 1994; Yan and 
Gray, 1997). Nine questions were developed relating to operational control: 1) 
production planning, 2) R&D, 3) product pricing, 4) sales and distribution, 5) quality 
control, 6) reward and incentive policies, 7) training and development policies, 8) 
general management, 9) management of legal or government (Hebert, 1994; Yan and 
Gray, 1997; Child and Yan, 1999). Participants are required to rate the extent of each 
decision (1 labelled local partner's full control, 4 labelled equally shared control, 7 
labelled the European partner's full control) to which the firm influences each of the 
strategic and operational decision-making activities. The seven-point scale represents 
the level of control exercised by foreign or local parents over the IJV.
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Strategic objectives As previous discussed, the strategic objectives of 
foreign parents are categorised as market-development objectives, efficiency-seeking 
objectives, and knowledge-acquiring objectives. Market-developing objectives are 
measured by four items: 1) to enter the Chinese market fast, 2) to gain more 
competitive advantage, 3) to manage competition, and 4) to overcome government 
barriers (Daniels et al, 1985; Harrigan, 1987; Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Luo, 1998). 
Efficiency objectives are measured by four items: 1) to explore global synergy, 2) to 
spread financial risks, 3) to reduce investment exposure, and 4) to avoid political 
uncertainty (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Yan and 
Child, 2002). Knowledge-acquiring objectives are measured by two items: 1) to 
acquire country-specific knowledge, and 2) to acquire local market knowledge 
(Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Yan and Child, 2002). In addition to these objectives, 
three traditional joint venture objectives are added for exploratory purpose. They are 1) 
to generate profits in China, 2) to benefit from low labour cost, and 3) to benefit 
natural resources (Daniels et al, 1985, Zhang, 1997; Kashlak, 1998; Chadee et al, 
2002). For each of these objectives, the participants were asked to indicate their 
agreement (with 1 labelled "Strongly Agree", and 7 labeled "Strongly Disagree" no 
descriptor label assigned to the integers in between) with the firm's decision to engage 
in this IJV. Respondents were also encouraged to detail other specific strategic 
objectives of the parent for the joint venture.
4.7. Analysis Methods
Several methods of analysis are applied.
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First, any systematic bias is examined by using t-tests to compare response and 
non-response IJVs. Since the samples are collected through a single source instrument 
(self-report questionnaire), Harman one-factor test is used to examine the extent of 
common method variance.
Second, general descriptive statistics are used to show characteristics of 
samples. Frequency, mean, mode are applied to illustrate the profiles of IJVs.
Third, confirmatory factor analysis is used to verify the underlying dimensions 
of strategic objectives and parent control. Cronbach's alpha was used to assess each 
scale's reliability.
Fourth, moderating hierarchical multiple regressions are applied to test HI to 
H8. Interaction effects of parent control on strategic objectives and satisfaction with 
objective performance are investigated with the help of control variables. To reduce 
the potential problem with multicollinearity, all interaction variables are mean- 
centered.
Fifth, proposed relationships among the main constructs, i.e. strategic 
objectives, parent control, and IJV performance are tested using path analysis. 
Multiple regression analysis is used to test the proposed direct effects.
Sixth, One-way ANOVA is used to test the superiority of performance among 
the categories of objectives. The analysis of variance procedure is used to detect the 
existence of inter-group performance differences among the three categories of 
strategic objectives. If significant inter-group differences are found, Post Hoc test was 
performed to identify performance differences between any two specific categories.
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Finally, the correlation between two dependent variables is examined by 
Pearson's Product-moment correlation. If the significance level is less than 0.05, they 
are considered correlated.
4.8. Chapter summary
This study uses mail questionnaires as the data collection method. The sample 
frame includes Sino-European international joint ventures established in 
manufacturing industries in China. Respondents are key decision-makers who have 
been closely involved in the joint venture decision making process. The measurement 
of variables and analysis methods are discussed. :
The next chapter presents the results and findings of the study.
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Chapter 5. Findings and Analysis
5.1. Chapter Introduction
The previous chapter presented the research methodology of this study. In this
chapter, before testing the study's hypotheses, the data are checked by both non 
response bias test and common method variance. Various descriptive statistics are run 
to depict the sample characteristics. The strategic objectives and levels of control are 
examined by factor analysis in order to reveal the latent categories. The correlation 
matrix of the study's variables is also presented. The hierarchy multiple regression is 
applied to discover the relationship between strategic objectives, control and 
performance. The conceptual framework is tested by path analysis. One-way ANOVA 
further examines the differences between various categories of objectives.
5.2. Research Systematic bias examination 
5.2.1. NOD response bias test
In this study, an important issue that needed to be addressed is that the data 
obtained from responding IJVs can be generalised to the target population. To 
examine whether there was any systematic response bias, respondent and non- 
respondent IJVs were compared across the following dimensions: IJV age and total 
equity share held by European partner. 21 IJV were randomly selected from the non- 
responding IJVs. Data on each of these variables were collected from public 
information, such as IJVs' web sites, IJV parent company's web sites. The age of the 
IJV was counted by taking the difference (in years) between the year of establishment
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and 2003 when the data were collected. Equity share held by European partners, as 
indicated by sampling criteria, ranged from 20% to 80%.
To test for differences between responding and non-responding IJVs, t-tests 
are used to examine any existence of systematic bias. As can be seen in Table 5.1, no 
significant age differences (p > 0.05) were found between responding and non- 
responding IJVs. Similarly, Table 5.2 indicates that no significant differences (p > 
0.05) were found in the equity share held by the European partner between the 
respondents and the non-respondents. Since no statistically significant difference was 
found between respondents and nonrespondents to these questions, nonresponse bias 
was assumed to be absent in the final sample.
Table 5.1 t-test of age between responding and non-responding IJVs
Variables
Age (years)
Responding 
IJVs
Mean
7.00
Standard 
Deviation
3.860
Non-Responding 
IJVs
Mean
7.57
Standard 
Deviation
2.580
t-statistics
-.521
p value
.608
Table 5.2 t-test of equity between responding and non-responding IJVs
Variables
Equity
Responding 
IJVs
Mean
58.62
Standard 
Deviation
17.060
Non-Responding 
IJVs
Mean
54.71
Standard 
Deviation
12.071
t-statistics
.758
p value
.457
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5.2.2. Common method variance
It should be noted that the data may suffer from common method variance as it 
was obtained from a single source instrument (the self-report questionnaire). 
Following Podsakoff and Organ (1986), the Harman one-factor test is used to examine 
the extent of common method variance in this study. The basic assumption of the 
Harman one-factor test is that if a substantial amount of common method variance is 
present, either a) a single factor will emerge from the factor analysis, or b) one 
"general" factor will account for the majority of the covariance in the independent and 
dependent variables.
A principal components factor analysis with an unrotated solution indicated 13 
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, with the largest variance explained by a 
single factor being 15.6 percent. The result suggests that no single factor accounted 
for the majority of the covariance in the variables. From this evidence, it can be 
inferred that no significant amount of common method variance was present in the 
data set.
5.3. Response rate and characteristics of respondents
5.3.1. Response rate
Of the 320 IJVs surveyed, there were 71 questionnaires returned, of which 10
i 
were unusable. Among the ten unusable returns: four were faulty responses probably
because of technical reasons, two were wholly-owned enterprises, two were from the 
service industry, one was in fact Japanese-Chinese and one was a Hong Kong-Chinese 
joint venture. All of the usable 61 responses were IJVs from manufacturing industry.
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This gives a response rate of 19 percent. While the response rate was not very high, it 
is comparable with similar surveys conducted by other international joint venture 
researchers (i.e., Kogut, 1989; Parkhe, 1993, Ding, 1997, Isobe et al, 2000; Tiessen 
and Linton, 2000).
5.3.2. Profile of Respondents
Table 5.3 indicates that of the 61 respondents, 53 (86.9%) were top executives 
in the IJV (general managers, deputy managers, and managing directors), and 8 
(13.1%) were department level managers (Chief Operation Officer, HRM, Sales, and 
R&D managers). This highly knowledgeable respondent profile met the requirements 
of the study.
Table 5.3 Characteristics of Respondents
General Management
Deputy General Manager
Managing Director
Department Manager
Total
Frequency
28
11
14
8
61
Percent
45.9
18.0
23.0
13.1
100
Cumulative 
Percent
45.9
63.9
86.9
100
Profiles of the IJVs
As can be seen from Table 5.4, the nationalities of the European IJVs were as 
follows: of the 61 respondents, 14 (23%) were from United Kingdom, 15 (24.6%) 
were from France, and 32 (52.5%) were from Germany. Among the sample IJVs, 34
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out of the 61 were located in the Shanghai area, 14 were based in Beijing, and 13 IJVs 
were in the Guangdong area (see Table 5.5).
Table 5.4 European Parent Nationality
United Kingdom
France
Germany
Total
Frequency
14
15
32
61
Percent
23.0
24.6
52.5
100
Cumulative
Percent
23.0
47.5
100
Table 5.5 Geographic Location
Beijing
Shanghai
Guangdong
Total
Frequency
14
34
13
61
Percent
23.0
55.7
21.3
100
Cumulative
Percent
23.0
78.7
100
The mean value of the European partner's ownership share was about 61%. 
From the equity share held by the European partner (Table 5.6), it was apparent that 
approximately two thirds of the European partners held more than 50% equity share. 
21 percent held equal shares and only 10 percent had less than half of equity share.
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Table 5.6 Share of equity held by European partner in the JV
European Partner 
Share (%)
25
30
33
40
49
50
51
52
55
60
65
66
67
70
75
77
78
80
Total
Frequency
1
2
1
1
1
7
9
1
2
9
1
1
2
10
5
1
1
6
61
Percent
1.6
3.3
1.6
1.6
1.6
11.5
14.8
1.6
3.3
14.8
1.6
1.6
3.3
16.4
8.2
1.6
1.6
9.8
100.0
Cumulative 
Percent
1.6
4.9
6.6
8.2
9.8
21.3
36.1
37.7
41.0
55.7
57.4
59.0
62.3
78.7
86.9
88.5
90.2
100.0
The total original investments were measured by four categories: less than $1 
million, $1 million to less than 10 millions, $10 millions to 50 millions, and over $50 
millions. Figure 5.1 reveals that the majority of European companies showed a 
generally high amount of investment in IJVs. Table 5.7 further illustrates that more 
than half of the respondent IJVs were medium-sized organisations, where the number
of employees ranged from 100 to 500.
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Figure 5-1 Total original Investment
30-
03 25-
O 20-
"I 1JH
10-
Less than $1 million $1 million to - $ 10 -50 Million 
Less Than 10 Million
Over $50 million
Table 5.7 Number of employees in China
Less than 1 00
100-500
Over 500
Total
Frequency
14
35
12
61
Percent
23.0
57.4
19.7
100
Cumulative
Percent
23.0
80.3
100
The mean value of the years of establishment is 7.64 years. Figure 5.2 also 
shows that the highest number of years of IJV establishment ranged from 7 to 9 years. 
This was probably related to the dramatic FDI inflow after 1993. Of the 61 IJVs, the
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intended duration of the IJV was rather long, with two thirds stating an intended 
duration of 20 years (see Table 5.8).
Figure 5-2 Number of Years of Establishment
ID-
10 11 12 16 18 19
Number of Years
Table 5.8 Intended duration of this JY when it was established
5-10 years
10-20 years
20-30 years
More than 30 years
Total
Frequency
6
10
22
23
61
Percent
9.8
16.4
36.1
37.7
100
Cumulative 
Percent
9.8
26.2
62.3
100
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The respondents also were asked the reasons why the current IJV location was 
chosen. There were four reasons given: close to raw materials, situated in economic 
zone, close to local partner, close to market. A supplementary blank box was provided 
for specifying any other reason. Respondents were encouraged to choose more than 
one. The results were presented in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5-3 Reason of Choosing Current IJV Location
40
30
3
cr
20
10 H
0
Close to Raw Situated in Close to Local Close to Market 
Materials Economic zone Partner
Reason of Choosing Current IJV Location
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5.4. Verification of factors of strategic objectives and parent control
Before examining the hypotheses, confirmatory factor analysis is conducted to
identify whether the thirteen strategic objectives variables could be reduced to three 
categories: market-developing, efficiency-seeking, organisational-learning-related 
objectives. A similar approach is applied to verify whether the sixteen control 
activities could be reduced to two dimensions: strategic and operational control.
5.4.1. Introduction to Confirmatory Factor Analysis
There are two major types of factor analysis: exploratory and confirmatory. 
Choice of method used is based on the purpose of the data analysis. Exploratory 
analysis is used to explore data to determine the number or the nature of factors that 
account for the covariation between variables when the researcher does not have, a 
priori, sufficient evidence to form a hypothesis about the number of factors underlying 
the data. Therefore, exploratory factor analysis is generally thought of as more of a 
theory-generating procedure as opposed to a theory-testing procedure (Stevens, 1996).
In contrast to theory-generating methods like exploratory factor analysis, 
confirmatory factor analysis is a theory-testing model. In confirmatory factor analysis, 
the researcher begins with a hypothesis prior to the analysis. This model, or 
hypothesis, specifies which variables will be correlated with which factors and which 
factor are correlated. The hypothesis is based on a strong theoretical and empirical 
foundation (Stevens, 1996).
The confirmatory factor analysis starts from proposed models which are based 
on theory or existing data. It tests whether a specified set of constructs is influencing
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responses in a predicted way. In addition, confirmatory factor analysis offers the 
researcher a more viable method for evaluating construct validity. The researcher is 
able to explicitly test hypotheses concerning the factor structure of the data due to 
having the predetermined model specifying the number and composition of the factors.
Kline (1994. p3) states that factor analysis consists of a number of statistical 
techniques the aim of which is to simplify complex sets of data. He suggests that 
confirmatory factor analysis seeks to determine if the number of factors and the 
loadings of measured variables on them conform to what is expected on the basis of 
pre-established theory. Indicator variables are selected on the base of prior theory and 
factor analysis is used to see if they load as predicted on the expected number of 
factors. The researcher's pre-assumption is that each factor (the number and labels of 
which may be specified beforehand) is associated with a specified subset of indicator 
variables. Gorsuch (1983) contended that confirmatory is more theoretically important 
and should be much more widely used than exploratory factor analysis, which should 
be reserved only for those areas that are truly exploratory, that is, areas where no prior 
analyses have been conducted.
In this study, confirmatory factor analysis is applied as the aim is to identify 
whether variables load on the categories that have been previously identified from 
theoretical work.
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5.4.2. Verification of underlying dimensions of strategic objectives
5.4.2.1. Descriptive statistics of strategic objectives
Respondents rated their agreement and satisfaction with thirteen strategic 
objectives pursued through participation in the joint ventures. The seven-point Likert 
scales used for rating the agreement and satisfaction with each objective were labelled 
from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree", and from "Very Dissatisfied" to "Very 
Satisfied", respectively.
Descriptive statistics for agreement with the strategic objectives are presented 
in Table 5.9. For the purpose of clarification, the mean of agreement for the sample is 
reported with the number of respondents who agreed (rating = 5, 6 or 7) and disagreed 
(rating = 1, 2, or 3) with each objective. The reason for such groupings is that the 
respondents might not be entirely certain as to the differences of the scale. In addition, 
the extreme values, such as 7 and 1, are usually avoided in Chinese culture (Lin, 
1997).
The strategic objectives were ranked by rating of agreement. The strategic 
objectives that were most frequently agreed with were "To enter Chinese market 
faster" at 82%, followed by "To acquire local market knowledge" at 78.7%, and "To 
gain more competitive advantages" at 77%. The strategic objectives that were least 
frequently agreed with were "To benefit from natural resources" at 73.8%, "To 
explore global synergies with other subsidiaries" at 63.9%, and "To spread financial 
risk" at 60.7%. The Pearson's correlations for agreement with strategic objectives are 
reported in Table 5.11.
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Table 5.10 presents the mean of satisfaction with the performance of the joint 
venture in relation to the firm's strategic objectives with the number of respondents 
who rated their satisfaction (rating =5, 6 or 7) and dissatisfaction (rating = 1, 2 or 3) 
with each objective, which is the same grouping approach as presented above for 
agreement with strategic objectives. They are ranked by rating of satisfaction.
It should be noted that while the respondents have an opinion on whether they 
agree with each objective, they do not necessarily have to have a judgment on 
satisfaction, which means they are neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. For example, 
foreign partners may agree they have strong learning intention when they establish the 
joint ventures. However, they might not have had a judgment on satisfaction on this 
objective since learning takes time and only can take effect in the long-term (Berrell 
et al, 2002). Taking this into account, one "N/A (Not Applicable) column was 
provided. Rather than treating this as a missing value, the N/A value can be replaced 
by a meaningful value. Following Hair et al (1995), mean substitution replaces the 
missing values for a variable with the mean value of that variable based on all valid 
responses. The rationale for this approach is that the mean is the best single 
replacement value as no statistical bias would be generated. Lyles and Baird (1994) 
also used mean values to substitute missing values to conserve degrees of freedom.
The strategic objectives with which respondents were most satisfied were "To 
enter Chinese market faster" at 87.3%, "To acquire knowledge of the local economy 
and culture" at 83% and "To deter competitive market entry" at 82.1%. The strategic 
objectives with which they were dissatisfied were "To spread financial risk" at 56.9%, 
"To explore global synergies with other subsidiaries" at 43.1%, and "To benefit from 
natural resources" at 33.3%.
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The results indicate that, in general, European companies were satisfied by 
their success in achieving their strategic objectives. The prioritised strategic objectives 
met the expectation of European parent companies, whereas the unimportant 
objectives showed low satisfaction ratings. However, they were somewhat dissatisfied 
with efficiency-seeking-related objectives. The Pearson's correlations for satisfaction 
with strategic objectives are reported in Table 5.12.
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Table 5.9 Agreement with Strategic Objectives
To enter Chinese market faster
To acquire local market knowledge
To gain more competitive advantages
To acquire knowledge of the local 
economy and culture
To overcome governmental trade barriers
To deter competitive market entry
To generate profits in China
To benefit from low labour cost
To spread financial risk
To explore global synergies
To avoid political risk or uncertainties
To reduce investment exposure
To benefit from natural resources
Mean
5.39
5.41
5.46
5.03
4.79
4.95
4.72
4.59
3.00
3.26
3.16
2.97
2.56
Most Agreed
Rank No. %
1 50 82.0
2 48 78.7
3 47 77.0
4 39 63.9
5 39 64.0
6 38 62.3
7 38 62.3
8 36 59.1
9 17 27.9
10 16 26.2
11 16 26.2
14 14 23.0
13 12 19.7
Least Agreed
Rank No. %
13 2 4.9
12 8 13.1
9 10 16.4
11 9 14.8
8 13 21.3
10 8 13.1
7 16 26.2
6 18 29.5
3 37 60.7
2 39 63.9
5 33 54.1
4 36 59.0
1 45 73.8
Table 5.10 Satisfaction with Strategic Objectives
To enter Chinese market faster
To acquire knowledge of the local 
economy and culture
To deter competitive market entry
To avoid political risk or uncertainties
To reduce investment exposure
To generate profits in China
To overcome governmental trade barriers
To benefit from low labour cost
To acquire local market knowledge
To gain more competitive advantages
To explore global synergies
To spread financial risk
To benefit from natural resources
Mean
5.42
5.13
5.17
4.98
5.07
4.98
5.03
4.77
4.62
4.43
3.86
3.24
3.76
Most Satisfied
Rank No. %
1 48 87.3
2 46 83
3 44 82.1
4 44 73.3
5 43 71.5
6 39 66.1
7 38 65.5
8 34 60.7
9 28 59.6
10 26 49.1
11 22 37.9
12 17 29.3
13 15 29.4
Least Satisfied
Rank No. %
13 2 3.6
10 8 14.3
12 5 9.4
9 9 15.0
5 12 19.7
6 11 18.6
11 7 12.1
8 10 17.9
7 10 21.3
4 15 28.3
2 25 43.1
1 33 56.9
3 17 33.3
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5.4.2.2. Verification of strategic objectives factors
The literature review suggested that foreign partner strategic objectives for joint 
venturing fall into three categories: market-developing objectives, efficiency-seeking 
objectives, and knowledge-acquiring objectives. In order to verify this premise, a 
confirmatory factor analysis of agreement with strategic objectives was performed.
The Principal Axis factoring was used as the type of extracting method in 
confirmatory factor analysis. This method allows the researchers to examine factor 
loadings of indicator variables to determine if they load on latent variables (factors) as 
predicted by the researcher's proposed model. Moreover, rather than setting eigenvalues 
as 1, which is widely applied in exploratory factor analysis, the extracted number of 
factors is constrained to 3. A Varimax orthogonal rotation method was applied. The 
results of the loading are reported in Table 5.13.
The proposed "Market-Developing" category exactly loaded on Factor 1, which 
comprised the four variables expected. The additional variable "To generate profits in 
China" also fell in this category. Factor 2 included the four expected Efficiency-Seeking 
variables. The additional variable "To benefit from low labour cost" fell in this category 
as well. The proposed "Organisational Learning" category loaded on Factor 3, which 
comprised both expected variables. The additional variable "To benefit from natural 
resources" did not meet the criterion of cutoff 0.3 (Churchill, 1991). Therefore, it was 
excluded from the analysis, and the CFA was re-run. The results are shown in Table 5.14.
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Table 5.13 Factor Loading of Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Market-Developing
Efficiency-Seeking
Knowledge- 
Acquiring
Additional category 
(traditional 
objectives of joining 
in a venture)
To enter Chinese 
market faster
To gain more 
competitive 
advantages
To deter competitive 
market entry
To overcome 
governmental trade 
barriers
To explore global 
synergies with other 
subsidiaries
To spread financial 
risk
To reduce investment 
exposure
To avoid political 
risk or uncertainties
To acquire 
knowledge of the 
local economy, 
politics, and culture
To acquire local 
market knowledge
To generate profits in 
China
To benefit from low 
labour cost
To benefit from 
natural resources
Factor
1
.330
.562
.470
.625
-.050
.033
-.113
-.400
.099
.209
.621
.159
.052
2
-.298
.009
-.110
.167
.318
.968
.819
.413
-.069
-.050
.009
.409
.123
3
.241
.109
.159
.155
-.072
-.073
.131
.186
.835
.723
.047
.077
.188
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
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Table 5.14 Rerun Factor Loading of Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Market-Developing
Efficiency-Seeking
Knowledge- 
Acquiring
To enter Chinese 
market faster
To gain more 
competitive 
advantages
To deter competitive 
market entry
To overcome 
governmental trade 
barriers
To generate profit in 
China
To explore global 
synergies with other 
subsidiaries
To spread financial 
risk
To reduce investment 
exposure
To avoid political 
risk or uncertainties
To benefit from low 
labour cost
To acquire 
knowledge of the 
local economy, 
politics, and culture
To acquire local 
market knowledge
Factor
1
.329
.564
.469
.627
.625
-.047
.049
-.096
-.384
.166
.105
.216
2
-.288
.000
-.104
.160
.004
.320
.950
.846
.423
.405
-.017
-.008
3
.253
.090
.172
.131
.045
-.077
-.137
.093
.145
.042
.848
.720
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.
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5.4.2.3. Reliability of strategic objectives factors
To examine the internal consistency of the factor loadings, Cronbach's Alpha was 
applied. Internal consistency reliabilities theoretically vary from a low of 0 to a high of 
1.0 and represent the proportion of the variance in the respondents' scores that are 
attributable to true differences on the construct (DeVellis, 1991). Nunnaly (1978) has 
indicated 0.7 to be an acceptable reliability coefficient. However, 0.60 is sometimes used 
in the literature. The following guidelines have been proposed by DeVellis (1991, p85) 
regarding acceptable reliabilities for research instrument scales: Below 0.60 is 
unacceptable; between 0.60 and 0.65 is undesirable; between 0.65 and 0.70 is minimally 
acceptable; and over 0.70 is acceptable.
The results of Cronbach's Alpha for factor 1, 2, and 3 are 0.6997, 0.6811, and 
0.7767, respectively. Therefore, the loading factors were deemed reliable for further 
examination of the hypothesised model according to DeVellis' (1991) recommendations. 
The variables were aggregated to measure market-developing-related, efficiency-seeking- 
related, and knowledge-acquiring-related objectives (Child and Yan, 1999) for further 
analysis.
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5.4.3. Verification of underlying dimension of IJV control 
5.4.3.1. Descriptive statistics of Parent Control
Table 5.15 reports the descriptive statistics for 16 control activities. The 
respondents were asked to rate these 16 activities on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 
"Control by Chinese Partner" to 7 "Control by European Partner", while 4 was specified 
as "Shared Control". Ratings 1, 2, 3 were considered to indicate the Chinese partner 
exercised control over a specific activity, whereas 5, 6, 7 were deemed to indicate the 
European partner had the dominant position.
The means of all 16 activities were more than 4. It can therefore be said that the 
European partner played an overall dominant role in IJV activities. These results are 
consistent with Vanhonacker's (1997) and Child and Yan's (1999) findings that foreign 
companies are more likely to seek managerial control over their joint venture in China 
than their Chinese partners. Taking the fact that two thirds of the European partners held 
more than 50 percent equity share into consideration, ownership may have an underlying 
impact on parent control. This is an area for future research.
Examining the mode for these sixteen control activities, ten were overwhelmingly 
controlled by the European partner. Production-related activities, such as Choice of key 
product lines, Production planning, Quality control, Product pricing, and R & D planning, 
were primarily controlled by the European partner. This is consistent with previous 
studies (e.g. Walsh et al, 1999; Tuan and Ng, 2003) that foreign partners have expertise
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in technology and production know-how and are more willing to manage these joint 
venture activities.
The activities where control was most shared were Use of profit and Choice of 
location of JV facilities. This can be explained, in the case of use of profit, by the fact that, 
Chinese law requires the joint venture partners to clearly state how the profit will be used 
when it is initially established. Subsequently, there is little debate over profit use by IJV 
partners. Partners share opinions on choice of location of JV facilities because of 
technical and pragmatic considerations. From a technical perspective, Chinese partners 
are state-owned companies, which have redundant production sites to offer. Foreign 
partners can be selective based on the technical requirements of factory building. Shared 
management and frequent communication are beneficial to both parties. From a 
pragmatic perspective, JV location is associated with complex national territory policies, 
which sometimes involve long bureaucratic procedures. This can also be considered as 
the contribution of the Chinese partner in managing government issues.
One area where most control was exercised by the Chinese partner was managing 
legal or government relations. There is little difficulty in understanding that Chinese 
partners know better how to cope with legal and governmental issues concerning joint 
ventures in China than their European partners.
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Table 5.15 Descriptive Statistics for IJV Control Activities
Setting JV strategic 
priority
Use of profit
Choice of key 
product lines
Allocating senior 
management 
positions
Choice of location of 
JV facilities
Choice of geographic 
market scope
Choice of major 
capital financing
Production planning
R & D planning
Product pricing
Sales and distribution
Quality control
Reward and 
incentive policies
Training and 
development policies
General management
Managing legal or 
government relations
Mode
7
4
7
4
4
7
4
7
7
7
7
7
4
7
7
4
Mean
5.48
4.49
5.85
5.30
4.38
5.31
5.16
5.56
5.87
5.56
5.46
5.75
4.97
5.30
5.16
4.07
European 
Partner 
Control
N
41
22
51
41
19
38
36
48
48
46
42
48
33
39
38
20
%
67.2
36.1
83.6
67.2
31.1
62.3
59
78.7
78.7
75.4
68.9
78.7
54.1
63.9
62.3
32.8
Shared 
Control
N
18
35
7
16
35
16
20
7
7
6
9
7
20
14
15
19
%
29.5
57.4
11.5
26.2
57.4
26.2
32.8
11.5
11.5
9.8
14.8
11.5
32.8
23.0
24.6
31.1
Chinese 
Partner 
Control
N
2
4
3
4
7
7
5
6
6
9
10
6
8
8
8
22
%
3.2
5.5
4.9
5.5
11.4
11.5
8.2
9.8
9.8
14.8
16.4
9.8
13.1
13.1
13.1
36.1
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5.4.3.2. Verification of Control factors
Based on the findings of prior studies, parent control has two dimensions: 
strategic and operational control (Child, 1997; Child and Yan, 2001). As a check on these 
two dimensions of parent control, a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on the 16 
strategic and operational control activities.
Activities 1 to 7 and activities 8 to 16 were intended to measure strategic and 
operational control, respectively. The principal axis factoring was used as the type of 
extracting method in confirmatory factor analysis. Rather than setting eigenvalues as 1, 
which is widely applied in exploratory factor analysis, the extracted number of factors 
was constrained as 2. A Varimax orthogonal rotation method was applied. The 
significance of loading must be greater than 0.30 (Churchill, 1991).
As expected, all the seven strategic control activities loaded on Factor 1 and the 
nine operational control activities loaded on Factor 2, respectively (see Table 5.15). Total 
explained variance was 62.23%.
5.4.3.3. Reliabilities of Parent Control Factors
The Cronbach's Alpha for the two factors was 0.8946 and 0.9416, respectively, 
indicating strong composite reliabilities. Therefore, control activities 1 to 7 were 
aggregated to measure strategic control and activities 8 to 16 were aggregated to measure 
operational control (Child and Yan, 1999) for farther analysis. The mean and standard
188
deviation of strategic control are 5.13 and 1.10, respectively. The mean and standard 
deviation of operational control are 5.29 and 1.38, respectively.
Table 5.15 Factor Analysis of Parent Control
Strategic 
Control
Operational 
Control
Setting JV strategic priority
Use of profit
Choice of key product lines
Allocating senior management positions
Choice of location of JV facilities
Choice of geographic market scope
Choice of major capital financing
Production planning
R & D planning
Product pricing
Sales and distribution
Quality control
Reward and incentive policies
Training and development policies
General management
Managing legal or government relations
Factor
1
.368
.185
.357
.320
.294
.443
.449
.779
.659
.614
.772
.701
.721
.865
.708
.530
2
.770
.624
.675
.753
.659
.610
.519
.318
.368
.511
.333
.333
.427
.243
.458
.518
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation.
189
5.5. Moderating effects of parent control on strategic objectives
Now that the underlying dimensions of the strategic objectives and control
variables have been verified using descriptive statistics and factor analysis, it is 
appropriate to use this data to test the hypotheses developed for this study. Hypotheses 
HI through H8 are tested by moderated hierarchical multiple regression. UV Age and 
European partner total equity share holding in the UV are used as control variables to 
determine whether they had the potential to confound results.
The moderated hierarchical multiple regression equation was:
X5
Where: Yj (j=i.8)= Satisfaction with Respective Strategic Objective 
Xn (j=i-8) = Respective Strategic Objectives 
X2 = Strategic Control 
X3 = Operational Control
XijX2 = Interaction between Respective Strategic Objective and Strategic Control 
XijX3=Interaction between Respective Strategic Objective and Operational Control 
Xt = UV Age 
Xs = European partner total equity share holding in the UV
Table 5.16 provides a summary of the correlation between all major constructs 
employed in later analysis. The significance levels of these coefficients have important 
consequences for the regression models.
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Table 5.16 Pearson's Correlation of Agreement with Strategic Objectives, Strategic 
Control, Operational Control, and Satisfaction with performance
STCO
OPCO
SP-ECMF
SP-DCME
SP-OGTB
SP-EGSS
SP-SPFR
SP-APRU
SP-AKLE
SP-ALMK
STCO
1
.788**
.433**
.636**
.157
-.328*
-.325*
.258*
.181
.135
OPCO
.788**
1
.583**
.371**
.039
.312*
-.217
.312*
.315*
.252
AO-
ECMF
.616**
.585**
.584**
.335*
.106
-.390**
-.274*
.276*
.452**
.177
AO- 
DCME
.231
.005
-.031
.429**
.289*
.113
.036
.320*
.010
-.065
AO- 
OGTB
.076
.044
-.026
.243
.209
-.047
.211
.326*
.156
-.166
AO- 
EGSS
-.407**
-.386**
-.319**
-.081
.220
.632**
.306*
-.085
-.276*
-.046
AO- 
SPFR
-.403**
-.360**
.322**
-.248
-.031
.055
.673**
.021
-.146
.006
AO- 
APRU
-.287*
-.229
-.279*
-.106
-.175
.069
.182
-.223
.099
.156
AO- 
AKLE
.336**
.287*
.080
.300*
.461**
.000
.006
.361**
.211
.311*
AO- 
ALMK
.236
.174
.056
.344*
.389**
.055
.144
.324*
.003
.240
Where: 
STCO
AO-ECMF 
AO-DCME 
AO-OGTB
AO-EGSS
AO-SFR 
AO-APRU
AO-AKLE 
AO-ALMK
Strategic Control
Agreement "To enter Chinese market faster"
Objective
Agreement "To deter competitive market
entry" Objective
Agreement "To overcome governmental trade
barriers" Objective
Agreement "To explore global synergies with 
other subsidiaries" Objective
Agreement "To spread financial risk"
Objective
Agreement "To avoid political risk or
uncertainties" Objective
Agreement "To acquire knowledge of the local 
economy, politics, and culture" Objective
Agreement "To acquire local market 
knowledge" Objective
OPCO 
SP-ECMF
SP-DCME 
SP-OGTB
SP-EGSS
SP-SFR 
SP-APRU
SP-AKLE 
SP-ALMK
Operational Control
Satisfaction with "To enter Chinese market
faster" Objective Performance
Satisfaction with "To deter competitive market
entry" Objective Performance
Satisfaction with "To overcome governmental
trade barriers" Objective Performance
Satisfaction with "To Satisfaction with
"explore global synergies with other
subsidiaries" Objective Performance
Satisfaction with "To spread financial risk"
Objective Performance
Satisfaction with "To avoid political risk or
uncertainties" Objective Performance
Satisfaction with "To acquire knowledge of
the local economy, politics, and culture"
Objective Performance
Satisfaction with "To acquire local market
knowledge" Objective Performance
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5.5.1. Multicollinearity and Center ed-Mean items
Multicollinearity exists when there is a strong correlation between two or more 
predictors in a regression mode (Lubinski and Humphreys, 1991). The literature indicates 
that in order to eliminate multicollinearity problems between the independent variables 
and the interaction items, predictor variables should be centered prior to computing the 
product items (Aguinis, 1995; Jaccard et al, 1995). This manipulation is important 
because when multicollinearity is present in a moderated multiple regression, the error 
terms rise and as a result, the predictive power of the model is greatly reduced. Centering 
is a straightforward transformation where the mean for a variable is subtracted from all 
cases resulting in a transformed mean of zero while distributions are unaffected (Jaccard 
et al, 1995). In this study, to represent the interaction between strategic objectives and the 
two dimensions of control, the variables were first centered and then multiplied together.
For example, to compute how strategic control moderates the objective "To Enter 
Chinese Market Faster", the multiple regression equation was:
Y,= ft, + PiXi , + £2X2 + p3X3 + p4X! & + PsXi 1X3 + X4 + X5
Where: YI = Satisfaction with "To Enter Chinese Market Faster" Objective
= "To Enter Chinese Market Faster" objective 
X2 = Strategic Control 
X3 = Operational Control
XnX2 = Interaction between "To Enter Chinese Market Faster" Objective and 
Strategic Control
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XnX3 = Interaction between "To Enter Chinese Market Faster" Objective and 
Operational Control
X4 = IJV Age
X5 = European partner total equity share holding in the IJV
Therefore, the interaction term XnX2 and XnX3 were centered as below:
= (Xn- 5.39) *(X2 - 5.13)
1X3 = (X,i- 5.39) *(X3 - 5.29)
Where: the mean scores of Xn, X2 , andXswere 5.39, 5.13, and 5.29, respectively
5.5.2. Hypotheses testing of HI - H8 
Hla & Hlb
HI a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between fast market entry and satisfaction with performance in relation 
to this objective: when the strategic control is high, fast market entry and 
satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is positively related; when 
the strategic control is low, fast market entry and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective is negatively related.
Hlb: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between fast market entry and satisfaction with performance in relation
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to this objective: when the operational control is high, fast market entry and 
satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is negatively related; 
when the operational control is low, fast market entry and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective is positively related.
The hypotheses HI a and Hlb proposed that high strategic control moderated the 
relationship between the objective "To Enter Chinese Market Faster" and satisfaction 
with performance in relation to this objective. Table 5.17 presents the three hierarchical 
regression models, hi the first model, the objective "To Enter Chinese Market Faster", 
IJV age, and equity shareholding were entered. Strategic control and operational control 
were entered in the second model. After being centered, the interaction items were 
entered in the third model.
The results clearly show that the interaction items improved the explanatory 
power of the model, although the increments in R2 were relatively small (AR2 = .079, F = 
9.452, p < .001). The p values associated with the interaction items were less than 0.05 
and thus achieved significance. Therefore, it can be concluded that strategic and 
operational control did have a strong moderating effect on the relationship between the 
objective "To Enter Chinese Market Faster" and satisfaction with objective performance 
in relation to that objective.
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Table 5.17 Hierarchical Regression of "To Enter Chinese Market Faster", Strategic 
and Operational Control on Satisfaction with Performance
Model
1
2
3
Variables
Constant
IJV Age
Held Share
To Enter Chinese Market
Faster
Constant
IJV Age
Held Share
To Enter Chinese Market
Faster
Strategic Control
Operational Control
Constant
IJV Age
Held Share
To Enter Chinese Market
Faster
Strategic Control
Operational Control
Interaction between "To Enter
Chinese Market Faster " and
Strategic Control
Interaction between "To Enter
Chinese Market Faster " and
Operational Control
Unstandardised
Coefficients
1.729
-.047
.013
.549***
2.030
-.040
. .007
.452**
-.280
.376
.697
-.049
.001
__ .***
.794
-.367***
.394***
.172**
.133*
R2
.384
.462
.886
AR2
.079
.423
F
11.826***
~ ,. __***9.452
58.632"'
*p<05, **p<01, ***p<001
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However, since the form of interaction has not yet been clearly specified, other 
valuable information might be ignored by concluding the analysis at this point. One way 
to achieve a better understanding of the pattern of interaction between the independent 
and dependent variables is to plot the within-subgroup regression equations. Take HI a as 
an example to make a full illustration.
Table 5.17 indicates that after both dimensions of parent control are added to the 
equation (model 2), the R2 changes from .384 to .462. The F statistic is 9.452 and it is 
significant at the 0.001 level, which implies that added variables significantly improve 
the overall model's explanatory power. When the interaction items are added to the 
equation (model 3), the R square is further increased to .886, which implies that the 
model explains 88.6% of variance in the dependent variable. The corresponding F 
statistic is 58.632, which is significant at the 0.001 level. This shows that interaction 
items significantly improve the overall model's explanatory power. Therefore, the 
multiple regression equation below can be obtained:
+ piXii + £2X2 + p3X3 + p4XnX2 + p5XnX3 + X* + X5
= .697 + .794Xn - .367X2 + .394X3 + .
After the interaction items were centered, the equation was:
= .697 + .794Xn - .367X2 + .394X3 + .172(Xn -5.39) (X2 -5.13)
.133(Xn- 5.39) (X3 - 5.29)
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In order to calculate interaction between Strategic contro
l and the objective "To 
Enter Chinese Market Faster", the following computation
 was conducted.
First, to examine the interaction between the objective "To Enter Chinese 
Market 
Faster" and strategic control, the variable X3 (operational control) w
as replaced by its 
mean value (u) 5.29:
= 2.733 + .794Xn - .367X2 + .394X3 + .172(Xn -5.39) (X2 -5.13)
The relationship between the independent variable, th
e objective "To Enter 
Chinese Market Faster", and the dependent variable, Sa
tisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective, should be ascertained when the moderator, st
rategic control 
exercised by the foreign parent over IJV, is converted
 by using values one standard 
deviation above variable mean, u+o, mean value, (j,, and one standard devia
tion below the 
mean, u-a, which will represent high level strategic cont
rol, shared control, and low level 
strategic control. Thus,
High Level of Strategic Control WhenX2 =u+o: Y
i= -.542 + .983X11
Shared Control WhenX2 =u; Y, = .85 
+ .794X11
Low Level of Strategic Control When X2 = u-o:
i = 2.273 + .605X11
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The plot presented in Figure 5.4 shows that when the level of strategic control 
is 
high (X2 = u+a), the objective "To Enter Chinese Market Faster" (Xn) is highly 
positively related to satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective (Yi). When 
the strategic control is shared (X2 = u), the relationship is positive. When the level of 
strategic control exercised by the foreign parent is low (X2 = M-~o), the relationship is 
highly positive as well. The results are plotted as Figure 5.4. The X-axis ref
lects the 
objective "To enter Chinese market faster" and the Y-axis reflects Satisfaction with 
Performance in relation to this objective. Therefore, positively moderating effect of high 
strategic control received support. However, negatively moderating effect 
for a low 
strategic control did not obtain support.
Operational control can be examined in a similar way. The variable strateg
ic 
control X2 was replaced by its mean 5.13:
YI = .697 + .794Xii - .367X2 + .394X3 + .172(Xn -5.39) (X2 -5.13) 
+ .133(Xn-5.39) (X3 -5.29)
= - 1.234 + .794Xn + .394X3 + .133(Xn ~ 5.39) (X3 - 5.29)
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High Level of Operational Control WhenX3 =u+a: Y, = .402 + .978X 11
Shared Control When X3 = M-:
Low Level of Operational Control When X3 = u-a Yi= 1.299+ .61Xn
The results indicate that when the level of operational control level is high, the 
objective "To Enter Chinese Market Faster" is positively related to satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective. The shared and low levels of operational control 
also lead to a positive relationship. Figure 5.5 graphs the results.
Therefore, for both high and low levels of strategic control, the relationship 
between "To Enter Chinese Market Faster" and Satisfaction with Performance is positive. 
The hypothesized moderating effect of a high level of strategic control is supported, 
whereas the moderating effect predicted for a low level of strategic control is not 
supported. Therefore, HI a is partially supported.
Similarly, for both high and low levels of operational control, the relationship 
between "To Enter Chinese Market Faster" and Satisfaction with Performance is positive. 
The hypothesized moderating effect of a high level of operational control is not supported, 
whereas the moderating effect of a low level of operational control is supported. 
Therefore, Hlb is partially supported.
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Figure 5-4 Interaction Between "To Enter Chinese Market 
Faster" and Strategic control
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Figure 5-5 Interaction between "To Enter Chinese Market 
Faster" and Operational Control
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H2a and H2b
H2a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between managing competition and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective: when the strategic control is high managing competition 
and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is positively related; 
when the strategic control is low, managing competition and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective is negatively related.
H2b: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between managing competition and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective: when the operational control is high, managing 
competition and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is 
positively related; when the operational control is low, managing competition and 
satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is negatively related.
H2a and H2b are related to the objective of managing competition objective. 
Table 5.18 indicates that neither strategic control interaction nor operational control 
interaction achieved significance. It can be inferred that neither strategic control nor 
operational control moderates the relationship between managing competition and 
satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective. Therefore, H2a and H2b were 
not supported.
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Table 5.18 Hierarchical Regression of "To Manage Competition", Strategic and 
____Operational Control on Satisfaction with Objective Performance_____
Model Variables
Unstandardised 
Coefficients
AR2 F
Constant
IJV Age
Held Share
To Managing Competition
2.658
.035
.011
.322"*
.195 4.616*
Constant
IJV Age
Held Share
To Managing Competition
Strategic Control
Operational Control
1.369
.054
-.002
.172*
.682*"
-.156
.469 .274 9.728*
Constant 
IJV Age 
Held Share
To Managing Competition 
Strategic Control 
Operational Control 
Interaction between "To 
Managing Competition" and 
Strategic Control 
Interaction between "To 
Managing Competition" and 
Operational Control
1.812
.046
-.003
.146
.671"*
-.182
-.128
.052
.494 .025 7.406*
P<.05, p<01, p<.OOJ
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H3a and H3b
H3a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between overcoming government barriers and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the strategic control is high 
overcoming government barriers and satisfaction with performance in relation to 
this objective is positively related; when the strategic control is low, overcoming 
government barriers and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective 
is negatively related.
H3b: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between overcoming government barriers and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the operational control is high, 
overcoming government barriers and satisfaction with performance in relation to 
this objective is positively related; when the operational control is low, overcoming 
government barriers and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective 
is negatively related.
H3a and H3b hypothesized moderating effects of control on the objective "To 
Overcome governmental Barriers" objective and satisfaction with objective performance 
in relation to this objective. The hierarchical multiple regression equation is:
Y3= po + PiX3 i + £2X2 + (33X3 + p4X3 iX2 + p5X31X3 + X4+ X5
Where: Y3 = Satisfaction with "To Overcome Governmental Barriers" Objective
X3 i = "To Overcome Governmental Barriers" Objective
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X2 = Strategic Control
X3 = Operational Control
X3 iX2 = Interaction between "To Overcome Governmental Barriers" Objective 
and Strategic Control
X3 iX3 = Interaction between "To Overcome Governmental Barriers" Objective 
and Operational Control
X4 = IJV Age
= European partner total equity share holding in the IJV
Table 5.19 indicates that interaction items significantly improve the overall 
model's explanatory power (R2 =.246, F=2.471, p<.05). Therefore, the multiple 
regression equation can be obtained:
Y3 = 2.846 + .205X31 + .510X2 - .156X3 + ,465(X31 -4.79) (X2-5.13) 
-.335(X3 i-4.79)(X3-5.29)
204
Table 5.19 Hierarchical Regression of "To Overcome Governmental Barriers", 
Strategic and Operational Control on Satisfaction with Objective Performance
Model Variables
Unstandardised 
Coefficients
R2 AR2 F
Constant
IJV Age
1
Held Share
To Overcome Governmental Barriers
Constant
IJV Age
Held Share
2
To Overcome Governmental Barriers
Strategic Control
Operational Control
Constant
IJV Age
Held Share
To Overcome Governmental Barriers
Strategic Control
Operational Control
5.009
-.031
.054 1.074
-.007
.140
4.291
-.023
-.009
.082 .029 1.983
.118
.301
-.123
2.846
.018
-.014
.205*
.510*
-.156
Interaction between "To Overcome 
Governmental Barriers" and 
Strategic Control
Interaction between "To Overcome 
Governmental Barriers" and 
Operational Control
.465
-.335
.246 .164 2.471
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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To further examine the interaction between strategic control and "To Overcome 
Governmental Barriers", X3 (operational control) was replaced by its mean 5.29. Hence:
Y3 = 2.021 + .205X31 + .510X2 + .465(X3 i-4.79) (X2-5.13)
High Level of Strategic Control WhenX2 =n+o: Y3= 2.745+ .717X3 i
Shared Control When X2 = \i: Y3 = 4.637+ .205X3 i
Low Level of Strategic Control When X2 = u~a: Y3 = 6.529-.307X3 i
Figure 5-6 Interaction between "To Overcome Governmental Barriers"
and Strategic Control
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To examine the interaction between strategic control and "To Spread Financial 
Risks", X2 (strategic control) was replaced by its mean 5.13. Hence:
= 5.462 + .205X31 - -156X3 - .335(X3 , - 4.79) (X3 - 5.29)
High Level of Operational Control When X3 = |i+a: Y3= 6.634 - .257X31
Shared Control WhenX3 = n: Y3= 4.637 + .205X31
Low Level of Operational Control When X3 = fi-a Y3= 2.639+ .667X3 i
Figure 5-7 Interaction between "To Overcome Governmental Barriers" and
Operational Control
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The results indicated that both strategic and operational control moderated the 
relationship between "To Overcome Governmental Barriers" and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective. Moreover, Figure 5.6 reveals that from the 
strategic control perspective, high level strategic control positively moderated the 
relationship, whereas low level strategic control can result in a negative relationship. 
From the operational control perspective, Figure 5.7 shows that high and low level 
operational control negatively and positively moderated the relationship, respectively.
Therefore, H3a is supported, H3b is not supported.
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H4a and H4b
H4a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between seeking global synergy and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective: when the strategic control is high seeking global synergy 
and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is positively related; 
when the strategic control is low, seeking global synergy and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective is negatively related.
H4b: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between seeking global synergy and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective: when the operational control is high, seeking global 
synergy and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is positively 
related; when the operational control is low, seeking global synergy and 
satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is negatively related.
H4a and H4b proposed moderating effects of control on the objective "To Explore 
Global Synergy" and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective. Whereas 
the score relating to Interaction between "To Explore Global Synergy" and Strategic
 
Control is significant, the score of Interaction between "To Explore Global Synergy" and
 
Operational Control failed to achieve significance (see Table 5.20).
For the interaction between strategic control and objective "To Explore Global 
Synergy", the following calculation was performed:
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Y4 = Po + PiX4i + (32X2 + p3X3 + p4X4iX2 + p5X4iX3 + X4+ X5
Where:
Y4 = Satisfaction with "To Explore Global Synergy" Objective
Xu = "To Explore Global Synergy"
X2 = Strategic Control
X3 = Operational Control
XuX2 = Interaction between "To Explore Global Synergy" Objective and 
Strategic Control
X4iX3 = Interaction between "To Explore Global Synergy" Objective and 
Operational Control
X4 = IJV Age
X5 = European partner total equity share holding in the IJV
To examine the interaction between strategic control and "To Explore Global 
Synergy", Operational control was replaced by its mean 5.29. Thus:
Y4 = 1.736 + .544X41 + .086X2 + .274(X4i - 3.26)(X2 - 5.13)
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Table 5.20 Hierarchical Regression of "To Explore Global Synergy", Strategic and 
Operational Control on Satisfaction with Objective Performance
Model Variables
Unstandardised 
Coefficients
AR2
Constant
IJV Age
Held Share
To Explore Global Synergy
2.540
-.020
-.001 
.468***
.382 11.740*
Constant
IJV Age
Held Share
To Explore Global Synergy
Strategic Control
Operational Control
2.878
-.022*
.001*
.451
-.013
-.054
.385 .003 6.886*
Constant 
IJV Age 
Held Share
To Explore Global Synergy 
Strategic Control 
Operational Control 
Interaction between "To 
Explore Global Synergy" and 
Strategic Control 
Interaction between "To 
Explore Global Synergy" and 
Operational Control
2.186
-.016* 
.004
.544* 
.086
-.085
.274*
.014
.487 .102 7.188*
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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H4a predicted that when strategic control was high, the relationship would be 
positive; strategic control was low, the relationship would be negative. The result 
indicates that the relationship was both positive and significant (see Figure 5.8), partially 
supporting H4a. However, the interaction with operational control was not significant 
(P=.014, p>.05). Therefore, H4b was not supported.
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H5a and H5b
H5a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between spreading financial risk and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective: when the strategic control is high spreading financial risk 
and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is positively related; 
when the strategic control is low, spreading financial risk and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective is negatively related.
H5b: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between spreading financial risk and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective: when the operational control is high, spreading financial 
risk and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is negatively 
related; when the operational control is low, spreading financial risk and 
satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is positively related.
H5a and H5b hypothesized moderating effects of parent control on "To Spread 
Financial Risks" and satisfaction with performance in relation to objective. From Table 
5.21, the hierarchical multiple regression equation is obtained:
Y5 = 2.720 + .566X5 i - .332X2 + .264X3 + .411(X5 i-3.00)(X2-5.13) 
- .327(X5 i-3.00)(X3-5.29)
Where: Y5 = Satisfaction with "To Spread Financial Risks" Objective 
Xsi = To Spread Financial Risks
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X2 = Strategic Control
Xs = Operational Control
XsiX2 = Interaction between "To Spread Financial Risks" Objective and Strategic 
Control
XsiXs = Interaction between "To Spread Financial Risks" Objective and 
Operational Control
X4 = IJV Age
X5 = European partner total equity share holding in the IJV
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Table 5.21 Hierarchical Regression of "To Spread Financial Risks", Strategic and 
Operational Control on Satisfaction with Objective Performance
Model Variables
Unstandardised 
Coefficients
R2
Constant
IJV Age
1
Held Share
To Spread Financial Risks
Constant
IJV Age
Held Share
2
To Spread Financial Risks
Strategic Control
Operational Control
Constant
IJV Age
Held Share
To Spread Financial Risks
Strategic Control
Operational Control
1.871
.043
.453 15.723*"
-.013
.612*"
2.300
.040
-.016
.468 .015 9.675***
.602***
-.305
.254
2.697
.041
-.018
.566***
-.332
.264
Interaction between "To Spread
Financial Risks" and Strategic
Control
Interaction between "To Spread
Financial Risks" and
Operational Control
.411*
-.327*
.524 .056 8.337
*P<.05, **P<.01, ***p<.001
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To examine the interaction between strategic control and "To Spread Financial 
Risks", X3 (operational control) was replaced by its mean 5.29. Hence:
Y5 = 4.096 + .566X5 , -.332X2 + .411(X5 i-3.00)(X2-5.13)
High Level of Strategic Control WhenX2 =(i+a: ¥5=.672+1.018X5 i
Shared Control When X2 = \JL: Y5= 2.393 + .566X5 i
Low Level of Strategic Control When X2 = H.-G: Y5= 4.114+ .114X5 i
Figure 5-9 Interaction Between "To Spread Financial Risks
and strategic control
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To examine the interaction between strategic control and "To Spread Financial 
Risks", X2 (strategic control) was replaced by its mean 5.13. Hence:
Y5 = .994 + .566X5 i + .264X3 - .327(X5 i-3.00)(X3-5.29)
High Level of Operational Control When X3 = Y5= 4.108+ .115X5 i
Shared Control When X3 = ji: Y5= 2.391+ .566X5 i
Low Level of Operational Control When X3 = p,-a Y5=.673+1.017Xsi
Figure 5-10 Interaction between "To Spread Financial Risks"
and Operational Control
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The results indicate that when strategic control is high, the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables is positively related, which is in accordance with 
what was proposed. When strategic control is low, the relationship is positively related, 
which contradicts the hypothesized moderating effect of low strategic control (see Figure 
5.9). Therefore H5a is partially supported.
The results also showed that when operational control is at both high and low 
ends of the spectrum, the relationship between the objective "To spread financial risk" 
and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is positive (see Figure 5.10). 
Moreover, the higher level strategic control leads to better satisfaction. The proposed 
moderating effect of high operational control did not receive support, whereas low 
operational control did. Hence, H5b is partially supported.
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H6a and H6b
H6a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between avoiding political uncertainty and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the strategic control is high 
avoiding political uncertainty and satisfaction with performance in relation to this 
objective is positively related; when the strategic control is low, avoiding political 
uncertainty and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is 
negatively related.
H6b: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between avoiding political uncertainty and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the operational control is high, 
avoiding political uncertainty and satisfaction with performance in relation to this 
objective is negatively related; when the operational control is low, avoiding 
political uncertainty and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective 
is positively related.
H6a and H6b hypothesized moderating effects on objective "To Avoid Political 
Risk and Uncertainties" objective and satisfaction with performance in relation to this 
objective. Since both interaction with strategic control (p=.019, p>.l) and operational 
control (P=.031, p>.l) failed to achieve significance (see Table 5.22), H6a and H6b are 
not supported.
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Table 5.22 Hierarchical Regression of "To Avoid Political Risk and Uncertainties", 
Strategic and Operational Control on Satisfaction with Objective Performance
Model Variables Unstandardised 
Coefficients
R2 AR2
Constant
IJV Age
Held Share
To Avoid Political Risk and
Uncertainties
7.009
.020
-.027**
-.166
.130 2.853
Constant
IJV Age
Held Share
To Avoid Political Risk and
Uncertainties
Strategic Control
Operational Control
5.452
.029
-.039
-.106
-.008 
.390*
.270 .140 4.066**
Constant
IJV Age
Held Share
To Avoid Political Risk and
Uncertainties
Strategic Control
Operational Control
Interaction between "To Avoid 
Political Risk and 
Uncertainties" and Strategic 
Control
Interaction between "To Avoid 
Political Risk and 
Uncertainties" and Operational 
Control
5.493
.032
-.040**
-.100
-.023 
.398*
.019
.031
.277 .007 2.897
*p<.05, **p<01, ***p<.001
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H7a and H7b
H7a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the strategic control is high 
acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with performance in relation 
to this objective is positively related; when the strategic control is low, acquiring 
country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with performance in relation to this 
objective is negatively related.
H7b: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the operational control is high, 
acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with performance in relation 
to this objective is negatively related; when the operational control is low, 
acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with performance in relation 
to this objective is positively related.
H7a and H7b hypothesized moderating effects of parent control on objective "To 
Acquire Country Specific Knowledge" and satisfaction with performance in relation to 
this objective. From Table 5.23, the hierarchical multiple regression equation is obtained:
Y7 = 2.599 + .198X7 i + -205X2 + .154X3 + .556(X7 i-5.03) (X2-5.13) 
- .395(X7i -5.03) (X3-5.29)
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Where:
Y7 = Satisfaction with "To Acquire Country Specific Knowledge" Objective
X7 i = To Acquire Country Specific Knowledge
X2 = Strategic Control 
= Operational Control
= Interaction between "To Acquire Country Specific Knowledge" 
Objective and Strategic Control
X7 iX3 = Interaction between "To Acquire Country Specific Knowledge" 
Objective and Operational Control
X4 = IJV Age
Xs = European partner total equity share holding in the IJV
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Table 5.23 Hierarchical Regression of "To Acquire Country Specific Knowledge", 
Strategic and Operational Control on Satisfaction with Objective Performance
Model Variables
Unstandardised 
Coefficients
R2 AR2 F
Constant
UV Age
Held Share
To Acquire Country Specific
Knowledge
4.204
.060
-.006
1.65
.061 1.225
Constant
IJVAge
Held Share
To Acquire Country Specific
Knowledge
Strategic Control
Operational Control
3.870
.064
-.015
.116
-.248 
.452*
.151 .090 1.953
Constant
UV Age
Held Share
To Acquire Country Specific
Knowledge
Strategic Control
Operational Control
Interaction between "To Acquire
Country Specific Knowledge" and
Strategic Control
Interaction between "To Acquire
Country Specific Knowledge" and
Operational Control
2.529
.087
-.017
.198*
.205
.154
.556***
  395**
.307 .156 3.356**
*p<05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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To examine the interaction between strategic control and "Acquire Country 
Specific Knowledge", XB (operational control) was replaced by its mean 5.29. Thus:
Y7 = 3.344 + .198X71 + -205X2 + .556(X7 i-5.03) (X2-5.13)
High Level of Strategic Control WhenX2 =u+a: Y7 = 1.543 + .81X7 i
Shared Control WhenX2 =ji: Y7 = 4.396 + .198X7 i
Low Level of Strategic Control When X2 = |J.-a: Y7 = 7.248 -.414X7 i
u u
CS
c _o'
C3 
00
-3
Figure 5-11 Interaction between "To Acquire Country-Specific 
Knowledge" Objective and Strategic Control
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To examine the interaction between operational control and "Acquire Country 
Specific Knowledge", X2 (strategic control) was replaced by the mean value 5.13. Hence:
3.581 + .198X7 i + .154X3 - .395(X71-5.03) (X3-5.29)
High Level of Operational Control When X3 = u+o: Y7= 7.349 - .347X71
Shared Control WhenX3 =ji: Y7= 4.396+ .198X7 i
Low Level of Operational Control When X3 = u-o Y7=1.442+ .743X71
Figure 5-12 Interaction between "To Acquire Country- 
Specific Knowledge" Objective and Operational Control
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Coefficients of interaction with both strategic control (P=.556, p<.0001) and 
operational control (p=-.395, p<.0001) were highly significant. The results were 
consistent with the predicted direction of the relationships.
Figure 5.11 indicates that when strategic control is high, the relationship between 
acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with performance in relation to 
this objective is positively related. When strategic control is low, the relationship is 
negatively related. The results are consistent with the hypothesized moderating effect of 
strategic control. Therefore H7a is supported.
Figure 5.12 reveals that when operational control is high, the relationship between 
acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with performance in relation to 
this objective is negatively related, whereas operational control is low, the relationship is 
positively related. The results are in accordance with what was proposed. Hence, H7b is 
supported.
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H8a and H8b
H8a: Strategic control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between acquiring local marketing knowledge and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the strategic control is high 
acquiring local marketing knowledge and satisfaction with performance in relation 
to this objective is positively related; when the strategic control is low, acquiring 
local marketing knowledge and satisfaction with performance in relation to this 
objective is negatively related.
H8b: Operational control that the foreign parent exercises over IJV will moderate the 
relationship between acquiring local marketing knowledge and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective: when the operational control is high, 
acquiring local marketing knowledge and satisfaction with performance in relation 
to this objective is negatively related; when the operational control is low, 
acquiring local marketing knowledge and satisfaction with performance in relation 
to this objective is positively related.
H8a and h8b hypothesized moderating effects of parent control on objective "To 
Acquire Local Market Knowledge" and satisfaction with performance in relation to this 
objective. From Table 5.24, the hierarchical multiple regression equation is obtained:
Y8 = 3.299 + .215X81 - .021X2 + .200X3 + .415(X8 i-5.41) (X2-5.13) 
- .305(X8 i-5.41) (X3-5.29)
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Where:
Yg = Satisfaction with "To Acquire Local Market Knowledge" Objective
X8 i = To Acquire Local Market Knowledge
X2 = Strategic Control
X3 = Operational Control
XgiX2 = Interaction between "To Acquire Local Market Knowledge" Objective 
and Strategic Control
X8 iX3 = Interaction between "To Acquire Local Market Knowledge" Objective 
and Operational Control
X4 = IJV Age
Xs = European partner total equity share holding in the IJV
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Table 5.24 Hierarchical Regression of "To Acquire Local Market Knowledge", 
Strategic and Operational Control on Satisfaction with Objective Performance
Model Variables
Unstandardised 
Coefficients
AR2 F
Constant
IJVAge
Held Share
To Acquire Local Market
Knowledge
4.373
-.005
-.011
.176
.056 1.118'
Constant
IJV Age
Held Share
To Acquire Local Market
Knowledge
Strategic Control
Operational Control
4.241
-.002
-.019
.143
-.257 
.400
,122 .067 1.532*
Constant
IJVAge
Held Share
To Acquire Local Market
Knowledge
Strategic Control
Operational Control
Interaction between "To Acquire
Local Market Knowledge" and
Strategic Control
Interaction between "To Acquire
Local Market Knowledge" and
Operational Control
3.304
.010
-.015
.215
-.021 
.200
.415*
-.305*
*p<05, **p<.OJ, ***p<001
.213 .090 2.043*
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To examine the interaction between strategic control and "To Acquire Local 
Market Knowledge", X3 (operational control) was replaced by the mean 5.29. Hence:
= 4.362 + .215X8 i - .021X2 + .415(X8 i-5.41) (X2-5.13)
High Level of Strategic Control WhenX2 =|ii+a: Y8= 1.759 + .672X81
Shared Control WhenX2 =jj.: Y8=4.254 + .215X81
Low Level of Strategic Control When X2 = M.-CJ: Y8= 6.749 - .242X51
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Figure 5-13 Interaction between "To Acquire Local 
Market Knowledge" Objective and Strategic Control
Low Level 
Strategic Control
Shared 
Strategic Control
High Level 
Strategic Control
6
-3 -2 -1 (
-1
) 1 2
"To Acquire Local Market Knowledge" Objective
231
To examine the interaction between strategic control and "To Acquire Local 
Market Knowledge", X2 (strategic control) was replaced by the variable mean 5.13.
Hence:
Y8 = 3.196 + .215X81 + .200X3 - .305(Xgi-5.41) (X3-5.29)
High Level of Operational Control When X3 = u+a: Y8= 6.808 - .206X81
Shared Control When X3 = ji: Y8=4.245 + .215X81
Low Level of Operational Control When X = i-a Y8= 1.70 + .636X;81
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Figure 5-14 Interaction between "To Acquire Local Market 
Knowledge" Objective and Operational Control
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Coefficients of interaction with both strategic control (0-.415, p<-05) an 
operational control (P=-.305, p<.05) were highly significant. After farther explored the 
moderating effects, Figure 5.13 shows consistency with the hypothesized moderating 
effect of strategic control. Therefore H8a is supported.
Figure 5.14 reveals that when operational control is high, the relationship between 
acquiring local market knowledge and satisfaction with performance in relation to this 
objective is negatively related, whereas operational control is low, the relationship is 
positively related. The results are in accordance with what was proposed. Hence, H8b is 
supported.
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5.6. Conceptual framework testing
Structural equation modeling (SEM) was initially considered as an appropriate 
means for the testing of this study's conceptual framework, since it takes into account the 
modeling of interactions, nonlinearities, correlated independents, multiple latent 
independents which are each measured by multiple variables. Structural equation 
modeling is a family of statistics techniques which incorporates and integrates 
confirmatory factor analysis and path analysis. A model is tested using SEM goodness- 
of-fit tests to determine if the pattern of variances and covariances in the data is 
consistent with a structural model specified by the researcher (Kline, 1998).
hi the SEM literature, one of the recommendations is that sample size should be at 
least eight times the number of variables in the model (Jaccard and Wan, 1996). Another 
recommendation, based on Stevens (1996) is to have at least fifteen cases per measured 
variable or indicator. There are a total of thirty-five variables in this study. However, total 
sample size is sixty-one. Therefore, SEM cannot be applied and is replaced by other 
approaches as indicated below to avoid statistical bias.
As a result of the inability to apply Structural Equation Modeling analysis to the 
data, a series of multiple regressions and path analysis were used to test the hypotheses.
5.6.1. Direct effects
Path analysis is a method employed to determine whether or not a multivariate 
set of non-experimental data fits well with a particular (a priori) causal model (Pedhazur,
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1982). A path model is a diagram relating independent, intermediary and dependent 
variables. Path arrows indicate causation between exogenous or intermediary variables 
and the dependent variable(s) (Loehlin, 1991). A path coefficient is a standardised 
regression coefficient (Beta) showing the direct effect of an independent variable on a 
dependent variable in the path model. This analytical technique enabled the researcher to 
identify the relative magnitudes of the direct and indirect effects of the three research 
constructs: strategic objectives, parent control, and joint venture performance. The 
following regression equations were run in the path analysis:
Performance = b0 + b tMD + b2ES + b3KA + b4SC + b5OC + e } 
Strategic Control = b0 + bjMD + b2ES + b3KA + e2 
Operational Control = b0 + bjMD + b2ES + b3KA + e3 
Where: MD = Market-Developing objectives,
ES = Efficiency-Seeking Objectives
KA = Knowledge-Acquiring Objectives
SC = Strategic Control
OC = Operational Control
The three categories of objectives are measured by aggregating the three factors 
that were generated from the confirmatory factor analysis in Section 5.4.2.2. Table 5.25 
presents the results of multiple regressions for IJV Overall Performance and the goodness 
of fit index. The R square is 0.728, which means that the model explains 72.8% of the
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variance in UV overall performance. The F statistic for the model is 29.46, significant at 
the 0.001 level, which indicates that the overall framework is substantiated.
Table 5.25 Results of Multiple Regression Analysis for IJV Overall Performance
Dependent variable: overall IJV performance
Variables
Constant
Market- 
Developing
Efficiency- 
Seeking
Knowledge- 
Acquiring
Strategic 
Control
Operational 
Control
Unstandardised 
Coefficients
-.442
.200*
.048
-.012
.341*
.519***
Standardised 
Coefficients
.169*
.047
-.014
.296*
.567***
R square
.728
F-Statistics
29.458
p-value
.000
p<.05, p<001
Table 5.26 and Table 5.27 report the results of multiple regressions for strategic 
control and operational control, respectively. The F statistics are all statistically 
significant (F=7.009, p<.001 and F=4.151, p<.005).
The regression equations are (all coefficients are standardised):
Performance = -.442 + .169MD + .047ES - .14KA + .296SC + .567OC
Strategic Control = 4.125 + .173MD - .357ES + .264KA
Operational Control = 4.760 + .063MD - .323ES + .237KA
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Table 5.26 Results of Multiple Regression Analysis for Strategic Control
Dependent variable: Strategic Control
Variables
Constant
Market- 
Developing
Efficiency- 
Seeking
Knowledge- 
Acquiring
Unstandardised 
Coefficients
4.125
.178
-.316*
.203*
Standardised 
Coefficients
.173
-.357*
.264*
R square
.269
F-
Statistics
7.009
p-value
.000
'p<.05. "p<.01, '"p<001
Table 5.27 Results of Multiple Regression Analysis for Operational Control
Dependent variable: Operational Control
Variables
Constant
Market- 
Developing
Efficiency- 
Seeking
Knowledge- 
Acquiring
Unstandardised 
Coefficients
4.760
.081
-.361*
.230
Standardised 
Coefficients
.063
-.323*
.237
R square
.179
F-Statistics
4.151
p-value
.010
p<05, p<. p<.001
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5.6.2. Hypotheses Testing for H9 - H13
Figure 5-15 provided hypothesized relationships of H9 to HIS. The standardised 
regression coefficients of the above equations represent the direct effects of the path 
coefficients (pc), which are presented in Figure 5.16. The path coefficients of Market- 
Developing objectives to strategic control and operational control are not significant 
(p>.05). The results suggest that Market-Developing objectives have no significant 
relationship with either strategic control or operational control. Thus H9a and H9b do not 
receive support. The relationships between Efficiency-Seeking objectives and strategic 
control (pc = -.357) and operational control (pc = -.323) are both significant (p<.01). 
However, the predicted sign for strategic control is positive, which is in contrast to the 
result. Therefore, HlOa is not supported, but HI Ob is supported. Knowledge-Acquiring 
objectives have a positive relationship with strategic control (pc =.264, p<.05). However, 
the sign is opposite to what was expected. The relationship with operational control is not 
significant (p>.05). Thus, HI la and HI Ib are not supported.
Strategic control (pc = .341) and operational control (pc = .519) have significant 
and positive relationships (p<.01) with overall joint venture performance. Therefore, 
H12a and H12b are supported.
Of the predicted direct paths from the three categories of objectives to Overall UV 
performance, only Market-Developing was found to be significant and positive (p<.05). 
Thus, H13a is supported. H13b and H13c are not supported.
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5.6.3. Indirect effects
To examine further whether the three categories of objectives relate to Overall 
IJV performance, it is necessary to compute the relative strengths of direct and indirect 
paths between strategic objectives and IJV overall performance. First, the indirect effects 
of each category of objectives on Overall IJV performance are calculated by multiplying 
the coefficients of each relevant path and then summing them up (Cohen and Cohen, 
1975). For example, the indirect effect of the Market-Developing category on Overall IJV 
performance through strategic control is calculated by multiplying the coefficients for the 
path between the Market-Developing category and strategic control and the path between 
strategic control and Overall IJV performance. A similar computation applies to 
operational control. The total indirect effect of the Market-Developing category on 
Overall IJV performance is calculated by summing up both paths. The equation is given 
below:
Indirect EffectMD-pERF = (PathMD-sc x Pathsc-pERp) + (PatliMD-oc x Pathoc-PERp) 
Where: MD = Market-Developing objectives
SC = Strategic control
OC = Operational control
PERF = Overall IJV performance
The results of the direct and indirect relationships between the three categories of 
objectives and Overall IJV performance are reported in Table 5.28. The total effects 
indicate that the relationship between the Market-Developing category of objectives and 
Overall IJV performance equals direct effect since both indirect effects via strategic
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control and operational control are insignificant (p>.05). Although Efficiency-Seeking 
has no significant direct relationship with Overall IJV performance, the indirect 
relationships via strategic control and operational control are significant. This outcome 
reveals that foreign parent's efficiency-seeking objectives have an indirect impact on IJV 
performance. The learning objectives have an indirect relationship with IJV performance 
via strategic control. It however is quite weak.
Table 5.28 Direct and Indirect effects between categories of objectives and
Overall IJV performance
Market- 
Developing
Efficiency- 
Seeking
Knowledge- 
Acquiring
Direct 
Effect
(DE)
.169*
NS
NS
Indirect effect
Path Via 
Strategic control
(IS)
NS
-.106*
.078*
Path Via 
Operational control
(10)
NS
-.183*
NS
Total
Effect
TE = DE + IS 
+ IO
.169
-.289
.078
'p<.05; NS = Not Significant
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5.7. Results of Performance between Categories of Objectives 
Hypotheses testing for H14
H14a: Where satisfaction with strategic objectives is concerned, on average, Market- 
developing objectives outperform Efficiency-seeking objectives.
H14b: Where satisfaction with strategic objectives is concerned, on average, Market- 
developing objectives outperform knowledge-acquiring objectives.
H14c: Where satisfaction with strategic objectives is concerned, on average, Knowledge- 
acquiring objectives outperform efficiency-seeking objectives.
H14a, H14b, and H14c predicted that the three categories of objectives, market- 
developing-related, efficiency-seeking-related and knowledge-acquiring-related, would 
perform differently in terms of foreign parent satisfaction with strategic objectives 
achievement. To test these three hypotheses, the three categories of objectives were 
analysed by applying analysis of variance (ANOVA), which is reported in Table 5.29. 
The results indicate that there was a significant difference between objectives in relation 
to satisfaction with performance (F (2, 180) = 59.83, p<.05).
To further examine this difference, each category of objectives is compared to 
each of the remaining categories. Table 5.30 shows the results of Tukey's HSD. For each 
pair of categories the difference between group means and the significance level of that 
difference are displayed.
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When market-developing category is compared to the efficiency-seeking category, 
the difference is positive and significant (see Table 5.30). This means that the market- 
developing objectives outperform efficiency-seeking objectives. Therefore, H14a is
supported.
When knowledge-acquiring category is compared with the efficiency-seeking 
category, the difference is positive and significant (see Table 5.30). This indicates that 
knowledge-acquiring objectives outperform efficiency-seeking objectives. In other words, 
H14b is supported.
However, when the market-developing category is compared with the knowledge- 
acquiring category (see Table 5.30), the difference is negative but not significant. Hence, 
H14c is not supported.
Table 5.29 ANOVA of Foreign Parent Satisfaction with performance for
different Categories of objectives
Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with performance
Between Groups
Within Groups
Total
Sum of
Squares
187.027
281.337
468.364
df
2
180
182
Mean
Square
93.513
1.563
F
59.83
Sig.
.000
***p<.001
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Table 5.30 Post Hoc Tests (Tukey's HSD) Multiple Comparison Results
Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with performance
(I) Objective
Market-Developing 
Objective
Efficiency-Seeking 
Objectives
Knowledge-Acquiring 
Objectives
(J) Objective
Efficiency-Seeking Objectives
Knowledge- Acquiring Objectives
Market-Developing Objective
Knowledge- Acquiring Objectives
Market-Developing Objective
Efficiency-Seeking Objectives
Mean Difference 
(I-J)
2.0459*
-.1852
-2.0459*
-2.2311*
.1852
2.2311*
Sig.
.000
.692
.000
.000
.692
.000
The mean difference is significant at the .05 level
5.8. Results of Parent Satisfaction and Overall IJV Performance 
Hypotheses testing for H15
HI5: Satisfaction with overall IJV performance is correlated with parent company 
satisfaction with performance in relation to objectives.
Satisfaction with performance in relation to objectives was measured by 
aggregating the twelve strategic objectives (Cronbach's Alpha = 0.7532). In Table 5.31, 
Pearson's correlation analysis indicates that there is a positive relationship between 
Satisfaction with Overall IJV performance and Satisfaction with performance in relation
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to objectives. But the relationship is not significant (r = .241, p > .05). Therefore HI5 was 
not supported.
Table 5.31 Pearson's Correlations of Satisfaction with Overall IJV 
Performance and Aggregate Satisfaction with Objective Performance
Satisfaction with Overall IJV performance
Aggregate Satisfaction with Objective 
Performance
.241
5.9. Summary of Results relating to Hypotheses
A summary of the results relating to the hypotheses is reported in Table 5.32
below.
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Table 5.32 Summary of Results Relating to Hypotheses
Hypotheses Result
When the strategic control is high, fast market entry and satisfaction with performance in 
Hla relation to this objective is positively related; when the strategic control is low, fast market 
entry and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is negatively related.
Partially 
Supported
When the operational control is high, fast market entry objective and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective is negatively related; when the operational control Partially 
is low, fast market entry and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is Supported 
positively related.
When the strategic control is high managing competition and satisfaction with
performance in relation to this objective is positively related; when the strategic control is Not 
H2a
low, managing competition and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective Supported
is negatively related.
When the operational control is high, managing competition objective and satisfaction
with performance in relation to this objective is positively related; when the operational Not 
H2b
control is low, managing competition and satisfaction with performance in relation to this Supported
objective is negatively related.
When the strategic control is high overcoming government barriers and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective is positively related; when the strategic control is 
low, overcoming government barriers and satisfaction with performance in relation to this 
objective is negatively related.
H3a Supported
H3b
When the operational control is high, overcoming government barriers objective and 
satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is positively related; when the 
operational control is low, overcoming government barriers and satisfaction with
Not 
Supported
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performance in relation to this objective is negatively related.
H4a
When the strategic control is high seeking global synergy and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective is positively related; when the strategic control is 
low, seeking global synergy and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective 
is negatively related.
Partially 
Supported
When the operational control is high, seeking global synergy objective and satisfaction 
with performance in relation to this objective is positively related; when the operational Not 
control is low, seeking global synergy and satisfaction with performance in relation to this Supported 
objective is negatively related.
When the strategic control is high spreading financial risk and satisfaction with
performance in relation to this objective is positively related; when the strategic control is Partially 
H5a
low, spreading financial risk and satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective Supported
is negatively related.
When the operational control is high, spreading financial risk objective and satisfaction
with performance in relation to this objective is negatively related; when the operational Partially 
H5b
control is low, spreading financial risk and satisfaction with performance in relation to this Supported
objective is positively related.
When the strategic control is high avoiding political uncertainty and satisfaction with
performance in relation to this objective is positively related; when the strategic control is Not 
H6a
low, avoiding political uncertainty and satisfaction with performance in relation to this Supported
objective is negatively related.
When the operational control is high, avoiding political uncertainty objective and
satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is negatively related; when the Not 
H6b
operational control is low, avoiding political uncertainty and satisfaction with performance Supported
in relation to this objective is positively related.
When the strategic control is high acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction 
with performance in relation to this objective is positively related; when the strategic 
control is low, acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with performance in
H7a Supported
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H7b
H8a
H8b
H9a
H9b:
HlOa
HlOb
Hlla
Hllb
relation to this objective is negatively related.
When the operational control is high, acquiring country-specific knowledge objective and 
satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is negatively related; when the 
operational control is low, acquiring country-specific knowledge and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective is positively related.
When the strategic control is high acquiring local marketing knowledge and satisfaction 
with performance in relation to this objective is positively related; when the strategic 
control is low, acquiring local marketing knowledge and satisfaction with performance in 
relation to this objective is negatively related.
When the operational control is high, acquiring local marketing knowledge objective and 
satisfaction with performance in relation to this objective is negatively related; when the 
operational control is low, acquiring local marketing knowledge and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective is positively related.
Foreign partner pursued market-developing objectives are positively related to strategic 
control.
Foreign partner pursued market-developing objectives are positively related to operational 
control.
Foreign partner pursued efficiency-seeking objectives are positively related to strategic 
control.
Foreign partner pursued efficiency-seeking objectives negatively related to operational 
control.
Foreign partner pursued knowledge-acquiring objectives are positively related to strategic 
control.
Foreign partner pursued knowledge-acquiring objectives are negatively related to 
operational control.
Supported
Supported
Supported
Not 
Supported
Not 
Supported
Not 
Supported
Supported
Not 
Supported
Not 
Supported
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H12a
H12b
H13a
H13b
H13c
H14a
H14b
H14c
HIS
The extent of strategic control exercised by the IJV foreign parent is positively related to 
the satisfaction with Overall IJV performance.
The extent of operational control exercised by the IJV foreign parent is positively related 
to the satisfaction with Overall IJV performance.
Foreign partner pursued market-developing objectives are positively related to the overall 
joint venture performance.
Foreign partner pursued efficiency-seeking objectives are negatively related to the overall 
joint venture performance.
Foreign partner pursued knowledge-acquiring objectives are negatively related to the 
overall joint venture performance.
Where satisfaction with strategic objectives is concerned, on average, Market-developing 
objectives outperform Efficiency-seeking objectives.
Where satisfaction with strategic objectives is concerned, on average, Knowledge- 
acquiring objectives outperform efficiency-seeking objectives.
Where satisfaction with strategic objectives is concerned, on average, Market-developing 
objectives outperform knowledge-acquiring objectives.
Satisfaction with overall IJV performance is correlated with parent company satisfaction 
with performance in relation to objectives.
Supported
Supported
Supported
Not 
Supported
Not 
Supported
Supported
Supported
Not 
Supported
Not 
Supported
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5.10. Chapter Summary
This chapter presents the empirical findings from the survey of 61 Sino-European
IJVs. The dimensions of IJV strategic objectives and parent control were examined and 
verified. The moderating effects of control on different strategic objectives were tested. 
Twelve hypotheses were statistically supported, with a further four hypotheses receiving 
partial support. The proposed framework was examined. A strong relationship between 
parent control and IJV performance was found. Different categories of strategic 
objectives have either direct or indirect impacts on IJV performance. Market-developing 
objectives have a direct impact. Efficiency-seeking objectives have an indirect impact 
through strategic control and operational control. Knowledge-acquiring objectives have a 
weak indirect impact via strategic control. Different performance was found between 
categories of strategic objectives. Market-developing and knowledge-acquiring objectives 
outperform efficiency-seeking objectives. However, no significance was found between 
parent's satisfaction with strategic objectives and IJV overall performance.
The next chapter will conclude the research by reviewing the research objectives, 
discussing the research findings, providing theoretical and managerial implications, 
showing limitations of the study, and recommending directions for future study.
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Chapter 6. Conclusions
6.1. Chapter Introduction
This chapter concludes the study. Section 6.2 briefly reviews the research 
questions and methodologies. Section 6.3 discusses the findings in relation to the research 
objectives and hypotheses. Section 6.4 and 6.5 discuss the implications for researchers as 
well as for managers. Section 6.6 and 6.7 address the limitations of the study and provide 
recommendations for future research, respectively.
6.2. Research Overview
This study focuses on international joint ventures, more specifically, on the 
strategic objectives, management control and performance aspects of IJVs. It investigates 
the relationships between these three theoretical constructs.
The central research objective of the study is to investigate the relationship 
between the strategic objectives, management control and performance of IJVs in 
developing countries using China as a focus for this research. The study has three specific 
objectives. To fulfill these three research objectives, six research questions were 
identified. The first three research questions attempt to fulfill research objective 1. The 
fourth research question addresses research objective 2, and research objective 3 is 
investigated by research questions 5 and 6.
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Research objective 1: To improve understanding of IJVs characteristics in 
developing countries.
As an important strategy, international joint ventures have been increasingly used 
by MNEs. In coping with the intensified international competition and the challenges of 
globalisation of the world's economies, IJVs represent an effective approach to 
competing globally (Kogut, 1988b). Joint ventures between domestic companies in 
developing countries and foreign companies have become a popular means for both 
managements to satisfy their objectives. They offer an opportunity for each partner to 
benefit significantly from the comparative advantages of the other. Local partners bring 
knowledge of the domestic market; familiarity with government bureaucracies and 
regulations; understanding of local labour markets; and existing manufacturing facilities. 
Foreign partners can offer advanced process and product technologies, management 
know-how, and access to export markets. For each side, the possibility of joining with 
another company in the new venture lowers resource requirements relative to going it 
alone.
Since previous research on joint ventures has been conducted by using a variety of 
theoretical lenses and by focusing on a number of different dimensions, our 
understanding of joint venture strategic objectives has been fragmented. Drawing largely 
from market power, transaction costs, and organisational learning theories, a set of 
strategic objectives the foreign companies attempt to achieve through establishing joint 
ventures with local partners are identified, which were illustrated in detail in Chapter
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Two. Market power theory largely explains IJV formation from a market development 
and benefits perspective (Child and Faulkner, 1998), whereas transaction costs theory 
underpins the efficiency seeking and costs saving perspective (Kogut, 1988). The 
organisational learning perspective (Kogut, 1988; Teece, 1986) posits that a firm seeks 
knowledge that it considers lacking but vital through IJVs for the fulfillment of its 
strategic objectives.
Since China entered the WTO, foreign companies have had more freedom to 
choose an entry mode. Wholly-owned enterprises (WOE) have been allowed since 1993. 
Regarding government FDI incentives, the differences between JVs and WOEs are 
becoming less and less. Under such circumstances, the reasons why foreign firms choose 
JVs as their strategic preference are worthy of research. Moreover, to what extent the 
foreign parents are satisfied with the performance of the IJV in relation to the objectives 
set is of importance. Therefore, the first and second research questions of this study were 
generated:
1) What are the strategic objectives of European MNEs for engaging in joint 
ventures in the People's Republic of China?
2) To what extent has the performance of the joint venture met the foreign 
partners' expectations?
A further research question is subsequently developed as research question 3:
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3) Through establishing Sino-European IJVs, do any strategic objectives 
outperform others? In other words, is joint venture more suitable to achieve 
certain strategic objectives than others?
Research objective 2: To theoretically explore and empirically examine 
strategic objectives of European MNEs when they establish joint ventures with 
Chinese firms, the content and focus of control they exercise over the joint ventures, 
and the performance which results.
Management control in an IJV is important because it determines the degree to 
which an organisation is able to achieve its objectives (Goold and Quinn, 1990). Without 
an appropriate control system in place it is highly unlikely that objectives will be 
achieved (Geringer and Frayne, 1990). Given its strategic importance, it is not surprising 
that the concept of IJV control has attracted the attention of scholars. However, a 
literature review in Chapter Two shows that there is a lack of consensus on the 
conceptualisation of IJV control. Many researchers (e.g. Beamish, 1993, Geringer, 1988) 
also found that when parent companies exercise management control over joint ventures, 
they tend to be selective rather than controlling the entire range of activities of the joint 
venture management. Research indicates that parents often prefer to emphasize control 
over long and short-term strategically important objectives (Geringer, 1993). However, it 
did not further explore the impacts of control on the attainment of different strategic 
objectives. Therefore, a fourth research question was developed:
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4) Regarding the specific strategic objective, to what extent does the control 
exercised by the foreign partner over a joint venture affect the attainment of the 
foreign parents' objectives?
Research objective 3: To examine the relationship between strategic 
objectives, IJV control and performance.
No existing research evidence shows links between partners' strategic objectives 
and IJV control. However, it is reasonable to believe that the objectives have considerable 
importance in relation to choices regarding the extent and focus of control. Some research 
has been directed at the questions related to what controls are and should be used in IJVs. 
Geringer and Hebert (1989) argue that the IJV managers receive little guidance about 
when and how to use control. Various studies investigating the relationship between 
control and IJV performance found conflicting results. For instance, Wang et al (1999) 
found that in Sino-foreign IJVs if the foreign parent was able to achieve dominant control 
they tended to be more satisfied with the IJVs overall performance. However, others 
found that shared control rather than dominant control is effective (e.g. Beamish, 1985, 
1993; Yan and Gray, 1994). This apparent conflict becomes the fourth research question 
of this study. In addition, foreign partners' control over joint ventures is greatly 
influenced by their strategic intentions in developing countries. With respect to the 
theoretical issues of interest here, little research has been reported yet on the relationships 
between strategic objectives and performance in IJVs.
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5) To what extent do strategic objectives, parent control, and IJV overall 
performance relate to each other?
A sizable stream of research has focused on identifying factors conducive to 
superior IJV performance. However, considerable fragmentation and inconsistency in 
empirical findings has limited theory development and the advancement of management 
practice in this important field. There is substantial evidence reporting unsatisfactory IJV 
performance, in fact, Beamish and Delios (1997) reveal that an average of two in five 
IJVs are perpetual strugglers or outright failures. Thus, understanding IJV performance 
dynamics is vitally important to managers interested in developing and maintaining this 
type of international strategic partnership.
Given the problematic nature of IJVs it is crucial to decide how IJV performance 
should be measured. There are both objective and subjective measures of performance. 
Although many studies have found both measures were positively related and widely 
used, each has its own benefits and limitations. Due to the fact that the research questions 
in this study are subjective in nature, two subjective measures of IJV performance are 
adopted. One is the parent company's satisfaction with objective achievement and the 
other is the parent's assessment of IJV overall performance. As mentioned above, a 
positive correlation between objective and subjective performance measures has been 
found. However, the relationship between different subjective measures has been left 
unexplored. Therefore, the sixth research question is:
6) Is there a relationship between parent companies' satisfaction with objective 
achievement and parents' assessment of IJV overall performance?
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The data was collected using survey methodology. The questionnaire designed 
was pre-tested and modified before being sent to the respondents. The objective of this 
test was to confirm that the items were clearly understandable and unambiguous. The 
sample frame of Sino-European IJVs was identified from four sources: 1) European 
Chamber of Commerce in China, 2) British Chamber of Commerce in China, 3) French 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry in China, and 4) Delegation of German Industry and 
Commerce. The sample frame was restricted to manufacturing industries in order to 
minimise extraneous variation that might arise from differences between the service and 
manufacturing sectors. Beyond the limitation of industry, the sample selected also met 
the following criteria: (1) IJVs were based in Beijing, Yangtze Delta (around Shanghai), 
and Guangdong Province; (2) IJVs were two-party sponsored by for-profit organisations 
where the foreign partners have headquarters in UK, France, or Germany; 3) a cut-off 
point of 80% equity share was used; (4) IJVs had been in operation at least three years. (5) 
the research time frame was limited within four months.
A combination of internet survey and mail survey was chosen. Following the 
recommendations of the Total Design Method (Dillman, 1991), a systematic mailing 
procedure was used to maximise the response rate. The steps used were: a first e-mailing, 
two reminder e-mails, and finally a mail version posted to non-respondents.
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6.3. Findings in Relation to research objectives and hypotheses
The findings relating to each objective are presented below.
Research objective 1: To improve understanding of IJVs characteristics in 
developing countries, with a specific focus on China
Research Question 1: What are the strategic objectives of European MNEs for 
engaging in joint ventures in the People's Republic of China?
The findings of this study challenge some assumptions about objectives of 
Western MNEs entering joint ventures in China. As an emerging market, China has a 
huge untapped territory. Early research suggested that the objectives of MNEs in 
establishing joint ventures in China were to take advantage of low labour costs, exploit 
natural resources, and benefit from favourable investment policies (Daniels et al, 1985, 
Wang, 1992; Kashlak, 1998). Using Sino-European IJVs as the research subject, however, 
this study found that these objectives are not the primary concerns of foreign partners. 
Rather, they aim at achieving longer-term objectives, such as market development and 
knowledge acquisition.
In this study, based on a synthesis of three theoretical streams of international 
joint venture research, market power, transaction costs, and organisational learning, a set 
of strategic objectives that foreign companies aim to achieve through joining with local 
partners were identified. The strategic objectives are the motivation driving foreign 
parents to enter joint ventures in China and control is one of the major means of assuring
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objective attainment (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). This study offers a comprehensive 
examination of the strategic objectives of foreign parent companies, parent control, and 
performance in relation to those objectives. A number of important empirical findings 
come out of this study, which are meaningful for both academic researchers and 
practitioners and are further discussed below.
Strategic objectives were examined from the perspective of the foreign partner 
(European companies) in the formation of UVs in China. The findings reveal that 
entering the Chinese market faster, acquiring local market knowledge, gaining more 
competitive advantages, acquiring knowledge of local economics, politics and culture, 
and overcoming governmental barriers rank as the top five strategic objectives for 
European firms establishing joint ventures in China. All these five objectives are either 
market-developing-related or knowledge-acquiring-related in nature.
This differs from the findings of Lin's (1997) study of Sino-Hong Kong joint 
ventures. In that study, the three most important goals for establishing joint ventures in 
China were: using cheaper production factors (labour, land, etc.), seeking favourable 
policies, and exploiting the Chinese market. Hence, the motives of Hong Kong 
companies were found to be more resource-oriented than those of European companies.
However, the findings of this study are somewhat similar to Glaister and Wang's 
(1993) findings on Sino-British joint ventures where the strategic motivations for joint 
venture formation were found to be: faster entry to market, to facilitate international 
expansion, to conform to host government policy, and to compete against common
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competitors. Moreover, local market knowledge, knowledge of local culture, and 
distribution channels were also highly important.
In the case of Sino-American joint ventures, Daniels et al (1995) found that the 
major interests of American companies were overcoming governmental barriers, market 
entry, and avoiding political risk. Their findings are consistent with the results of this 
study except in relation to the consideration on political risk. This suggests that European 
companies have more confidence in the Chinese political environment than their 
American counterparts. However, it must be noted that the results of Daniels et al's 
study were published in 1995, nine years before this study, and it is quite possible that the 
views of American JV managers might have changed in response to the changing Chinese 
environment over that time.
The similarity in the strategic objectives of the Western companies confirms the 
findings of Tremblay (1995). By tracking the profitability of 1066 foreign manufacturers 
registered in China, U.S. and European firms not only had a high rate of profitability, but 
these rates exceeded those of firms based in Taiwan or Hong Kong. Rheem (1996) also 
found that by 1993 more than half of the Western companies were profitable, compared 
to only one third of Hong Kong and Taiwan enterprises. They attribute the success of 
Western IJVs to putting great emphasis on the domestic Chinese market.
The results provide support for the findings of previous studies on Sino-Western 
IJVs. Foreign companies consider their market development vital. In addition, learning 
objectives are prioritised by foreign parents. China is an unfamiliar market for foreign
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investors (Peng and Heath, 1996) and it is, therefore, understandable that MNEs 
emphasize the need to acquire knowledge of the Chinese culture and market.
Research Question 2: To what extent has the performance of the joint venture met 
the foreign partners' expectations?
The findings indicate that the objectives where respondents were most satisfied 
with performance matched the rank order of agreement with those objectives. This 
indicates that through joint venture with Chinese local partners, foreign companies can 
effectively achieve their strategic objectives. Of these objectives, they are highly satisfied 
with Market-developing-related objectives. Foreign MNEs are targeting the last huge 
market in the world. Effective entry is the major concern. Joint venture seems to be the 
most practical vehicle to realise their market development goals. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Isobe et al (2000).
In the efficiency-seeking category, the respondents were only satisfied with the 
objective of avoiding political risks and uncertainties. They are least satisfied with the 
objectives of spreading financial risk and exploring global synergies. Since China opened 
the door to foreign investment, it has treated capital resources as a first priority. For 
investment projects with large financial inputs, with which European MNEs are more 
likely to be involved, the Chinese state-owned enterprises often fail to provide the 
required share due to their own financial deficiency. Therefore, foreign companies have 
difficulties meeting the objective of spreading financial risk. The findings also show that 
MNEs have difficulties exploring global synergies with other subsidiaries through
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establishing joint venture in China. As a country long isolated from market-economics, 
the Chinese are still not familiar with international practices. Many governmental barriers 
are set up to protect national industries. These barriers hinder connection and cooperation 
between parent companies and their joint ventures. In addition, potential conflicts may 
occur because a company's global strategic plan may often be against the Chinese 
partner's interest (Ding, 1996). To explore such synergies, therefore, parent companies 
are more likely to establish wholly-owned subsidiaries to harmonise their global strategy. 
Joint ventures with local partners serve other strategic purposes, and may be coordinated 
by the wholly-owned subsidiaries.
The results also revealed that the Sino-European IJVs were generally satisfied 
with their success in achieving their learning objectives. Joint venture was proved to be 
an excellent learning vehicle. Acquiring country-specific and local market knowledge 
were considered very important by foreign parents. They were highly satisfied with 
performance in relation to the Country-specific knowledge acquiring objective, but less 
content with performance in relation to the local market knowledge acquiring objective. 
The best explanation here is that China is believed to be a difficult country to understand. 
It has unique characteristics which are quite different from other countries. Where 
marketing conditions are concerned, however, Western country markets are mature and 
tend to have more sophisticated systems. Distribution channels, for example, are widely 
available in Western markets. However, in China these were previously monopolised by 
state-owned wholesale enterprises. During the last two decades, the Chinese market has 
developed rapidly and distribution systems are now quite chaotic and undergoing 
fundamental changes. The Finnish company Nokia identified at least six different
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distribution channels for its phones - with retail prices varying as much as 20% among 
them (Vanhonacker, 1997).
The findings in relation to the parent's strategic objectives suggest the need to 
modify and expand our understanding of joint venture formation. Current theoretical 
explanations of joint venture formation as a means to either enter a market, achieve 
efficiency, or for knowledge transfer appear to be too narrow to capture the complexity of 
parent companies' motivations to launch a joint venture. Although market power, 
transaction costs, and organisational learning are useful theoretical approaches in 
explaining joint venture formation, they may be inadequate, or may have been too 
narrowedly used to date, to explain joint venture creation in isolation. The findings 
indicate that the three theoretical streams are complementary rather than contradictory.
Research Question 3: Through establishing Sino-European IJVs, do any strategic 
objectives outperform others? In other words, is joint venture more suitable to achieve 
certain strategic objectives than others?
H14 predicted three comparative relationships between categories of objectives. 
Previous studies have examined the strategic objectives of entering an IJV (e.g. 
Calantone and Zhao, 2000; Child and Yan, 2001; Daniels et al, 1985), but the relative 
performance of various objectives has yet to be compared. The empirical results of this 
study indicate that both market-developing-related and knowledge-acquiring-related 
objectives have better performance than efficiency-seeking-related objectives. It can be 
inferred that European MNEs' market-developing and learning objectives for their joint
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ventures with Chinese local partners are easier to satisfy. Low agreement and satisfaction 
with efficiency-seeking objectives also suggest that foreign partners are more market- and 
learning-oriented in Sino-European IJVs.
Research objective 2: To theoretically explore and empirically examine 
strategic objectives of European MNEs when they establish joint ventures with 
Chinese firms, the content and focus of control they exercise over the joint ventures, 
and the performance which results.
Research Question 4: Regarding the specific strategic objective, to what extent 
does the control exercised by the foreign partner over a joint venture affect the 
attainment of the foreign parents' objectives?
Undoubtedly, one of the most important empirical findings in this study is that 
parent control acts as a powerful moderator in the relationship between foreign 
companies' strategic objectives and satisfaction in relation to these objectives. What is 
even more interesting is that the moderating effects of parent control do not merely 
intensify or weaken the relationship between strategic objectives and satisfaction in 
relation to these objectives, but also parent control has different moderating effects in 
relation to different strategic objectives.
The first eight pairs of hypotheses were proposed in order to examine the 
moderating effect of parent control on the relation between strategic objectives and 
performance in relation to them. The findings provided strong empirical evidence that
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parent control acts as a rather powerful moderator in the relationship between agreement 
and satisfaction with strategic objectives. However, there is no simple rule to follow as to 
how much control should be exerted over an IJV, as the findings show that control does 
not appear to have a universal direct effect on strategic objective attainment. Moreover, 
the distinction between strategic control and operational control in this study has been 
helpful in specifying the differentiated effects of these two variables on management 
control.
HI to H3 related to market-developing strategic objectives. HI a, H2a, and H3a 
predicted that a high level of strategic control has a positive moderating effect on 
objectives and satisfaction with these objectives performance. HI a, which predicted a 
moderating effect between objective "To Enter the Chinese market Fast" and 
performance in relation to this objective, received partial support. MNEs entering a 
foreign market indeed require great control of strategic decisions to assure their long term 
strategy in Chinese market development. This finding is consistent with Tallman and 
Shenkar's (1994) findings. However, strong local partner competitive advantages can 
also help foreign firms enter market quickly. This might also lead foreign firms to 
exercise a low level of strategic control over the joint venture.
H2a failed to receive support from the results. One interpretation is that, in order 
to obtain assistance from the Chinese partners to manage competition, foreign parents 
have to relinquish some elements of strategic control, such as use of profit, allocating 
senior management positions, or choosing location of IJV facilities. When foreign 
partners have long-term market development in mind, a compromise over financial 
benefits in the short term can be easily understood. Foreign companies entering China are
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sometimes willing to sustain losses for growth; more typically, they desire to reinvest 
their profits for further expansion, while most Chinese companies seek profits on a much 
shorter time horizon (Child and Yan, 1999). Successfully deterring competitive market 
entry largely depends on whether and how much the foreign companies obtain the 
Chinese partners' cooperation. Through shared control, the Chinese would be as 
motivated to make the joint venture work as foreign companies. In this regard, ceding 
some strategic level decisions seems more appropriate. However, where overcoming 
governmental barriers is concerned, a high level of strategic control was found to have a 
highly significant moderation effect on the relationship. This shows that IJV strategic 
decisions are firmly controlled by foreign partners when they established a joint venture 
with a local partner in order to overcome governmental barriers and enter the market.
On the other hand, operational control in relation to market-developing-related 
objectives must be used with caution. For the faster market entry objective, both high and 
low levels of operational control have a positive moderating effect. This is possibly 
because fast market entry needs more active action so that foreign parents can enter the 
market quicker. However, in the case of managing competition and overcoming 
governmental barriers, the hypotheses did not receive support. Managing competition 
needs close cooperation from local partners. Similarly, more delegation to IJV managers 
is desirable when the objective is overcoming various governmental barriers. It seems 
that achieving the objective of overcoming governmental barriers needs local partners to 
play a more active role in IJV operation in order to comply with diverse government 
requirements and bureaucracy.
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H4 to H6 dealt with efficiency-seeking strategic objectives. H4a, which predicted 
strategic control positively moderated seeking global synergy and satisfaction with this 
objective, was partially supported. IJVs are increasingly perceived as important elements 
of an MNE's global business network (Griffith et at, 1998). Consistency with global 
strategy requires a high level of strategic control to assure implementation in the Chinese 
market. When an MNE pursues a global strategy, it is critical that company-wide 
activities are coordinated centrally, and such central coordination can be achieved only 
with full control of local subsidiaries (Kim and Hwang, 1992). H4b failed to achieve 
statistical significance. Hence, operational control has no moderating effect on foreign 
parent's global synergy seeking objective. Indeed, as long as the IJV accords with parent 
company's global strategy, it should be given autonomy at operational governance 
(Newburry and Zeria, 1999).
The results partially supported H5a and H5b as both high and low level strategic 
and operational control was found to have a positive moderating effect. Moreover, high 
level strategic control had a stronger positive effect than low level strategic control, 
whereas low level operational control had a stronger positive effect than high level 
operational control. The probable explanation for this is that European investors generally 
undertake large scale investment, where only state-owned enterprises are available as 
partners (Zhang and Keith, 1999). Normally, the Chinese representatives had a 
government background (Osland, 1994). They have to assure the stability of the IJV and 
its operation continuously since the failure of large size IJVs is perceived as "losing face" 
(Yang and Lee, 2002). It also can be said that, if foreign parents join with a local Chinese
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partner to spread financial risks, no matter what the extent of control exercised by foreign 
parents, the result will be satisfactory.
H6a and H6b failed to achieve statistical significance. Hence, they cannot be 
supported. It can be said that neither strategic control nor operational control has a 
moderating effect on avoiding political uncertainty objective and satisfaction with 
performance in relation to this objective. The results suggest that attainment of foreign 
parents' objective to avoid political uncertainty cannot be guaranteed by exercising 
management control. It needs MNEs to take other factors into consideration. For example, 
Daniels et al (1985) argue that an important tool of political risk management is 
insurance. Small initial investment or keeping IJV physical assets mobile can reduce such 
risks. Merchant (2000) contends the local partner selection is essential since these 
important local resources providers can minimise the institutional risks of economic 
activities in developing countries.
H7 and H8 related to knowledge-acquiring objectives. As was expected, high 
level strategic control or low level operational control can significantly improve the 
learning objectives. Hamel et al (1989) argue that irrespective of learning capability, 
partners will not learn unless they are motivated and make a conscious effort. Foreign 
parent control exercised at the strategic level can establish strategic priorities that are 
consistent with learning goals which will lead to greater success in the long term. As for 
day-to-day operations, however, delegating the operational decisions to Chinese 
managers will enhance learning efficiency, as foreign managers accumulate knowledge 
and know-how of the Chinese culture and markets by learning-by-doing with their 
Chinese colleagues.
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Research objective 3: To examine the relationship between strategic 
objectives, IJV control and performance.
Research Question 5: To -what extent do strategic objectives, parent control, and 
IJV overall performance relate to each other?
The proposed relationships between the parent control variables and foreign 
parent satisfaction with IJV overall performance received full support. Hypothesis H12a 
regarding the relationship of strategic control with performance was found to be 
significant and highly correlated, suggesting that the strategic level decisions have a great 
impact on the performance of the joint venture. Hypothesis H12b is also supported by a 
highly correlated relationship between operational control and performance. This 
indicates that control over the day-to-day operations of the IJV affects the pattern of 
performance. In other words, how the operational control is managed directly and 
positively impacts the pattern of the partner's satisfaction with IJV overall performance. 
The results are consistent with those of Killing (1983), Mjoen and Tallman (1997) and 
Ding (1997).
This study provided strong empirical evidence for the notion that dominant 
control will lead to better IJV performance. The more control foreign parents had over the 
IJVs, the more satisfactorily the IJVs performed. This finding sheds light on the 
inconsistent and often contradictory results of previous studies on the relationship 
between parent control and IJV performance. As demonstrated in the literature review, 
there are two different arguments in relation to superior IJV performance: dominant 
control, as posited by Ding (1997), Killing (1983), Lecraw (1984), Mjoen and Tallman
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(1997), or shared control, (e.g. Beamish, 1985, 1985). In Killing's (1983) findings, the 
best performers were those highly controlled by foreign partners as if they were wholly- 
owned subsidiaries. The results of this study are in line with the dominant control 
argument. However, it is necessary to point out that whereas Killing (1993) measured 
parent satisfaction, Beamish (1985) studied IJV management's assessment to evaluate 
joint venture performance. However, Yan and Gray (1994) found that joint venture 
management had difficulty providing independent performance assessment because 
senior joint venture management did not represent the partnership per se, rather they were 
the agent of their parent company.
This study argues that the measure of IJV performance should be dependent on 
the nature of research and research questions. For example, this research attempts to give 
insights into the achievement of strategic objectives from the European MNEs' 
perspective. The nature of the research here determines that joint venture performance 
should be measured from the foreign parents' point of view and the attainment of 
objectives is a reasonable measure for this.
The proposed theoretical framework received mixed support from the empirical 
findings. At the overall level, the tentative relationships between the partners' strategic 
objectives and IJV overall performance are partially substantiated. As revealed from the 
path analysis in Chapter Five, only the market-developing category has a direct 
relationship with IJV overall performance. The findings indicate that foreign companies 
motivated by market development are more likely to have a satisfactory IJV performance. 
No statistically significant direct relationship was found between efficiency-seeking 
objectives and IJV overall performance. However, there is a strong indirect relationship
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between efficiency-seeking objectives and IJV overall performance via different levels of 
management control. Hence, the moderating effects of management control on the 
linkage between strategic objectives and IJV overall performance are demonstrated. 
Although efficiency-related objectives do not have direct impact on IJV performance, 
they have indirect effect through management control. Knowledge-acquiring objectives 
have no direct but have a weak indirect impact through strategic control on LJV 
performance.
Research Question 6: Is there a relationship between parent companies' 
satisfaction with objective achievement and parents' assessment of IJV overall 
performance?
The hypothesized correlation between overall satisfaction with strategic 
objectives and IJV performance was not supported. The results reflect a general fact that 
when companies enter a foreign market with a certain level of resource commitment, the 
joint venture, as one of many entry modes, serves diverse objectives that the companies 
aim to attain. The IJV must comply with parents' objectives. Once the goals are achieved, 
this contractual relationship can continue, or be terminated. When the IJV is being 
operated in accordance with parent's interest, the hypothesized correlation can exist, i.e. 
satisfaction with overall IJV performance is correlated with parent company satisfaction 
with performance in relation to specific objectives. Otherwise, the good performance of 
the joint venture per se is not necessarily satisfactory for the parent company. For 
example, an MNE generally wishes to minimise its worldwide tax burden. This objective
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can dramatically affect its relations with a joint venture, especially when the latter either 
imports parts and components from the MNE or exports product through the MNE parent. 
The MNE may manipulate transfer prices - that is, the prices charged by one part of the 
MNE when transferring them to another part - to lower its taxes, a strategy that is not 
necessarily in the interests of the IJV and the local partners. The joint venture is 
sometimes even charged a premium price on import parts and required to sell export 
product at a discount price, which benefits the MNE but hurts the profitability of the joint 
venture. This opportunistic behaviour would damage the trust and cooperation of local 
partners, and would be eventually likely to lead to an unsatisfactory joint venture 
performance.
6.4. Contribution to Theory
First, the theoretical underpinning of this research largely draws from market 
power, transaction costs, and organisational learning theories. The findings reveal the 
strategic objectives of European companies when establishing joint ventures with 
Chinese partners. Prior research has examined IJV from a single theoretical perspective. 
Market power theory has been used to depict market entry and improvement of 
competitive position vis-a-vis rivals (Terpstra and Sarathy, 1994). Transaction costs 
theory has been used to argue that joint ventures are formed as a means to bypass 
inefficient markets for intermediate inputs, i.e., a way to keep costs down (Hennart, 1988). 
The concept of organisational learning has been used to suggest that joint ventures are 
primarily formed to transfer knowledge (Kogut, 1988).
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However, Dunning's (1988, 1990) eclectic theory developed theoretical 
propositions from a variety of theories, thus providing a more robust theoretical paradigm 
to explain foreign direct investment. This study integrates the three major theoretical 
streams in the IJV field to investigate the rationale for the formation of international joint 
ventures. As such, it offers more comprehensive explanatory power and demonstrates the 
importance of using integrated theoretical streams to investigate research problems. 
Through the use of multiple theories a better understanding of partner objectives in 
forming an IJV has been gained. Future research might use a similar approach to explain 
the complex nature of research questions.
Second, two dimensions of IJV control were empirically examined and 
substantiated in this study. The extent and focus of parent control over IJV is a dilemma 
for both researchers and managers. Child (1984) argued that the distinction between 
strategic control and operational control is necessary because of the differing behaviour 
observed by joint venture researchers in relation to each. Verification of the distinction is 
beneficial for further IJV control studies as well as foreign managers. MNE parents 
cannot achieve their strategic objectives, by simply sharing control as much as possible 
with local partners or by simply exercising control as much as possible. The results show 
that the amount of control either exercised over IJV or shared with local partners depends 
on the individual strategic objectives. In other words, what is wanted determines what 
should be done. Differentiating strategic and operational control is essential for attaining 
parent objectives.
The moderating effects of management control enrich the literature by providing a 
theoretical linkage between strategic objectives and the attainment of these objectives.
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The results of this study show that this perspective is empirically sound and powerful. 
With respect to the relationship between parent control and IJV performance, an essential 
but controversial topic in the IJV literature, this research is theoretically critical. 
Although most IJV researchers believe an influential relationship between control and 
performance exists, efforts to theoretically explain the linkage have been lacking. This 
study offers such an explanation. Strategic objectives determine the magnitude and extent 
of control exercised over UVs, which in turn influence the achievement of strategic 
objectives. The strong empirical evidence confirms the significant moderating effects of 
parent control on attainment of strategic objectives. It therefore provides a foundation for 
further examination of moderating effects between foreign parent control and IJV 
performance.
Third, IJV performance measurement has long yielded inconclusive results and 
become a controversial issue in the literature. There is no consensus on the most 
appropriate criteria for the evaluation of success, even if some of them are more widely 
used than others. Certainly, none is perfectly adequate, since each of them reflects one 
aspect of performance, which requires a better understanding of the links between its 
different dimensions. Whereas the correlation between objective and subjective measures 
has been empirically tested, little is known about the links between the various criteria 
used within each category. The present study suggests that IJV performance measures 
must comply with the diverse IJV strategic objectives. As a result, this research measures 
IJV performance from two perspectives. One is objective-specific performance 
measurement. The other is IJV overall performance. Hatfield et al (1998) found that 
partner assessment of joint venture goal achievement is positively and significantly
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related to joint venture survival over time. However, this study found no significant 
relationship between the assessment of joint venture goal achievement and IJV overall 
performance. Strategic objectives generally take a longer time to be attained, which may 
lead to a long duration of the IJV. However, longevity should not necessarily be equated 
with good performance.
A fourth contribution is related to research methodology. Traditional mail 
questionnaires were heavily used in previous studies on international joint ventures. 
Internet access has been steadily increasing with the result that more people have access 
to the Web. This has introduced a new methodology for survey data collection which, in 
internet surveys, can increase speed of response and greatly reduce costs. Craig and 
Douglas (2001) advise that international marketing researchers need to broaden their 
capabilities in order to design, implement and interpret research in the twenty-first 
century. Research in international joint ventures is often associated with financial 
problems because of geographical constraints. This study concentrated initially on a web- 
based survey, using a mail survey to increase response rate as needed. The majority of 
respondents (87%) completed the questionnaire online. This provides excellent evidence 
for researchers to make use of web-based surveys in future international marketing 
studies.
Finally, one important implication of this study is associated with the research 
subject. Due to the proliferation of international joint ventures in China in recent years 
and the unique characteristics of the country's political, economic, social and cultural 
systems, joint ventures in China have been said to deserve special attention (Child, 1991). 
Sino-European joint ventures were chosen as the unit of analysis here, as they represent
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one of the fastest growing areas of joint venture investment worldwide. This research 
thus contributes to the literature on the Chinese experience.
6.5. Managerial Implications
Choosing the mode of entering a foreign market is a very important strategic 
decision and has a crucial impact on the competitive advantage of multinational 
companies (Contractor and Lorange, 1988). Differentiating effects of different entry 
modes could influence a foreign investor's ability to achieve control over local ventures, 
monitor overseas operations, reduce operational risks, and eventually, fulfill strategic 
objectives.
This research provides some new and interesting insights for improving joint 
venture management. While many managers have ambiguous and controversial 
perceptions of IJVs, which are described as "Trojan Horses" or "Workhorses" (Hennart et 
al, 1999), this study provides insights for managers in assessing their strategic objectives, 
designing of control systems, and evaluating subsequent IJV performance. The 
managerial implications are discussed below.
First, instead of isolating the relationship between parent control and joint venture 
performance, the moderating effects of control on strategic objectives and satisfaction 
with attainment of objective were investigated. Parent companies cannot dominate 
everything in IJV as control is not free. However, failing to exert any control over joint 
ventures would ultimately lead to a failure to meet the expectations. The extent and focus
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of control becomes a major concern. Guidance is offered as to how to effectively link 
strategic objectives with a management control system.
The findings of this study suggest that parent companies should formulate 
different control structures according to different strategic objectives. If companies have 
multiple objectives, which in fact is often true in reality, then they should prioritise the 
strategic objectives and set up a control structure accordingly. When priority objectives 
are changed, the control structure should also be changed since IJV control must be 
handled precisely.
For example, a company might bear both market entry and local market 
knowledge learning objectives in mind simultaneously. It might prioritise the market 
entry objective at the early stage of the joint venture. Based on the findings of this study, 
the foreign parent should seize strategic and operational control so that the market entry 
objective can be effectively achieved. After successfully entering the market, learning 
becomes the priority for the parent company. The control structure can be altered as 
desired, i.e. the foreign company still holds the dominant position on strategic decisions, 
but encourages the local partner to increase its involvement in IJV day-to-day operations.
Second, and rather interestingly, one managerial implication of this research is 
that different categories of objectives perform differently in joint ventures. Companies 
often have various strategic objectives when entering into a joint venture. Some can be 
more efficiently achieved than others because of the joint venture setting. The findings of 
this study suggest that in joint ventures with Chinese partners, European MNEs achieve 
better in relation to market development and knowledge acquisition than they do when
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seeking organisational efficiency. This finding may serve as a practical guide to managers 
when they choose an international market entry mode in China.
Third, this study found that partners' most important goals tend to be market 
development and knowledge acquisition. Thus, to adequately assess their joint venture's 
performance, executives will need to extend their performance assessment beyond the 
traditional financial measures of profitability and return on investment. Partner objective 
achievement offers an enriched means of measuring joint venture performance.
6.6. Limitations of the study and Recommendations for future research
As with all research, there are a number of limitations to this study. Firstly, the 
issue of single versus multiple respondents needs to be considered. One of the basic 
issues in IJV performance evaluation is the question of whose performance to assess. 
Parents have their own objectives in creating IJVs, and obviously to measure a venture's 
performance against these objectives is relevant. But it is not the only basis for measuring 
results. Anderson (1997) argues that IJVs should be measured primarily as stand alone 
entities seeking to maximise their own performance, not the performance of parents. 
Further, encouraging the IJV to stand alone promotes harmony among the partners and 
increases the chance of survival and prosperity (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). Other 
researchers argue that using only the IJV entity to assess IJV performance represents an 
incomplete method for assessing performance (Yan and Gray, 1994). Data in this study 
was collected from foreign senior management within joint ventures who, thus, represent 
the views of foreign partners. However, Geringer and Hebert (1991) found there was no
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difference if one uses the evaluation of IJV performance from 1) one partner, 2) both 
partners, or 3) IJV management. Nevertheless, since IJVs are jointly owned, future 
studies might examine whether both parties are satisfied with performance.
A second issue concerns the generalisability of the findings. A single IJV host 
country, China, was chosen. This inevitably raises the question of whether the findings 
from this study can be generalised to IJVs in other emerging markets. A replication study 
of IJV in other developing countries would be helpful to examine the generalisability. 
The study also focuses on the manufacturing sector. Given the increasing number of IJVs 
from the service sector (Contractor and Kundu, 1998), an attempt to compare the findings 
of this study to IJVs in the service sector would be an interesting topic for future research.
In this study, only IJVs located in Beijing, Yangtze Delta (around Shanghai) and 
Guangdong Province are considered as they contain the majority of joint ventures and 
therefore assure a certain level of representativeness of IJV activity in China. However, 
the recent trend for foreign direct investment in China is that joint ventures are gradually 
extending to other coastal and inland areas as a result of the fact that FDI in central and 
northwest regions is highly encouraged by the Chinese government (Lai, 2002). 
Therefore, it will be interesting to include other emerging regions in future Sino-foreign 
IJV studies.
Although consistent with previous research into IJVs (e.g. Ding, 1997, Child and 
Yan, 2001), the sample of sixty-one joint ventures is relatively small. A larger sample 
size would considerably enhance statistical power (Cohen and Cohen, 1975). Given the 
complicated interactions between variables in the proposed framework and the weakness
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of some multiple measures, structural equation modeling could have helped improve the 
results of the study because of its ability to handle measurement and structural models 
simultaneously, and its ability to handle causal relationships between dependent variables. 
Unfortunately, such methods could not be used owing to the small sample size. This may 
be a major reason for the lack of significance in certain proposed relationships. However, 
it has been recognised that obtaining data (Kogut, 1988) and even locating UVs is often 
one of the biggest problems in research of this nature. Access to published data sources is 
rare and extremely expensive. Nevertheless, future research with a bigger sample size 
might allow sounder conclusions to be generated.
Two other issues relating to the collection of UVs for study are also of interest. 
Firstly, since there is no consensus on what percentage of foreign ownership is required 
to clarify FDI as an IJV, any cut-off may be arbitrary and consequently generate bias. 
Makino and Beamish (1998) applied conventional Western accounting principles to 
distinguish joint ventures and portfolio investment. Although their 20/80 cut-off is 
employed in this study, future research may investigate whether any difference exist if 
other cut-off points are used. Secondly, British, French, and German investors in UVs are 
investigated in this study. The rationale is that they are the three biggest European 
investors in China. However, other European nations, such as Scandinavian countries, 
Italy, and Netherlands, are actively participating in the Chinese market, and future study 
should be extended to include these countries. Moreover, the cultural literature (e.g. 
Hofstede, 1984) suggests that the UK, France, and Germany may have different 
organisational, structural, and managerial processes, as well as national culture. These 
characteristics may significantly influence their decisions relating to establishing and
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managing IJVs in China. Consequently, different IJV performance may be expected. The 
impact of these differences on international joint ventures has not been considered here 
and should be examined in future research.
Future research may also look at the role of the control mechanism on IJV 
strategic objective achievement in greater detail. IJV management control is 
multidimensional (Geringer and Hebert, 1988). This study investigates the extent and 
focus of two dimensions of control. The findings also suggested that equity ownership 
may have an impact on the level of parent control (see section 5.4.3.1). It would be 
interesting to examine the moderating effects of various control mechanisms in enhancing 
parent's satisfaction with objective achievement.
Finally, scholars are increasingly acknowledging that use of management control 
may depend upon the particular phase in the IJV life cycle (e.g. Jap and Ganesan, 2000). 
It may be that for certain strategic objectives, dominant control is more useful in the early 
stages of the IJV than in later stages. Future research may be to follow-up this study in a 
few years time to see if the IJVs are still in existence and if so, to examine both how they 
exercise their management control and their current performance.
In conclusion, it is only through further refinements of and extensions to this 
research that it may be possible to gain a sufficient and comprehensive understanding of 
the complex issues inherent in IJV management. Nevertheless, this study has made a new 
contribution to our understanding in the field.
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Dear Sir/Madam,
I am a doctoral researcher at the University of Salford, Manchester, UK, and am presently 
conducting research with European multinational corporations that have joint ventures in 
the People's Republic of China.
I have obtained your name from British Chamber of Commerce in China, and would like 
you to participate in this study as someone who is particularly knowledgeable in the area 
of my research. Only a small amount of time will be needed to answer a few questions. 
Any information that you provide will be treated as strictly confidential. In particular, 
information that may be sensitive or firm-identifying will not be presented, published, or 
otherwise divulged.
As soon as the results are analysed, I will provide you with a summary report of findings, 
which I hope may be beneficial to you in managing your existing and future joint 
ventures. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.
Now, please click the link below. It will lead you to the questionnaire which is on our 
university's website. When you complete the questionnaire, please press the 'Send' button. 
It will automatically send your questionnaire to me. Thank you.
www.som.salford.ac.uk/HY/
Sincerely yours, 
Hui Yang 
Ph.D Researcher 
School of Management 
University of Salford 
Salford / Greater Manchester 
M5 4WT United Kingdom 
Tel:+44 (0)161-295-4465 
Fax:+44 (0)161 295 3821 
E-mail: h.yang@pgr.salford.ac.uk
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A Survey of Sino-European Joint Ventures
This questionnaire is designed for easy completion. It should only take a few minutes to 
complete. Your cooperation is appreciated.
1. Background Information
Name of joint venture (JV): _________________________________ 
Geographical location: _________________________________ 
Year of establishment: _________________________________ 
European partner: _________________________________ 
Location of headquarters: _________________________________ 
Chinese partner: _________________________________ 
Total original investment:
Less than $ 1 million D $1-10 Million D $ 1 0 - 1 5 Million D Over $50 million 
Share of equity held by European partner in the JV: ___ % 
Principle JV products/services:
Number of employees in China:
D Less than 100 D 100 -500 D Over 500
Intended duration of this JV when it was established:
D Less than 5 years D 5-10 years D 10-20 years D 20-30 years QMore than 30
years
Please indicate the reasons why your company chose the current location to establish the 
JV (can be more than one):
I I Close to raw materials I I Situated in economic zone 
I I Close to local partner I I Close to Market 
I I Others, (please specify) ______________
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2. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements as reasons for the decision ofvour company in enterins into a JVin China.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
Meanwhile, please also indicate how satisfied you are with the performance of the JV
in relation to our firm's expectations for each of the following objectives (circle a 
number).
To explore global synergies with other subsidiaries
Strongly 1 2 3 4 s A 7 Stion^
agree
Vei7 1 23 satisfied
To enter Chinese market faster
Strongly l
agree
Very 1 23 satisfied
To gain more competitive advantages
Strongly } 2
agree
Very 1 23 satisfied
To spread financial risk
Strongly ^ 2
agree
Very } 23 
satisfied
To reduce investment exposure
Strongly } 2 3
agree
Very j 23 
satisfied
t *S \J
456
456
456
456
456
456
456
456
456
disagree
Very 
dissatisfied
Strongly
disagree
Very 
dissatisfied
Strongly
disagree
7 Very 
dissatisfied
_ Strongly
disagree
Very 
dissatisfied
Strongly
disagree
7 Very 
dissatisfied
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
To avoid political risk or uncertainties
Strongly j 2 3
agree
Very j 23 
satisfied
To deter competitive market entry
Strongly } 2 3
agree
Very 1 2 3 satisfied
456
456
456
456
7 Strongly
disagree
7 Very 
dissatisfied
_ Strongly
disagree
7 Very 
dissatisfied
N/A
N/A
To overcome governmental trade barriers
Strongly } 2 3
agree
Very 1 23 satisfied
456
456
„ Strongly
disagree
7 Very 
dissatisfied N/A
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9) To acquire knowledge of the local economy, politics, and culture
10)
11)
12)
13)
Strongly
agree
Very 
satisfied
To
Strongly
agree
Very 
satisfied
To
Strongly 
agree
Very 
satisfied
To
Strongly 
agree
Very 
satisfied
To
Strongly 
agree
Very 
satisfied
1
1
acquire
1
l
2
2
34567
34567
Strongly
disagree
Very 
dissatisfied N/A
local market knowledge
2
2
quickly generate profits
l
l
benefit
l
l
benefit
l
l
Other reasons
14)
15)
Very 
satisfied
Very 
satisfied
l
l
2
2
from low labour
2
2
34567
34567
in China
34567
34567
cost
34 5 6 7
34567
Strongly
disagree
Very 
dissatisfied
Strongly 
disagree
Very 
dissatisfied
Strongly 
disagree
Very 
dissatisfied
N/A
N/A
N/A
from natural resources
2
2
34567
34567
Strongly 
disagree
Very 
dissatisfied N/A
(please specify any other reasons not listed)
2
2
3456
3456
7 Very 
dissatisfied
7 Very 
dissatisfied
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3. Please indicate who is responsible for each of the following decisions in your 
joint venture.
Chinese European
	Shared 
partner partner
Setting JV strategic priority 1 23456 7
Use of profit 1 23456 7
Choice of key product lines 1 23456 7
Allocating senior management positions 1 23456 7
Choice of location of JV facilities 1 23456 7
Choice of geographic market scope 1 23456 7
Choice of major capital financing 1 23456 7
Production planning 1 23456 7
R&Dplannmg 1 23456 7
Product pricing 1 23456 7
Sales and distribution 1 23456 7
Quality control 1 23456 7
Reward and incentive policies 1 23456 7
Training and development policies 1 23456 7
General management 1 23456 7
Managing legal or government relations 1 23456 7
4. Please indicate how satisfied you have been overall with the JV's performance?
Very Very
1234567 
satisfied dissatisfied
Finally, please provide some background information about yourself.
Your position in the JV:
Have you been employed by either partner before you joined the JV?
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No.
Yes; which one: Q] European partner Q Chinese partner
Thank you for your participation in this study. Please fax or mail the completed 
questionnaire to
Ms Angela Tivey
Research Officer
School of Management
University of Salford
Salford / Greater Manchester
M54WT United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)161 295 4465
Fax: +44 (0)161 295 3821
E-mail: h.vang@pgr.salford.ac.uk.
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Name
ABB Ltd
BBA Airlaid Co. Ltd
BHP Billiton China
The BOC Group
BP China Ltd
British American Tobacco China
* CSM-CVSC
DBT China
The Expro Group
FLAG Group
* Glaxosmithkline Co. Ltd
* Howden Hua Engineering Co. Ltd
Joy Mining Machinery Co. Ltd
MMD Mining Machinery Developments Ltd.
Novar Building Products Ltd
Novartis Overseas Investments Ltd
Oxford Instruments
Reckitt Benckiser China
Rolls-Royce International Ltd
Scott Wilson Ltd
* Shell (China) Ltd
Shell China Exploration And Production Co. Ltd
Unilever (China) Ltd
Haworth LLC
Powderject Ltd
Zetex Electronics Ltd
* Zhonghua Light
Location
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
European 
Parent 
Nationality
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
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Arnold Magnetics Ltd
BP China Exploration & Development Co.
BP Oil (China)
Digital Lighting Co. Ltd
Dong Guan Cooper Lighting Co. Ltd.
Foseco Foundry Co. Ltd
* Foshan Hepworth Acorn Pipe Co. Ltd 
Franke Kitchen Equipment Co. Ltd 
ICI Swire Paints Ltd 
Knauf Plasterboard (Dongguan) Co. Ltd 
Meiko Dishwashers Co. Ltd
* Orsan Guangzhou Gourmet Powder Factory 
Poloair Guangzhou Ltd
* Guangzhou Coats Pic 
Shenzhen Fairness Engineering Ltd
* Shenzhen Unigel Telecommunication Co.
SRS Plaster Ltd
Swallow Mackenzie Ltd
Testo Instrument Co. Ltd
Volex Cable Assembly Co. Ltd
Wall's Co. Ltd
Wogen Pacific Ltd
* Sino-British Boqing Foodstuffs Co. Ltd
VA Tech Elin Transformer Co. Ltd
Salcomp Co. Ltd
Air Products And Chemicals Inc.
The Independent Fragrance Inc.
China Dyson Ceramic Systems
Griffin Industries Ltd
Grunenthal Pharmaceutical (China) Co. Ltd
Foshan Hepworth Acorn Pipe Co. Ltd
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom
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Kangol Headwear Ltd
Amersham Health Ltd
Analogue Holdings Ltd
Atkins Ltd
Associated British Foods
Astrazeneca Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd
Atlas Ward Structures Co. Ltd
Battersby Kingsfield Ltd
BHP Billiton China
Black & Veatch Asia
BOC (China) Holdings Co. Ltd
BOS Automotive Systems Co. Ltd
Bovis Lend Lease
Corning China Ltd
Domino Coding Ltd
Filtronic Telecommunication Products Co. Ltd
Gammon Skanska Ltd
Hamworthy KSE Ltd
International Nutrition Co.
Johnson Mattey Chemicals Ltd
Johnson Diversey Co.
Liz Claiborne International Co. Ltd
Quintiles Medical Development Co. Ltd
Rexam Der Kwei Industrial Co. Ltd
Rotork Gears Co. Ltd
Shanghai Abacus Lighting Co. Ltd
Shanghai Compair Compressor Ltd
* SIG Combibloc Co. Ltd
* SECCO
Sino Infrastructure Partnership
Smith & Nephew Ltd
Guangdong 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai 
Shanghai
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom
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Shanghai Marconi Communication Equipment Shanghai
Syngenta Investment China Ltd Shanghai
Tarmac Heavy Building Material Ltd Shanghai
BOC Gases Co. Ltd Shanghai
Hubei Chaip Wei Garments Co. Ltd Shanghai
Wuhan Bundy Fluid Systems Co. Ltd Shanghai
* Wugang-Vesuvius Ceramics Co. Ltd Shanghai
Yaohua Pilkington Satefy Glass Co. Ltd Shanghai
* Zetex Electronic Ltd Shanghai
* Arc Glassware Nanjing Shanghai
AGIE Charmilles China (Shanghai) Ltd. Shanghai
* Alstom Shanghai Transformer Co., Ltd. Shanghai
* ALSTOM T&D Shanghai Power Automation Shanghai
ALSTOM Technical Services (Shanghai) Co. Shanghai
APCO CHINA Shanghai
Arjowiggins Fine Papers Shanghai
Aventis Pharma China Shanghai
* ATOFINA Shanghai Hydrogen Peroxide Shanghai
* Bacou Industrial Trading (Shanghai) Co.. Ltd Shanghai
Bollore Shanghai Dielectric Materials Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Bontaz Centre (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Brasserie FLO Shanghai
Carbone Lorraine Chemical Equipment Co. Shanghai
Cerestar Jiliang Maize Industry Co.,Ltd. Shanghai
Chloride Masterguard Power Systems Ltd Shanghai
Grappin Annat Metal Product Shanghai
Lafarge Onoda Gypsum (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Lafarge Roofing Systems (China) Shanghai
Moret Pumps (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Linya Swimming Pool & Water Treatment Co. Shanghai
Rhodia (China) Co., Ltd. Shanghai
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
France
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Rhodia Silicones (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Saint-Gobain Abrasives (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Shanghai 
Saint-Gobain Advanced Ceramics (Shanghai) Co. Shanghai
* Saint-Gobain Hangzhou Vetrotex Shanghai
Saint-Gobain Vetrotex Asie Pacifique Shanghai 
Shanghai ALSTOM Transport Electric Equipment Shanghai
Shanghai Danone Biscuits Foods Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Shanghai Ethypharm Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Shanghai Laina Worsted Mill Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Shanghai Murga Steel Abrasive Co., Ltd Shanghai
Shanghai Long Ma Engineering Plastics Co. Shanghai
* Shanghai Nexans Kanghua Cable Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Shanghai Seb Electric Appliances Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Shanghai Vetro Arredo SSG Glass Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Sidel Machinery(Shanghai) Co.,Ltd Shanghai
Sigmacalon Shanghai Shanghai
Sigmakalon (Kunshan) Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Sofitel Jin Jiang Oriental Pudong Shanghai Shanghai
Valeo Shanghai
Yue-Sai Kan-Coty Cosmetics(Shanghai) Co.,Ltd. Shanghai
* Alcatel Communication Systems Shanghai
ALSTOM (China) Investment Co.,Ltd. Beijing
Beijing Montagne Medical Device Co., Ltd. Beijing
Beijing Rhodia Eastern Chemical Co., Ltd. Beijing
Beijing Chinefarge Cement Co.,Ltd Beijing
Beijing Yicheng Lafarge Concrete Co., Ltd. Beijing
* Beijing Saint-Gobain Vetrotex Glass Beijing
Beijing SEPR Refractories Co., Ltd. Beijing
Hua Si De Plastic Products Co. Ltd. Beijing
Beijing Shunfa Lafarge Cement Co., Ltd. Beijing
Beijing Yicheng Lafarge Concrete Co., Ltd. Beijing
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France
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Beijing Zhijie Flocculant Co., Ltd.
* Changchun Hella Automotive Lights Co.
Lafarge Roofing Systems (China)
Beijing Fortune Draeger Safety Equipment Co.
Beijing Fremont Automation Engineering Co.
* Nexans Tianjin
Ondeo Degremont CHINA
Peugeot
Renault Trucks
Rexel Hailongxing Electrical Equipment Co., Ltd
Saint-Gobain Isover Beijing
Schneider Electric (China) Investment Co., Ltd.
Totalfmaelf (China) Investment Co., Ltd.
Atotech (Guangzhou) Chemicals Ltd.
* Guangdong Degremont Water Engineering 
Knauf Plasterboard (Dongguan) Co., Ltd.
* Orsan Guangzhou Gourmet Powder Co. Ltd. 
Robust (Guangdong) Food & Beverage Co., Ltd. 
Rousselot (Guangdong) Gelatin Co., Ltd. 
TOTAL Petroleum (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd. 
Via Plast
* Alcatel SDGI Shenzhen Optical Fiber Co., 
ABB Power System Communication & Automation 
Co. Limited
ABB Xinhui Low Voltage Switchgear Co. Ltd. 
Linde-Xiamen Forklift Truck Corporation Ltd., 
Leybold Vacuum Equipment Manufcturing Co. 
Long Wei Power Generation Technology Co. Ltd. 
Asimco (Bosch Braking Systems (Guangdong) 
Atotech (Guangdong) Chemicals Ltd. 
BASF Headway Polyurethanes (China) Co. Ltd.
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Guangdong
Guangdong
Guangdong
Guangdong
Guangdong
Guangdong
Guangdong
Guangdong
Guangdong
Guangdong
Guangdong
Guangdong 
Guangdong
Guangdong 
Guangdong
Guangdong 
Guangdong
France 
France 
France
France
France 
France
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France 
France
France
France 
France 
France
France 
Germany
Germany 
Germany
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Berres Kuechen Gmbh Schwarzwald 
Bosch (Shunde) Gas Appliances Co., Ltd 
Chun Tak Lighting Control Systems (Panyu) Ltd. 
Changzheng Kloeckner Moeller Co. Ltd. 
Clariant Guangdong Masterbatch Co. 
Dongguan EFEN Electrical Products Co., Ltd 
Dongguan Heitkamp & Thumann Steel Metal 
Factory
Zhuhai Schwarz Pharnia Co., Ltd.
Dongguan Wickmann Electrical Product Co.,Ltd
ECO Schulte Gmbh & Co. KG
Geicke HK Ltd Ying Cheong Garment Co Ltd
German China Chemical Industries Co. Ltd.
* Guangdong MR OLTC Ltd
GMD Guangdong Mak Diesel Engine Co Ltd
Gruenenthal Pharmaceutical (China) Co., Ltd
Guangdong Agfa Imaging Product Company
Henkel Adhesives Company Ltd.
KME Metals (Dongguan) Limited
Knauf New Building Material Product Co.Ltd
Kufner (Guangdong) Textiles Manufacturing Co.
* Lonza Guangzhou Ltd
* MTU Maintenance Zhuhai Co., Ltd. 
Tianyi Electrical Applicance Co., Ltd.
* Siemens Transmission Systems Co. Ltd. 
Voith Zhongxing Power Transmission Co. 
Wicke Castors Co. Ltd. Zhongshan 
Zhanjiang Saint-Hua Glass Container Co.Ltd 
Zhaoqing Henkel Cosmetics Co.Ltd. 
Zhuhai Cellulose Fibers Co. Ltd.
* Zhangjiagang Brose Automotive Systems Co
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong 
Guangdong
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany
Guangdong Germany
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany
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Zhenjiang Schaefer OTL Storage Equipment Co. 
Zhuhai Cellulose Fibers Co. Ltd. 
Zhuhai Schwarz Pharma Company Limited 
Alcatel Transport Automation Control Systems Co. 
Ltd. (Beijing ATACS)
August Vormann Gmbh & Co., 
BASF (China) Co. Ltd. 
Beijing Agie Charmilles Industrial Electronics 
Changcheng Bilfmger+Berger Construction Co. 
Beijing Belong Electric Power Equipment Co. 
Beijing Erbsloeh Automotive Parts Co., Ltd. 
Beijing Fresenius Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. 
Beijing Fresenius Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.
* Beijing Novartis Pharma Ltd 
Wanyuan GDX Automotive Sealing Products Co. 
Beijing Zimmer Sanlian Textile & Chemical 
Engineering Co. Ltd.
* Bitzer Refrigeration Equipment Co. Ltd.
* Dalian Termica Heat Pump Systems Co. 
German Perfact Window Co. Ltd. 
Beijing Fremont Automation Engineering Co. 
Gleason-Pfauter Maschinenfabrik Gmbh
* Hammelmann Pump System (Tianjin) Co.
Herberts-Akzo-Red Lion Automotive Coatings Co. 
Ltd.
Hofmann-Nago-Pausch Medical Equipment 
(Beijing) Co. Ltd.
Hua An Fleisch Gmbh
Kloeckner Haensel Far East Pte. Ltd.,
* Schaltbau Ltd
* Siemens Electronic (Beijng) Ltd.
Guangdong
Guangdong
Guangdong
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing 
Beijing 
Beijing 
Beijing
Germany
Germany
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany
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Tianjin Bebro Electronic Co. Ltd.
Tianjin Hexal Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.
Tianjin Unis Electronics Co.
Xin Detelecom International Ventures Co. Ltd.
Ximen Infolai Machinery Fittings Co.
ABB Engineering (Shanghai) Co. Ltd.
* ABB Shanghai Transformer Co., Ltd.
Alldos Dosiertechnik Gmbh
Amcor Shanghai White Cap Co. Manufacturing
Aoding Machinery Co.
BASF Chemicals Company Limited
* BASF Hua Yuan Nylon Co. Ltd. (BHYN) 
BASF Shanghai Coating Co. Ltd. (BSC)
* Bayer Shanghai Pigments Company Limited 
Bayer Zhongxi Agrochemical Co. 
Benifsbildungszentrum(Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung) 
Shanghai
* Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals 
Bomag (Shanghai) Compaction Mashinery Co. 
Boge Compressors (Shanghai) Co., Ltd 
BOGE Kompressoren (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. 
Braun (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. 
Burgmann (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. 
BYK Chemie Asia Pacific Pte Ltd. 
Chloride Masterguard Power Systems Ltd. 
CICO Electronic (Shanghai) Co. Ltd.
* Changzhou Troester Equipments Ltd 
CONSTAB Additive Polymers Shanghai 
Daimlerchrysler SIM Technology Co. Ltd. 
Deckel Maho Gildemeister (Shanghai) Machine 
Tools Co., Ltd.
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Beijing
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai -
Shanghai
Shanghai .
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Shanghai
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Germany
Shanghai Germany
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Degussa Chemicals (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Delan Electric (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Shanghai
E.G.O. Electrical Componet (Shanghai) Co. Shanghai
Kurtz (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. Shanghai
* Lian He Automotive Electronics Co. Shanghai
ODU Shanghai Manufacturing Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Lumberg Electronics (Shanghai) Ltd. Shanghai
* Peiniger Corrosion Protection Shanghai
Reemtsma Cigarettenfabrik Gmbh, Shanghai
Schaeff Machinery (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. Shanghai
Schattdecor (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Shanghai
* Schneck Shanghai Machinery Corp. Ltd Shanghai
* Shanghai Aibeisheng Co. Shanghai
* Shanghai Automotive Brake Systems Co. Shanghai
Shanghai Ao Lin Dan Stationery Co. Ltd. Shanghai
Shanghai DEUTA Electrical Equipment Co. Shanghai
Shanghai Draeger Medical Instrument Co. Ltd. Shanghai
Shanghai Henkel Kemeng Cosmetics Co. Ltd. Shanghai
Shanghai Henkel Surface Technology Co. Ltd. Shanghai
Shanghai Huade Aluminium Smelting Co., Ltd. Shanghai
* Shanghai Huf-Liyong Automotive Lock Co. Shanghai
Huihao Wooden Door Manufacture Co. Ltd. Shanghai
Shanghai Liebherr Machinery Equipment Co. Shanghai
* Shanghai MANN+HUMMEL Filter Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Shanghai Pepperl+Fuchs Automation Co. Ltd. Shanghai
Shanghai Veit-Hongxin Ironing Equipment Co. Shanghai
Shanghai URBAN-BAO Machinery Co. Ltd. Shanghai
Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Co. Ltd. Shanghai
* Shanghai Vogel Co. Shanghai
* Siemens Dongzi Automotive Electric Motor Shanghai
Siemens High Voltage Switchgear Ltd., Shanghai
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany
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Siemens Industrial Automation Co. Ltd. Shanghai
* Simens Mobile Communication Ltd Shanghai
* Siemens Shanghai Medical Equipment Ltd. Shanghai
Sulzer Shanghai Engineering & Machinery Works Shanghai
Texfit Shanghai Garment Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Thyssen Krupp Elevators Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Truetzschler Textile Machinery (Shanghai) Co. Shanghai
TRUMPF Siberhegner Ltd. Shanghai
TUEV Rheinland (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Shanghai
* United Automotive Electronic System Co. Shanghai
Veka Plastics (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Shanghai
VOGT Electronic Shanghai Co. Ltd. Shanghai
* Vopak Ningbo Terminal Co. Ltd Shanghai
Vohringer Wood Products (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. Shanghai
Voith Siemens Hydro Power Generation Ltd. Shanghai
Wacker Polymer Materials (Shanghai) Co. Ltd. Shanghai
Wieland Metals Shanghai Ltd. Shanghai
Yixing DO-Ceram Engineered Ceramics Co. Shanghai
* ZFSJ Shanghai
Zimmer AG / Shanghai Lianji Synthetic Fibre Co. Shanghai
* Zhangjianggang Yangtse Spinning Co. Ltd Shanghai
* Zhenjiang - Moeller Electical Switcher Shanghai
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany
Responding Joint Venture
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